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Abstract: Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared
and evaluated. While three of them endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims
that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. Section 1 of this target article
introduces the four accounts. Section 2 develops the “mindreading is prior” model in more detail, showing how it predicts introspection
for perceptual and quasi-perceptual (e.g., imagistic) mental events while claiming that metacognitive access to our own attitudes always
results from swift unconscious self-interpretation. This section also considers the model’s relationship to the expression of attitudes in
speech. Section 3 argues that the commonsense belief in the existence of introspection should be given no weight. Section 4 argues
briefly that data from childhood development are of no help in resolving this debate. Section 5 considers the evolutionary claims to
which the different accounts are committed, and argues that the three introspective views make predictions that are not borne out
by the data. Section 6 examines the extensive evidence that people often confabulate when self-attributing attitudes. Section 7
considers “two systems” accounts of human thinking and reasoning, arguing that although there are introspectable events within
System 2, there are no introspectable attitudes. Section 8 examines alleged evidence of “unsymbolized thinking”. Section 9
considers the claim that schizophrenia exhibits a dissociation between mindreading and metacognition. Finally, section 10 evaluates
the claim that autism presents a dissociation in the opposite direction, of metacognition without mindreading.
Keywords: Autism; confabulation; conscious thought; introspection; metacognition; mindreading; schizophrenia; self-interpretation;
self-monitoring; self-knowledge
1. Introduction
Human beings are inveterate mindreaders. We routinely
(and for the most part unconsciously) represent the
mental states to the people around us (thus employing
metarepresentations – representations of representational
states). We attribute to them perceptions, feelings, goals,
intentions, knowledge, and beliefs, and we form our
expectations accordingly. While it isn’t the case that all
forms of social interaction require mindreading (many,
for example, follow well-rehearsed “scripts” such as the
procedures to be adopted when boarding a bus or entering
a restaurant), it is quite certain that without it, human
social life would be very different indeed. But human
mental life, too, is richly metarepresentational, containing
frequent attributions of mental states to ourselves. This
sort of first-person metarepresentation is generally
referred to as “metacognition.” The present target article
is about the cognitive basis (or bases) of our dual capacities
for mindreading and for metacognition, and the relation-
ships between them. For reasons that emerge in section
2, however, our main focus will be on propositional atti-
tude mindreading and metacognition (involving attribu-
tions of beliefs, judgments, intentions, decisions, and the
like) rather than on our capacities for attributing mental
states more generally.
At least four different accounts of the relationships that
obtain between mindreading and metacognition can be
distinguished. Three of them maintain that our access to
our own minds is quite different in kind from our access
to the minds of other people (because they involve a
form of introspection), whereas the fourth (which will be
defended here) denies this. The present section provides
a brief explanation of each, before making some further
introductory comments.
1.1. Model 1: Two mechanisms
One possibility is that mindreading and metacognition are
two independent capacities, realized in distinct cognitive
mechanisms. Nichols and Stich (2003) have elaborated
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and defended this view. Their model of the mindreading
system is an eclectic one, involving both simulation-like
aspects and information-rich components (both theory-
like and modular). There are postulated mechanisms for
detecting the perceptual states of other people, for detect-
ing the desires of other people, and for detecting the
beliefs of other people where they differ from our own.
A “Possible Worlds Box,” or hypothetical reasoning
system, is used to construct a representation of the
world as seen by the other person (containing as supposi-
tions the beliefs and goals attributed to the other), and
then the subject’s own inferential and planning mechan-
isms are used to figure out what else the target might
believe, or to work out what the target might do.
(Crucially, and in distinction from most other forms of
simulation theory, this stage isn’t supposed to involve
introspection of one’s own states.) While most of the
basic components are held to be innate, there is said to
be much work left for learning to do in the course of child-
hood development.
When Nichols and Stich (2003) then turn to provide an
account of self-awareness, they defend the view that there
are two (or more) distinct self-monitoring mechanisms.
There is at least one such mechanism for monitoring and
providing self-knowledge of our own experiential states,
and one (at least) for monitoring and providing self-knowl-
edge of our own propositional attitudes. These mechanisms
are held to be distinct from one another, and also from the
mindreading system that deals with the mental states of
other people. They are also held to be innate and to
emerge under maturational constraints early in infancy.
An account of this sort predicts a double dissociation
between mindreading and metacognitive capacities.
Since these are held to be realized in two (or more)
independent mechanisms, there should exist cases where
each is damaged or interfered with in the absence of
damage or interference occurring to the other (Sternberg
2001). So there should be cases of people who can
attribute mental states to others successfully but who
have difficulty in attributing mental states to themselves,
as well as instances of people who maintain reliable
access to their own mental states while losing their
capacity to attribute such states to other people. Nichols
and Stich (2003) argue that people with passivity-
symptom schizophrenia fit the first profile, whereas
people with autism fit the second, thus confirming their
account. These arguments are discussed and evaluated
further on.
1.2. Model 2: One mechanism, two modes of access
A second account maintains that there is just a single
metarepresentational faculty, but one that has two distinct
kinds of access to the mental states with which it deals,
using distinct informational channels. This single faculty
has both a perception-based mode, used when interpret-
ing other people, and an introspective mode, used when
accessing and representing one’s own mental states.
Although it is unclear whether such a view has ever been
defended explicitly in print, it is implicit in Carruthers
(1996a), and it is often suggested in conversation,
especially among those who endorse a “modular”
account of the mindreading faculty. Moreover, both
Frith and Happe´ (1999) and Happe´ (2003) are quite
naturally interpreted in this way (although they might
also be read as endorsing model 4).
This account has one significant advantage over the “two
independent mechanisms” proposal just considered:
It provides a smooth and natural explanation of the fact
that self-knowledge and other-knowledge utilize the
same conceptual resources. This will be because the very
same concepts and/or the very same body of “core knowl-
edge” of mental states are housed in one and the same
metarepresentational faculty, albeit a faculty that has
input connections deriving not only from the mental
states of other people (indirectly, via perception) but
also from oneself (more directly, via introspection).
This sort of single-mechanism account makes slightly
different predictions regarding the expected dissociations.
Like model 1, it entails that there should be cases in which
self-knowledge is compromised (because the introspective
inputs to the metarepresentational faculty have been dis-
rupted), whereas other-knowledge is intact (because the
faculty itself remains undamaged and still has access to
perceptual input). And it predicts that there should be
cases where both self-knowledge and other-knowledge
are compromised, by virtue of damage to the metarepre-
sentational faculty itself. (Frith and Happe´ [1999] can
quite naturally be interpreted as arguing that people
with autism fit this profile.) But there should be no cases
where other-knowledge is damaged while self-knowledge
is left intact, except by virtue of massive multi-modal per-
ceptual failure.1 These predictions, too, are examined in
due course.
1.3. Model 3: Metacognition is prior
A third view maintains that metacognition is prior to mind-
reading, in such a way that the attribution of mental states
to others depends upon our introspective access to our
own mental states, together with processes of inference
and simulation of various sorts. Goldman (1993; 2006),
among others, have proposed and defended accounts
of this kind. They also lie behind much of the excitement
surrounding the discovery of so-called mirror neurons
(Gallese & Goldman 1998; Gallese et al. 1996; Rizzolatti
et al. 1996). For it is by virtue of awareness of our own
action-tendencies, caused by observing the actions of
others, that we are supposed to gain our initial social
understanding.
Goldman’s account of our introspective abilities has
evolved over the years. In his 1993 target article, he
thought that our access to our own propositional attitudes
was mediated via awareness of the phenomenal feelings
that are distinctive of them. This view came in for heavy
criticism, however (Carruthers 1996c; Nichols & Stich
2003), and he now maintains that introspection uses an
innate code in the language of thought, whose basic
elements are caused by the various mental state types,
responding to features of their neural realization
(Goldman 2006). But the account of mindreading
remains essentially the same: One adopts, in imagination,
the perspective of a target subject, reasons on one’s
own behalf within the scope of that imagination (hence
simulating the reasoning processes of the other), and
then introspects the resulting mental state of belief
or decision, before attributing such a state to the agent
in question.
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Model 3 makes predictions similar to those of model 2,
but with an opposite valence. Both accounts agree that
there should be cases in which both mindreading and
metacognition are damaged. (In the case of Goldman’s
model, this will occur whenever the introspective capacity
is disrupted, since mindreading is held to be grounded in
introspective access to one’s own mind.) But instead of
predicting that there should be cases where metacognition
is poor while mindreading is normal, as did model 2, the
present account predicts the opposite: that there should
be cases where metacognition is normal while mindread-
ing is damaged. This would happen whenever the simulat-
ive abilities utilized in mindreading are disrupted.
Following Nichols and Stich (2003), Goldman (2006)
argues that people with autism fit this profile.
1.4. Model 4: Mindreading is prior
A fourth view, in contrast, claims the reverse of the third:
Instead of mindreading being grounded in metacognition,
it maintains that metacognition is merely the result of
us turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves.
A variety of different versions of such an account have
been proposed (Carruthers 2006; Gazzaniga 1995; 2000;
Gopnik 1993; Wegner 2002; Wilson 2002; some differ-
ences among these authors will emerge as we proceed).2
The purpose of the present target article is to explain, elab-
orate, and defend the most plausible variant of this final
sort of view. Section 2 will embark on that task.
This fourth account entails that there should be no dis-
sociations between mindreading and metacognition. This
is because there is just a single faculty involved in both
forms of activity, using essentially the same inputs,
which are all perceptual or quasi-perceptual in character
(including visual imagery and “inner speech”; see sect. 2).
However, the account also predicts that it should be
possible to induce subjects to confabulate attributions of
mental states to themselves by manipulating perceptual
and behavioral cues in such a way as to provide misleading
input to the self-interpretation process (just as subjects can
be misled in their interpretation of others). Likewise, the
account predicts that there should be no such thing as
awareness of one’s own propositional attitudes indepen-
dently of any perceptually accessible cues that could
provide a basis for self-interpretation. The accuracy of
these predictions will be discussed and evaluated in due
course. Note that the “mindreading is prior” account is
the only one of the four to make such predictions.
Notice that each of the first three accounts just
described endorses the existence of some variety or
other of introspection, understood broadly to encompass
any reliable method for forming beliefs about one’s own
mental states that is not self-interpretative and that
differs in kind from the ways in which we form beliefs
about the mental states of other people. (It should be
emphasized that the term “introspection” is used in this
broad, negatively defined, sense throughout this target
article. Many different specific views are thereby
included.) Notice that to say that an introspective
process is not self-interpretative doesn’t mean that it
isn’t inferential. On the contrary, those who take seriously
the analogy between introspection and external percep-
tion, and who think that the former is realized in a
self-monitoring mechanism of some sort, are apt to think
that it achieves its output by effecting computations on
the data that it receives as input (just as does vision, for
example). But these inferences will presumably rely on
general principles, such as (in the case of vision) that
light shines from above, or that moving objects are
locally rigid. For present purposes, an interpretative
process, in contrast, is one that accesses information
about the subject’s current circumstances, or the subject’s
current or recent behavior, as well as any other infor-
mation about the subject’s current or recent mental life.
For this is the sort of information that we must rely on
when attributing mental states to other people.
In contrast with the first three accounts, proponents of
view 4, who maintain that metacognition results from us
turning our mindreading abilities upon ourselves, must
deny the existence of introspection (at least for a signifi-
cant class of mental states; see sect. 2). So also at stake
in this target article is the commonsense view that we
have introspective access to our own minds (or at least
to certain aspects of them).
2. Elaborating the “mindreading is prior” model
As we noted earlier, a number of different versions of the
“mindreading is prior” view have been proposed. These
come in different strengths. At one extreme is Gopnik
(1993). In her target article on this topic, she urged that
the attribution of all mental states to oneself (with the
exception, perhaps, of what she described as some sort
of “Cartesian buzz”) is equally theory-based, and equally
interpretational. But this strong view has come in for
heavy criticism. For as Nichols and Stich (2003) and
Goldman (2006) both point out, I seem to be able to
know what I am currently thinking and planning even
though I am sitting quiet and motionless (in which case
there will be no behavior available for the mindreading
system to interpret). How is this possible, the critics ask,
unless we have access to our own mental states that isn’t
interpretative, but is rather introspective?
At the other extreme lie Wegner (2002) and Wilson
(2002), who are often interpreted as proponents of a
“mindreading is prior” account. Each makes a powerful
case that we often attribute propositional attitudes to our-
selves via self-interpretation (and often false and confabu-
lated interpretation, at that). But both seem to allow that
we also have access to some of our attitudes that is intro-
spective in character. For each allows that we undergo
conscious as well as unconscious thoughts, and that the
former can provide part of the evidence base for self-
attributing the latter. I argue in section 7 that they have
been misled, however, and that they have run together
the sensory accompaniments of attitudes – such as inner
speech and visual imagery (to which we do have introspec-
tive access, I allow) – with the attitudes themselves.
In contrast with the preceding accounts, the position to
be defended in the present target article is as follows.
There is just a single metarepresentational faculty, which
probably evolved in the first instance for purposes of
mindreading (or so I shall argue in sect. 5). In order
to do its work, it needs to have access to perceptions of
the environment. For if it is to interpret the actions of
others, it plainly requires access to perceptual represen-
tations of those actions.3 Indeed, I suggest that, like
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most other conceptual systems, the mindreading system
can receive as input any sensory or quasi-sensory (e.g.,
imagistic or somatosensory) state that gets “globally broad-
cast” to all judgment-forming, memory-forming, desire-
forming, and decision-making systems. (For evidence
supporting a global broadcasting cognitive architecture,
see Baars 1988; 1997; 2002; 2003; Baars et al. 2003;
Dehaene & Naccache 2001; Dehaene et al. 2001; 2003;
Kreiman et al. 2003.)
By virtue of receiving globally broadcast perceptual
states as input, the mindreading system should be
capable of self-attributing those percepts in an “encapsu-
lated” way, without requiring any other input. Receiving
as input a visual representation of a man bending over,
for example, it should be capable of forming the judgment,
“I am seeing a man bending over.” (At least, this should
be possible provided the visual state in question has
been partially conceptualized by other mental faculties,
coming to the mindreading system with the concepts man
and bending over already attached. I return to discuss the
significance of this point shortly.) This is the way in which
introspection of perceptual, imagistic, and somatosensory
mental events is achieved, I suggest. Given that the mind-
reading faculty possesses the concepts sight, hearing, and
so forth (together with a concept of self), it should be able
to activate and deploy those concepts in the presence of
the appropriate sort of perceptual input on a recognitional
or quasi-recognitional basis (Carruthers 2000). Because no
appeals to the subject’s own behavior or circumstances
need to be made in the course of making these judgments,
the upshot will qualify as a form of introspection, in the
broad sense being used here.
Let me stress, however, that what is being offered here is
an account of introspection for perceptual states, not an
account of experiential, or “phenomenal,” consciousness.
(And although I sometimes use the language of “conscious-
ness” in this target article, this should always be understood
to mean access consciousness rather than phenomenal con-
sciousness; see Block [1995] for the distinction.) Although
global broadcasting is often put forward as a theory of
phenomenal consciousness (Baars 1988; 1997), that isn’t
how it is being used in the present context. Rather, it
forms part of an account of how we come to have knowl-
edge of our own perceptual and quasi-perceptual states.
Whether global broadcasting provides a sufficient expla-
nation of the “feely” qualities of phenomenal conscious-
ness is another matter entirely. And although I myself
have defended a higher-order account of phenomenal con-
sciousness, according to which it is the availability of glob-
ally broadcast states to the mindreading faculty that
is responsible for their phenomenally conscious status
(Carruthers 2000), I don’t mean to rely on that here,
either. Indeed, I intend the discussion in this target
article to be neutral among proposed explanations of
phenomenal consciousness.
Although the mindreading system has access to percep-
tual states, the proposal is that it lacks any access to the
outputs of the belief-forming and decision-making mech-
anisms that feed off those states. Hence, self-attributions
of propositional attitude events like judging and deciding
are always the result of a swift (and unconscious) process
of self-interpretation. However, it isn’t just the subject’s
overt behavior and physical circumstances that provide
the basis for the interpretation. Data about perceptions,
visual and auditory imagery (including sentences
rehearsed in “inner speech”), patterns of attention, and
emotional feelings can all be grist for the self-interpret-
ative mill.
Such an account can plainly avoid the difficulties that
beset Gopnik (1993). For consider someone sitting
quietly in his living room, who has just become aware of
deciding to walk to his study to get a particular book
from the shelf (Goldman 2006, p. 230). His mindreading
system has access to a variety of forms of evidence in
addition to overt behavior (which in this case is lacking).
The agent might, for example, have verbalized or partially
verbalized his intention, in “inner speech.” And then, since
inner speech utilizes the same perceptual systems that are
involved in the hearing of speech (Paulescu et al. 1993;
Shergill et al. 2002), this will be available as input to the
mindreading system. Or he might have formed a visual
or proprioceptive image of himself selecting that particular
book, which will be similarly available (Kosslyn 1994). Or
the context provided by his prior verbalized thoughts and
visual images, together with a shift in his attention towards
the door, might make it natural to interpret himself as
having decided to walk to his study to collect that particu-
lar book.
Notice that allowing the mindreading system to have
access to visual imagery, proprioceptive data, and
emotional feelings is pretty much mandatory once we
buy into a global broadcasting architecture, even though
such events will presumably play little or no role in
third-person mental-state attribution. For perceptual and
quasi-perceptual states of all kinds are capable of being
globally broadcast when attended to, and will thus
become available to any conceptual system that looks to
such broadcasts for its input. But the upshot is to blur
the boundary somewhat between the “mindreading is
prior” account and model 2 (“one mechanism, two
modes of access”). For we now have to concede that the
mindreading system does have available to it information
when attributing mental states to the self that it never
has access to when attributing mental states to others.
For unless subjects choose to tell me, I never have
access to what they are imagining or feeling; and certainly
I never have the sort of direct access that my mindreading
system has to my own visual images and bodily feelings.
Despite this “blurring of boundaries,” there remains
good reason to insist on the distinctness of our account
from model 2. This is because the latter is committed to
the claim that the metarepresentational faculty has intro-
spective, non-interpretative access to mental states of all
types, including propositional attitudes as well as sensory
experiences. The account being proposed here, in contrast,
maintains that our access to our own propositional attitudes
is always interpretative, while conceding that the evidence
base for self-interpretation is somewhat wider than we nor-
mally have available when interpreting other people.
One final point needs to be emphasized: As the example
of seeing a man bending over should make clear, the thesis
that judgments aren’t introspectable requires important
qualification. In particular, it should be restricted to judg-
ments that aren’t perceptual judgments. According to
Kosslyn (1994) and others, the initial outputs of the
visual system interact with a variety of conceptual
systems that deploy and manipulate perceptual templates,
attempting to achieve a “best match” with the incoming
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data. When this is accomplished, the result is globally
broadcast as part of the perceptual state itself. Hence,
we see an object as a man or as bending over. Because
this event is apt to give rise immediately to a stored
belief, it qualifies as a (perceptual) judgment. But
because it will also be received as input by the mindread-
ing system (by virtue of being globally broadcast), it will
also be introspectable. In the discussion that follows,
therefore, whenever I speak of “judgments,” I should be
understood to mean “non-perceptual judgments,” such as
the judgment that 17 is a prime number or that polar
bears are endangered.4
2.1. Mindreading and speech
If we lack introspective access to our own propositional
attitudes, then how is it that we can report on those atti-
tudes, swiftly and unhesitatingly, in the absence of any-
thing that could plausibly be seen as input to a process
of self-interpretation? If someone asks me for the date
on which I think the Battle of Hastings took place, for
example, I can reply immediately, “1066, I believe.” But
on what basis could I interpret myself as possessing such
a belief? I can recall no Battle-of-Hastings-related beha-
vior; and there need have been nothing relevant of an
imagistic sort passing through my mind at the time, either.
There is surelyno reason to think, however, that the verbal
expression of a belief requires prior metacognitive access to
it. Rather, one’s executive systems will conduct a search of
memory, retrieving an appropriate first-order content
which can then, in collaboration with the language faculty,
be formulated into speech. And then attaching the phrase,
“I think that . . .” or “I believe that . . .” to the first-order sen-
tence in question is a trivialmatter (Evans 1982), and is often
a mere manner of speech or a matter of politeness (so as not
to appear too confident or too definite). It certainly needn’t
require that subjects should first formulate a metacognitive
judgment to the effect that they believe the content in ques-
tion. Hence, it may be that the first metacognitive access
subjects have to the fact that they have a particular belief
is via its verbal expression (whether overtly or in inner
speech). And such speech, like all speech, will need to be
interpreted to extract its significance.
General considerations of cognitive engineering support
such a view. For we already know that executive systems
would need to have access to stored information, and
that they would have been honed by evolution to
conduct efficient searches for the information required
to solve each type of practical task in hand. Moreover,
this capacity would surely have been of ancient evolution-
ary provenance, long pre-dating the emergence of
language and mindreading. Nor does it qualify as a form
of introspection, since it isn’t metarepresentational in
character. When the mindreading system was added in
the course of human evolution, therefore, there would
have been no need for it to be built with its own capacities
to conduct searches of all memory; and on the contrary,
since all data-mining is computationally expensive, this
would have come at significant additional cost. And
while there is every reason to think that capacities for
language and for mindreading would have coevolved
(Gomez 1998; Origgi & Sperber 2000), there isn’t any
reason to think that the language faculty can only
produce an output when provided with a metacognitive
content as input, either issued by the mindreading
faculty or by a separate faculty of introspection.
Many cognitive scientists think that the speech-pro-
duction process begins with a thought-to-be-expressed
(Levelt 1989). I myself believe that this is an exaggeration
(Carruthers 2006). Speech is an action, and like other
actions can be undertaken for a variety of purposes (the
expression of belief being only one of them). Hence, any
utterance in the indicative mood needs to be interpreted
to determine whether it is made ironically, or in jest, or
as a mere supposition; or whether it is, indeed, expressive
of belief. However, I know of no theorist who thinks that
speech needs to begin from a metacognitive represen-
tation of the thought to be expressed. So even utterances
that do express a corresponding belief don’t qualify as a
form of introspection, since no metarepresentational
thought occurs until one’s own words are heard and
interpreted.
Similar points hold in respect to the verbal expression of
desire. No doubt we often give voice to our desires, having
first envisaged the thing or circumstance in question and
monitored and interpreted our affective responses, in the
manner proposed by Damasio (1994; 2003). (This is, of
course, fully consistent with a “mindreading is prior”
account.) But often our current desires can recruit appro-
priate speech actions in their own service, with use of the
terminology of “want” or “desire” being just one possible
means among many. Thus, the two-year-old child who
says, “I want juice,” is unlikely to have first formulated a
metacognitive thought. Rather, desiring juice, the child is
seeking ways to achieve that goal. And for these purposes
a number of different speech actions might be equally
effective, including, “Give me juice,” “Juice, please,” and
so on. If she chooses to say, “I want juice,” then she does
make an assertion with a metacognitive content, and
hence (if she understands the concept of wanting) she
will subsequently come to entertain a metacognitive
thought. But there is no reason to think that her utterance
must begin with such a thought, any more than does the
utterance of someone who answers the question, “Is it
the case that P?” by saying, “Yes, I believe that P.”
It might be objected that even if we sometimes learn of
our own beliefs and desires by first becoming aware of
their formulation into speech (whether inner or outer),
this still gives us reliable, non-interpretative access to
them. Hence this can still count as a form of introspection.
But this appearance of immediacy is illusory. All speech –
whether the speech of oneself or someone else – needs to
be interpreted before it can be understood. Unless we beg
the point at issue and assume that subjects have direct
introspective access to their own articulatory intentions,
the language-comprehension system will need to get to
work on the utterance in the normal way, figuring out its
meaning in light of the utterance’s linguistic properties
(lexical meanings, syntax, etc.) together with knowledge
of context. And even if, as is likely, the result of this
process (the content of the utterance) is attached to the
existing representation of the sound of the utterance and
globally broadcast to all conceptual systems, including
the mindreading faculty, the latter will still only have inter-
pretative access to the underlying beliefs or goals that
initiated the utterance.
But how is it, then, that our own utterances are not
ambiguous to us, in the way that the utterances of other
Carruthers: How we know our own minds
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people often are? If I find myself thinking, “I shall walk to
the bank,” then I don’t need to wonder which sort of bank
is in question (a river bank, or a place where one gets
money). And this fact might be taken to indicate that
I must have introspective access to my intentions.
However, there will generally be cues available to disam-
biguate our own utterances, which wouldn’t be available
to help interpret the similar utterances of another. For
example, just prior to the utterance I might have formed
a visual image of my local bank, or I might have activated
a memory image of an empty wallet. But even when no
such cues are available, there remains a further factor
that will serve to disambiguate my own utterances, but
which won’t always help with the utterances of others.
This is the relative accessibility of the concepts involved,
which is a pervasive feature of speech comprehension gen-
erally (Sperber & Wilson 1995). Because the goals that
initiated the utterance, “I shall walk to the bank,” would
almost certainly have included an activation of one or
other specific concept bank, this will ensure the increased
accessibility of that concept to the comprehension system
when the utterance is processed and interpreted.
I conclude, therefore, that while subjects can often
express their beliefs in speech, and can hence acquire
more-or-less reliable information about what they
believe, this gives us no reason to think that introspection
for propositional attitudes exists.
3. The introspective intuition
There is no doubt that the denial of introspection for prop-
ositional attitudes, entailed by the “mindreading is prior”
view, is hugely counterintuitive to most people. Almost
every philosopher who has ever written on the subject,
for example – from Descartes (1637), Locke (1690), and
Kant (1781), through to Searle (1992), Shoemaker
(1996), and Goldman (2006) – has believed that many
(at least) of our own judgments and decisions are immedi-
ately available to us, known in a way that is quite different
from our knowledge of the judgments and decisions of
other people. We are (pre-theoretically) strongly inclined
to think that we don’t need to interpret ourselves in
order to know what we are judging or deciding (or that
we don’t need to do so all of the time, at least; many of
us now have enough knowledge of cognitive science to
concede that such events can also occur unconsciously).
Rather, such events are often (somehow) directly available
to consciousness. Since it is generally thought to be a good
thing to preserve intuitions ceteris paribus, this might be
taken to create a presumption in favor of one of the
three alternative accounts that we considered at the
outset. The strategy of this section is to draw the teeth
from this argument by showing, first, that the intuition
underlying it is unwarranted, and then by using reverse
engineering to explain why (from the perspective of a
“mindreading is prior” account) it nevertheless makes
good sense that such a folk-intuition should exist.
3.1. The subjective experience of introspective access
isn’t evidence of introspection
The thesis expressed in this subsection’s title is clearly demon-
strated by research with commissurotomy (“split-brain”)
subjects, conducted over many years by Gazzaniga
(1995; 2000) and colleagues. In one famous case (repre-
sentative of many others of similar import), Gazzaniga
(1995) describes how different stimuli were presented to
the two half-brains of a split-brain patient simultaneously.
The patient fixated his eyes on a point straight ahead, while
two cards were flashed up, one positioned to the left of
fixation (which would be available only to the right
brain) and one to the right of fixation (which would be
available only to the left brain). When the instruction,
“Walk!” was flashed to the right brain, the subject got up
and began to walk out of the testing van. (The right
brain of this subject was capable of some limited under-
standing of language, but had no production abilities.)
When asked why, he (the left brain, which controlled
speech-production as well as housing a mindreading
system) replied, “I’m going to get a Coke from the
house.” This attribution of a current intention to himself
is plainly confabulated, but delivered with all of the confi-
dence and seeming introspective obviousness as normal.
It is important to note that although commissurotomy
patients can often have a good understanding of their
surgery and its effects, they never say things like, “I’m
probably choosing this because I have a split brain and
the information went to the right, non-verbal, hemi-
sphere” (Gazzaniga 1995). On the contrary, they make
their confabulated reports smoothly and unhesitatingly,
and their (i.e., their left brain’s) sense of self seems quite
unchanged following the operation. Even reminders of
their surgery during testing have no effect. On a number
of occasions testing was paused and the experimenter
said something like, “Joe, as you know, you have had this
operation that sometimes will make it difficult for you to
say what we show you over here to the left of fixation.
You may find that your left hand points to things for that
reason, OK?” Joe assents, but then on the very next
series he is back to showing the interpreter effect once
again (Gazzaniga, personal communication). If patients
were aware of interpreting rather than introspecting,
then one would expect that a reminder of the effects of
commissurotomy would enrich the hypothesis pool, and
would sometimes lead them to attribute some of their
own behavior to that. But it doesn’t do so.
Of course it doesn’t follow from the extensive commis-
surotomy data that normal human subjects never have pri-
vileged, non-interpretative, access to their own judgments
and decisions, as Goldman (2006) points out. (And for this
reason the defense of a “mindreading is prior” account that
is mounted by Gazzaniga [1998] strikes many people as
massively under-supported. One way of viewing the
present target article is that it is an attempt to rectify
that deficiency.) Gazzaniga’s data were collected from
patients who had undergone serious brain damage (a
severed corpus collosum). Hence, it may be that in
normal brains the mindreading system does have immedi-
ate access to the agent’s judgments and intentions. The
split-brain data force us to recognize that sometimes
people’s access to their own judgments and intentions
can be interpretative (much like their access to the judg-
ments and intentions of other people), requiring us at
least to accept what Goldman (2006) calls a “dual
method” theory of our access to our own thoughts. But
one could believe (as Goldman does) that introspection
is the normal, default, method for acquiring knowledge
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of our own propositional attitudes, and that we only revert
to self-interpretation as a back-up, when introspection
isn’t available.
The split-brain data show decisively that we don’t have
any introspective, subjectively accessible, warrant for
believing that we ever have introspective access to our
own judgments and decisions, however. This is because
patients report plainly confabulated explanations with all
of the same sense of obviousness and immediacy as
normal people. And if normal people were to rely upon
subjectively accessible cues to identify cases of introspec-
tion, then commissurotomy patients should be able to use
the absence of such cues to alert them to the interpretative
status of their reports. The best explanation is therefore
that subjects themselves can’t tell when they are intro-
specting and when they are interpreting or confabulating.
So for all we know, it may be that our access to our own
judgments and decisions is always interpretative, and
that we never have introspective access to them. Now phi-
losophers will note, of course, that given so-called reliabi-
list conceptions of knowledge and justification, we might
count as knowing, and as justified in believing in, the exist-
ence of introspection, despite our inability to discriminate
cases of introspection from cases of confabulation. This
will be so provided that introspection really does exist
and is common, and provided that our belief in it is reliably
caused by the fact that we do often introspect, and is
caused in the right sort of way. My point here, however,
is that our inability to discriminate shows that we have
no subjectively accessible reason to believe in the existence
of introspection. So anyone who is wondering whether or
not introspection is real should realize that they have no
reason they can offer for thinking that it is, in advance of
examining the evidence.
3.2. The mindreading system’s model of its own access
to the mind
The intuition that there is introspection for propositional
attitudes is therefore unwarranted. But in addition, we
can explain why we should have such an intuition in the
first place, even if (as I am suggesting) it turns out to be
false. This is because the mindreading system’s operations
will be greatly simplified, but without any significant loss of
reliability (and perhaps with some gain), if its model of its
own access to the mind is an introspective (non-interpret-
ative) one. We should then predict that just such a model
would be arrived at, whether by natural selection or
through individual learning. This argument is laid out in
some detail in Carruthers (2008a). In consequence, this
section is brief.5
In order to be effective, the mindreading system needs
to contain some sort of model of the way that minds, in
general, work. Such a model should include an account
of the access that agents have to their own mental states.
And here there are essentially two choices. The mindread-
ing system can either represent agents as interpreters of
themselves, or it can picture them as having direct intro-
spective access to their own mental states. The former
would complicate the mindreading system’s computations,
and would mandate consideration of a wider range of evi-
dence, taking into account the possibility of misinterpreta-
tion. But there is unlikely to be any compensating gain in
reliability. One reason for this is that people are, probably,
excellent interpreters of themselves. (We know that they
are remarkably good interpreters of others.) Hence, in
normal circumstances instances of confabulation will
be rare, and thus any errors introduced by a belief in
introspection will be few. A second reason is that self-
attributions of mental states, even if initially confabulated,
are likely to be self-fulfilling. This is because agents will
feel obliged to act in ways that are consistent with the
mental states that they have attributed to themselves.
And a third reason is that any expansion in the compu-
tational complexity of a system will introduce additional
sources of error (as well as imposing a cost in terms of
speed of processing, of course), as will any increase in
the types of evidence that need to be sought. It is now a
familiar point in cognitive science, not only that simple
(but invalid) heuristics can prove remarkably reliable in
practice, but that they can often out-compete fancier com-
putational processes once the costs imposed by compu-
tational errors, as well as missing or misleading
information, are factored in (Gigerenzer et al. 1999).6 What
we should predict, therefore, is that the mindreading
system should model the mind as having introspective
access to itself. And then that very same model will
render agents blind to the fact (if it is a fact) that their
mode of access to their own mental states is actually an
interpretative one.
I conclude that the playing field is now leveled between
the competing theories, in the sense that there is no initial
presumption against model 4. And given a level playing
field, we should prefer the simplest theory ceteris
paribus. This means that the “mindreading is prior”
account should now be our default option, because it
postulates just a single mechanism with a single mode of
access to its domain, whereas the other accounts postulate
greater complexity.
4. The data from development
Gopnik (1993) bases much of her case for a “mindreading
is prior” account on developmental evidence, claiming that
there is a parallelism between children’s performance in
mindreading tasks and matched metacognitive tasks (see
also, Gopnik & Meltzoff 1994). This claim has held up
well over the years. In an extensive meta-analysis of hun-
dreds of experiments, Wellman et al. (2001) are able to
find no evidence of any self/other asymmetry in develop-
ment. Taken at face value, these data count strongly
against both a “two independent mechanisms” account
and a “metacognition is prior” view, each of which predicts
that metacognitive competence should emerge in develop-
ment in advance of mindreading.
What most parties in these debates have overlooked,
however, is the existence of the remaining alternative to
a “mindreading is prior” account, namely the “one mech-
anism, two modes of access” view. For this, too, predicts
that development in the domains of both self- and other-
understanding should proceed in parallel. Like the “mind-
reading is prior” view, this account claims that there is just
a single mechanism or body of core knowledge underlying
both mindreading and metacognitive competence. Hence,
one would expect children’s capacities in both domains
to emerge at about the same time. What this means is
that developmental evidence is inherently incapable of
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discriminating between views that endorse, and those that
deny, the existence of introspective access to propositional
attitudes.
There is another, equally important, reason why devel-
opmental evidence is of no use to us in this inquiry,
however. This is that all parties in the debate over the
existence of introspection for attitudes have shared a
traditional and widely accepted understanding of the
developmental timetable for mindreading competence
(Goldman 2006; Gopnik 1993; Nichols & Stich 2003).
This was thought to proceed through well-defined stages
over the first four or five years of life, with competence
in false-belief reasoning not emerging until after the age
of four (Wellman 1990). Yet there have always been
those who have maintained that an underlying compe-
tence with false-belief might be present much earlier,
but masked by young children’s difficulties in executive
functioning (Fodor 1992; Leslie & Polizzi 1998). Indeed,
Birch and Bloom (2004; 2007) refer to the latter as “the
curse of knowledge,” pointing out that adults, too, can
often have difficulty in allowing for the false beliefs of
another. And this general perspective has now received
dramatic confirmation through the use of nonverbal
looking-time and expectation measures. These show com-
petence with false-belief understanding and other alleg-
edly late-emerging aspects of mindreading capacity at
around 15 or 24 months, long before this had traditionally
been thought possible (Bosco et al. 2006; Onishi & Baillar-
geon 2005; Onishi et al. 2007; Song & Baillargeon, forth-
coming; Song et al., forthcoming; Southgate et al. 2007;
Surian et al. 2007). But no one has, as yet, been able to
develop nonverbal measures of metacognitive understand-
ing in infants for purposes of comparison.
Of course there is much here that needs to be explained.
In particular, if metarepresentational competence is
present in the second year of life, we want to know why
it takes two or more additional years for that competence
to manifest itself in verbally based tasks. But this isn’t a
question for us. Our focus is on adjudicating between
accounts that endorse the existence of introspection and
those that deny it. And for these purposes it is plain that
we need to seek evidence of other sorts.
5. The evolution of mindreading and
metacognition
The differing accounts outlined in section 1 lead to differ-
ent commitments concerning the likely course of human
evolution, and these in turn lead to different predictions
about what we should expect to find in contemporary
human cognition, and also in other species of animal.
The present section shows that the “mindreading is
prior” account comes out significantly ahead of its rivals
in the former respect, before arguing that the animal
data lend no support to either side.
All four of the accounts of the relationship between
mindreading and metacognition can, and probably
should, converge on essentially the same explanation of
the evolutionary origins of human mindreading capacities.
(Even those who think that mindreading capacities
emerge in the course of childhood development through
processes of learning that are akin to scientific theorizing
insist that such theorizing has to begin with a specific
innate basis; see Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997.) This will be
some or other variant of the “Machiavellian intelligence”
hypothesis (Byrne & Whiten 1988; 1997; Dunbar 2000),
which points to the immense fitness advantages that can
accrue to effective mindreaders among highly social crea-
tures such as ourselves. And all should predict that one
might expect to find simpler versions of mindreading
capacity among other animals (perhaps confined to recog-
nition of perceptual access and ignorance together with
intention), especially among mammals who live in
complex social groups. These predictions appear to be
borne out (Call & Tomasello 2008; Cheney & Seyfarth
2007; Hare 2007; Hare et al. 2000; 2001; Tomasello
et al. 2003a; 2003b).
Where the various accounts diverge is over the evol-
ution of metacognition. From the perspective of a “mind-
reading is prior” account, no separate story needs to be
told. Since metacognition, on this view, results from
turning one’s mindreading capacities upon oneself, its
emergence will be a by-product of the evolution of mind-
reading. (This isn’t to say that metacognition might not
have come under secondary selection thereafter, perhaps
by virtue of helping to build and maintain a positive self-
image, as Wilson [2002] suggests.) All three competitor
accounts, in contrast, have some explaining to do. This is
most obvious in connection with a “two independent
mechanisms” account of the sort championed by Nichols
and Stich (2003). For if mindreading and metacognition
are subserved by two (or more) cognitive mechanisms,
then plainly there should be a distinct evolutionary story
to be told about the emergence of each. But the same
also holds in respect of a “one mechanism, two modes of
access” account. Because neural connections are costly
to build and maintain (Aiello & Wheeler 1995), some dis-
tinct evolutionary pressure will be needed to explain why
the metarepresentational faculty (which might well have
evolved initially for purposes of mindreading) should
have acquired the input channels necessary to monitor
the subject’s own propositional attitudes.
The most natural way of explaining the structures postu-
lated by the “metacognition is prior” account (championed
by Goldman 2006) would likewise involve a distinct evol-
utionary pressure of some sort for the emergence of
metacognition. The latter would happen first, followed
subsequently by the integration of introspection with pro-
cesses of imagination and simulative reasoning, presum-
ably driven by the pressure to develop forms of
“Machiavellian intelligence.” Would it be possible to
argue, however, that metacognitive capacities evolved to
subserve mindreading from the start? It might be
suggested that each incremental increase in metacognitive
capacity was selected for because of its role in mindread-
ing. For this account to work, however, it would have to
be supposed that capacities to identify with others in
imagination, together with dispositions to think and
reason in simulation of the other within the scope of
such a pretence, were already in place in advance of the
appearance of both metacognition and mindreading. And
one then wonders what such capacities would have been
for. In the absence of any plausible suggestions, therefore,
I shall assume that the “metacognition is prior” account,
like the other two introspection-involving views, needs to
postulate some evolutionary pressure in addition to those
that issued in mindreading.
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Thus, all three of the competitor accounts need to tell
some story about the evolution of introspection. What I
argue in section 5.1 is that the most popular such story –
that metacognition evolved for purposes of self-monitoring
and executive control of our own cognitive processes –
makes predictions that are not borne out by the data. To
the extent that this is true, then each one of those accounts
is simultaneously disconfirmed. And this will therefore
provide us with a further reason to accept the “mindread-
ing is prior” account (in addition to the fact that it is the
simplest, and should in consequence be accepted by
default).
Although all three competitor accounts are committed
to the existence of a distinct evolutionary pressure to
explain the emergence of metacognition, only the “meta-
cognition is prior” model makes a specific prediction
about the order of emergence of the two capacities in
phylogeny. It predicts, in particular, that we should be able
to find metacognitive capacities in creatures that lack any
capacity for mindreading (presumably because they lack
the requisite imaginative abilities). Just this idea appears to
motivate the recent flurry of interest in the metacognitive
capacities of nonhuman animals (Terrace & Metcalfe
2005). This topic is examined in section 5.2.
5.1. The evolution of metacognition
What evolutionary pressures might have shaped the emer-
gence of a distinct metacognitive capacity? One natural
and very popular suggestion is that it was designed to
have a supervisory role with respect to regular, first-
order, cognitive processes – troubleshooting and inter-
vening in those processes in cases of difficulty, initiating
new strategies, checking that tasks are proceeding as
expected, and so on (Shallice 1988). What I argue,
however, is that although there is indeed a supervisory
role for metacognition, it is one that does not require an
introspective capacity distinct from the third-person mind-
reading system. I also argue that our metacognitive inter-
ventions are not capable of the sort of direct impact on
cognitive processing that would be predicted if metacogni-
tion had, indeed, evolved for the purpose. But we first
need to notice an important distinction.
Unfortunately, cognitive scientists use the term “meta-
cognition” in two quite distinct ways, often without
noticing the difference. (See Anderson & Perlis [2005a]
for what seems to be a clear example. For distinctions
related to the one drawn here, see Dennett 2000.) Gener-
ally the term is used, as it has been throughout this target
article, to mean cognition about one’s own cognition.
Metacognition, in this sense, is inherently higher-order,
involving metarepresentations of one’s own first-order
cognitive processes as such. But the word “meta” literally
just means “above.” And consequently many people
understand metacognition to be any process that goes on
above regular cognitive processes, performing a number
of kinds of executive-function roles, such as monitoring
the progress of a task and initiating new strategies when
progress is blocked. On this view, any cognitive architec-
ture that is organized into layers – containing not only a
set of automatic information-generating and decision-
making systems, but also a supervisory layer of some sort
that can intervene in or alter the processes taking place
in the first layer – will count as “metacognitive.” But it is
important to see that these supervisory processes needn’t
involve anything metacognitive in our first sense. For
example, monitoring the progress of a task may just
require a (first-order) representation of the goal-state,
together with some way of comparing the current output
of the system with the represented goal-state and
making adjustments accordingly.
Indeed, all of the supervisory processes thatAnderson and
Perlis (2005a) describe as requiring both “self-awareness”
and a “metacognitive loop” are actually just first-order
processes organized into layers in this sort of way. For
example, they describe a robot that is capable of noticing
that it is no longer making forward progress (because it
keeps bumping into a fence that it cannot see), and initiating
an alternative strategy (e.g., traveling in an alternative direc-
tion for a while). There is plainly nothing metacognitive (in
the sense of “metarepresentational”) required here. The
robot just needs to be on the lookout for failures to move
forwards, and it needs to have been programmed with
some alternative strategies to try when it doesn’t. Even a
mechanism that is capable of recognizing and responding
to contradictions need only be sensitive to the formal prop-
erties of the representations involved, without representing
them as representations. Thus, if representations of the form
“P” and “P” are detected within active memory, the system
might be programmed to place no further reliance on either
of these premises, just as Anderson and Perlis suggest.
A significant portion of what gets described within
cognitive science as “metacognition,” then, should be set
aside as irrelevant to the issues we are discussing. But of
course a very large body of genuinely metacognitive data
remains, especially in the domain of metamemory (e.g.,
Metcalfe & Shimamura 1994; Nelson 1992). But even
where cognitive processes are genuinely metacognitive in
the sense of being metarepresentational, deploying con-
cepts of mental state types, they often operate without
the capacity to intervene directly in the states and pro-
cesses represented. For example, most metamemory
capacities only require an ability to initiate or to intervene
in behavior. Thus, a child might select one memorization
task rather than another on the grounds that it contains
fewer items (thus implicating knowledge about memory,
but not intervening in the process of memory itself). Like-
wise, someone might mentally rehearse items in inner
speech as an aid to memorization, which is an indirect
behavioral influence on memory, not a direct intervention.
And in the same spirit, it should be noted that while the
intention to learn has an effect on study patterns, it has
no effect on learning and recall once study patterns are
controlled for (Anderson 1995). This is not what one
would predict if metamemory were some sort of introspec-
tive capacity that had evolved for purposes of executive
control, enabling subjects to intervene directly in the pro-
cesses of memorization or memory retrieval. (Guiding
behaviors that tend to issue in memorization or retrieval,
in contrast, can be done equally well by a mindreading
system.)
Koriat et al. (2006) review much of the extensive litera-
ture on metamemory, and experimentally contrast two
competing models. One is that metacognitive monitoring
serves the function of controlling and directing the under-
lying cognitive processes. (Plainly this would be consistent
with the evolutionary explanation of introspection
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sketched earlier.) The other is that metacognitive judg-
ments are evidence-based, cued by experiences that are
caused by the cognitive processes in question. (This
would be consistent with the self-interpretative position
being developed here.) Although they do find metacogni-
tive phenomena that fit the former profile, none of these
suggests any real role for introspection of attitudes.
Rather, they include such phenomena as allocating
greater study time to items that attract a larger reward.
In contrast, there is extensive evidence of cue-based meta-
cognitive judgments. Thus, feelings of knowing are often
based on the ease with which one can access fragments
of the target knowledge (Koriat 1993) or items related to
the target (Schwartz & Smith 1997). And judgments of
learning made during or after study are based on the
“fluency” with which items are processed during study
itself (Begg et al. 1989; Benjamin & Bjork 1996; Koriat
1997). Again, this isn’t at all what one would predict if
one thought that a capacity for introspection of attitudes
had evolved for purposes of metacognitive control. For
why, in that case, would one need to rely on indirect
cues of learning?
While the influence of metacognitive judgments on cog-
nitive processes is often indirect, it should be stressed that
such judgments are actually intrinsic to the sorts of pro-
cesses that would be characterized as belonging to
“System 2,” as we will see in section 7. Human beings
sometimes engage in forms of conscious thinking and
reasoning that are thoroughly imbued with metacognitive
beliefs and judgments. But what appears to make such
forms of thinking consciously accessible is that they are
conducted in inner speech and other kinds of imagery.
In which case the type of metacognitive access that we
have, here, will turn out to be fully consistent with a
“mindreading is prior” account.
The preliminary upshot of this discussion, then, is that
the predictions generated by the most common evolution-
ary explanation of an introspective capacity (namely, that
its purpose is executive monitoring and control) are not
borne out by the data. This provides us with good reason
to embrace the alternative “mindreading is prior”
account instead.
5.2. Metacognitive processes in nonhuman animals
The last few years have seen a flurry of experiments
purporting to demonstrate the presence of metacognitive
processes in nonhuman animals (Beran et al. 2006; Call
& Carpenter 2001; Hampton 2001; 2005; Hampton et al.
2004; Kornell et al. 2007; Shields et al. 1997; Smith
2005; Smith et al. 1995; 1997; 2003; Son & Kornell 2005;
Washburn et al. 2006). If these experiments were to
prove successful, and if the animals in question were to
lack any capacity for mindreading of attitudes (as most
researchers assume), then this would provide dramatic
support for the view that metacognition is prior to and
underpins mindreading. (By the same token, it would
provide powerful evidence against the “mindreading is
prior” account being defended here.) These studies are
reviewed and critiqued in detail in Carruthers (2008b),
where I demonstrate that all of the phenomena in question
are readily explicable in first-order terms. Here I shall
confine myself to outlining my treatment of just one of
the simpler alleged instances of animal metacognition.
Smith et al. (2003) argue that the adaptive behavioral
choices made by monkeys and dolphins in conditions of
uncertainty demonstrate that the animals are aware of
their own state of uncertainty and are choosing accord-
ingly. Thus, monkeys who have been trained to discrimi-
nate between dense and sparse visual patterns, and to
respond differentially as a result, will increasingly make
use of a third “don’t know” option (which advances them
to a new trial without the penalty of a delay) when the pat-
terns are made harder and harder to distinguish. But all
that is really needed to explain the animals’ behavior
here is an appeal to degrees of belief and desire. For an
animal that has a weak degree of belief that the pattern
is dense and an equally weak degree of belief that the
pattern is sparse, will have correspondingly weak and bal-
ancing desires to make the “dense” response as well as to
make the “sparse” response. In contrast, the animal will
have a high degree of belief that the “don’t know” response
will advance to a new trial without a timeout, and a timeout
is something that the animal wants to avoid. Hence, press-
ing the “don’t know” key will be the strongest-motivated
action in the circumstances. No metacognitive forms of
awareness of the animal’s own mental states are required.
Of course humans, when they have performed tasks of
this sort, will report that they were aware of a feeling of
uncertainty, and will say that they chose as they did
because they were uncertain. There is no problem here.
Although these reports are metacognitive, and reflect
metacognitive awareness, the processes reported on can
be first-order ones, just as they are for the monkeys. In
both species uncertainty will be accompanied by feelings
of anxiety, which will motivate various forms of infor-
mation-seeking behavior (such as moving one’s head
from side to side for a better view), as well as a search
for alternatives. But humans, with their highly developed
mindreading capacities, will interpret these feelings and
resulting behaviors for what they are – manifestations of
uncertainty. It is only if a human reports that she acted
as she did, not just because she was uncertain, but
because she was aware of being uncertain, that there will
be any conflict. Such reports are likely to be false, in my
view. For the most part the “executive function” behaviors
that we share with other animals are best explained
in terms of the first-order processes that we also share
(Carruthers 2008b). It is only when we consider forms of
behavior that are unique to humans that we need to
appeal to metacognitive processes.7 But these can all be
processes that I shall describe in section 7 as belonging
to “System 2”, which don’t require any faculty of introspec-
tion distinct from mindreading.
6. The confabulation data
There is extensive and long-standing evidence from cog-
nitive and social psychology that people will (falsely)
confabulate attributions of judgments and decisions to
themselves in a wide range of circumstances, while
being under the impression that they are introspecting
(Bem 1967; 1972; Eagly & Chaiken 1993; Festinger
1957; Nisbett & Wilson 1977; Wegner 2002; Wicklund &
Brehm 1976; Wilson 2002). These data are consistent
with a “dual method” account of metacognition
(Goldman 2006), according to which metacognition is
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sometimes self-interpretative and sometimes introspec-
tive. But given that we have been offered, as yet, no posi-
tive reasons to believe in the reality of introspection for
attitudes, the best explanation at this stage is that metacog-
nition always results from people turning their mindread-
ing abilities upon themselves.
Literally hundreds of different studies have been con-
ducted charting confabulation effects and the circum-
stances under which they occur; and a number of
different explanatory frameworks have been proposed
(“cognitive dissonance,” “self-perception,” and others).
I have space only to describe a few salient examples and
to discuss some of the ways in which an introspection
theorist might attempt to respond.
First, however, let me mention some types of confabu-
lation data that aren’t relevant for our purposes. One
emerges from studies that find people to be inaccurate
in reporting the causes of their judgments or behavior.
For example, people are notoriously bad at identifying
the factors that persuade them of the truth of a message
or the quality of a job interviewee. Such cases raise no
difficulty for a believer in introspection. The reason is
simple: no one thinks that causation can be introspected.
It is supposed to be the occurrence of our attitudes that
is accessible to introspection, not the causal role (if any)
that those attitudes have in any given situation. This
could only be known by theorizing. Likewise, we should
set to one side studies in which subjects are required to
report on their attitudes some significant time afterwards.
Thus, the fact that subjects will, at the end of the exper-
iment, confabulate lesser enjoyment in playing with a
game when they had been paid to play with it (belied by
the amount of time that they had freely devoted to the
game in their spare time; Kruglanski et al. 1972) raises
no difficulty for an introspection theorist. For, given the
proposed on-line monitoring function for introspection,
it makes sense that no medium- or long-term record of
introspected mental events should normally be kept.
And in the absence of any such record, subjects have no
option but to self-interpret. (The cognitive monitoring
account must require that brief records of introspected
events should be kept in some sort of working memory
system, however. So we should expect subjects to be
capable of giving introspective reports for a few
moments after the events have occurred. This point is rel-
evant to a number of the experiments described below.)
Now consider one of the classic studies conducted by
Nisbett and Wilson (1977). Subjects chose between four
items of panty-hose (which were actually identical), think-
ing that they were taking part in a market survey. They dis-
played a strong right-hand bias in their choices, but all
offered judgments of quality (“I thought that pair was
the softest,” etc.) immediately afterwards in explanation
of their choice. Nisbett and Wilson themselves cast this
result in terms of confabulation about the causes of
action, and those who believe in the introspectability of
judgments will often dismiss it on that ground (Rey
2008). But this is to miss the point that subjects are also
confabulating and attributing to themselves a judgment
(albeit one they believe to have caused their action, and
at least on the assumption that they didn’t actually judge
the right-hand item to be softest – otherwise the first-
order mechanisms discussed in sect. 2.1 could underlie
their reports). How could one claim otherwise? Well, it is
likely that the root cause of the right-hand choice bias is a
right-hand attention bias, and someone might claim that
attending more to the right-hand items causes subjects
to judge that those items are softer (or are of better
quality, or a nicer color, etc.). These judgments can then
be introspected and veridically reported. But the causal
pathways postulated here are pretty mysterious. And the
most likely candidates for fleshing them out are ones
that already involve confabulation. (For example, noticing
that I am attending more to the right-hand item, and noti-
cing that it is soft, my mindreading faculty might hypo-
thesize that I am paying more attention to it because it is
the softest, leading me to ascribe to myself just such a
judgment.)
There is also ample evidence of confabulation for
decisions. For example, Brasil-Neto et al. (1992) caused
subjects to move one index finger or another via focal mag-
netic stimulation of areas of motor cortex in the relevant
brain hemisphere. (Subjects had been instructed to
freely decide which finger to move when they heard a
click, which was actually the sound of the magnet being
turned on.) Yet the subjects themselves reported deciding
to move that finger. Now, it is very unlikely that stimu-
lation of motor cortex should itself cause a decision (as
well as causing movement), hence giving rise to a prop-
ositional attitude event that can be introspected. For if
the back-projecting pathways between motor cortex and
frontal cortex were used for this purpose, then one
would predict that stimulation of premotor cortex would
also have such an effect; but it does not (Brasil-Neto
et al. 1992).
Further evidence of confabulation for decisions is pro-
vided by Wegner and Wheatley (1999), who induced in
subjects the belief that they had just previously taken a
decision to stop a moving cursor on a screen (which was
controlled via a computer mouse operated jointly with a
confederate of the experimenter), by the simple expedient
of evoking a semantically relevant idea in the subject just
prior to the time when the confederate actually caused
the cursor to stop. (Subjects heard a word through head-
phones, ostensibly as a distracter, shortly before the con-
federate was able to bring the cursor to a stop beside a
picture of the named object.) It seems that the subject’s
mindreading faculty, presented with the evidence that
the subject had been thinking of the relevant object
shortly before the cursor came to a stop beside it, reasoned
to the most likely explanation, and concluded that the
subject had taken a decision to stop beside that very
object. (A control condition ruled out the possibility that
hearing the semantically relevant word caused an actual
decision to stop the cursor next to the named object.)
It might be objected that all of the examples considered
so far are ones where (plausibly) actually no judgment was
made, nor any decision taken, although behavior occurred
that led subjects to think that it had. Hence, someone
might propose that it is only in such cases that confabula-
tion occurs. Whenever there is a propositional attitude
event, it might be said, it can be introspected; and only
when there isn’t, will subjects self-interpret. However, if
there really were two distinct ways of attributing judg-
ments and decisions to oneself (an introspective mode as
well as an interpretative one), then it would be odd that
the latter should always win out in cases where no judg-
ment or decision has actually been made. For presumably
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an introspective mechanism can detect an absence. And if
the introspective mechanism is delivering the judgment,
“No judgment,” or, “No decision” at the same time as
the mindreading system is attributing one to oneself,
then why is it that the latter should always dominate,
leading to confabulated answers to the experimenters’
questions? On the contrary, since the introspective mech-
anism is supposed to have evolved to be especially direct
and reliable, one would expect it to be routinely given pre-
cedence in cases of conflict.
Consider some further data: Subjects who emerge from
a hypnotic trance, and then later carry out an instruction
given to them while hypnotized, will often confabulate
an explanation for their action (Sheehan & Orne 1968;
Wegner 2002). Presumably what happens is that they
decide, while hypnotized, to comply with the request of
the hypnotist. And the effect of this decision is to set up
a conditional intention – for example, “When I see the
book on the table I shall place it on the shelf” – which
remains in existence once the hypnotic episode and orig-
inal decision are forgotten. This intention is then activated
thereafter when the antecedent of the intention is fulfilled
(e.g., the book is seen). In which case, there is a decision
here to report. And if the subject were to confine herself
to reporting just that decision (e.g., to put the book on
the shelf), then she would report veridically. But in fact
she confabulates a further judgment and/or goal – for
example, that the book is out of place and makes the
room look untidy.
It might be said in reply that placing a book on a shelf
isn’t something that people normally do for its own sake.
Hence, there are powerful pragmatic reasons for the
agent to confabulate a further attitude when pressed by
the experimenter to explain her action, even given that
the introspective mechanism is detecting the absence of
any such state (Rey 2008). But this explanation is proble-
matic. For there are all sorts of circumstances in which
people are perfectly content to say, “I don’t know why;
I just did it” when asked to explain why they acted in a
particular way. Why should the same not be true here?
Indeed, it isn’t uncommon to catch oneself performing
actions of precisely this sort – absent-mindedly moving a
household item from one place to another – in circum-
stances where one is prompted to ask oneself, “Why did
I just do that?”, or where one replies if challenged for an
explanation, “I don’t know; just a nervous tic I suppose.”
But in any case, Rey’s suggestion should be testable: The
hypnotist could instruct a subject to perform a movement
that is ambiguous between two distinct actions (e.g., greet-
ing someone with a wave versus waving away a bug), one of
which is very much more likely in the circumstances (e.g.,
indoors, occurring just as someone known to the subject
enters the room). The hypnotist’s instruction would be for-
mulated in terms of the less likely action: “When John
enters the room you will raise your arm and move it
back and forth with the palm facing forwards to shoo
away any bugs.” On Rey’s introspective account, subjects
should offer the latter in explanation of their arm move-
ment. A “mindreading is prior” theorist will predict, in
contrast, that subjects should offer the more likely expla-
nation: “I was waving to John.”
There is also an extensive and long-standing set of data
that subjects’ behavior, when caused in ways that they are
unaware of or inattentive to, will lead them to confabulate
when describing their own degree of belief in some prop-
osition. (See Bem 1967; 1972; Cooper & Duncan 1971;
Festinger 1957; Greenbaum & Zemach 1972; Wicklund
& Brehm 1976; see also, Eagly & Chaiken 1993 for a
more recent review.) Thus, subjects who are manipulated
into writing a counter-attitudinal essay for meager pay, but
who do so believing that they have made a free decision,
will say that they have a greater degree of belief in the
proposition that their essay was defending than will sub-
jects in the same circumstances who are paid a decent
sum of money. It seems that subjects reason: “I wrote
the essay freely, but I can’t have done it for the money,
so I must believe it.” And indeed, subjects who don’t par-
ticipate, but have the circumstances of the various essay-
writers described to them, make just such an inference.
Likewise, it has long been known that subjects who are
induced to nod their heads while listening to a tape via
headphones (ostensibly to test the headphones them-
selves) will say that they have a greater degree of belief
in the propositions being defended on the tape than will
subjects who are induced to shake their heads (Wells &
Petty 1980). It seems that subjects reason: “Since I am
nodding/shaking my head, this is evidence that I
believe/disbelieve the propositions asserted.” Admittedly,
this is not the only explanation possible. It might be that
head-nodding primes for positive thoughts about the
message, which in turn cause greater agreement, which
is then veridically reported. Brin˜ol and Petty (2003) set
out to test this alternative by varying the persuasiveness
of the messages themselves. When the message is persua-
sive, nodding increases belief and head-shaking decreases
it, which is consistent with either one of the two expla-
nations. But when the message is unpersuasive, the oppo-
site occurs: nodding decreases belief and head-shaking
increases it. The authors present evidence that what is
actually happening is that subjects interpret their own
nodding behavior as confirming their own initial negative
reactions to the message, whereas head-shaking is inter-
preted as disagreement with those reactions.
Now, it does not follow, logically, from all this (and much
more) data that there is no such thing as introspection for
propositional attitudes. For there might be one set of
such events to which we have introspective access while
there is another set that we can’t introspect; and hence,
whenever our behavior is caused by attitudes drawn from
the latter set, we are forced to self-interpret (and often to
confabulate). What might be proposed, in effect, is that
there is both a conscious and an unconscious mind. Judg-
ments and decisions within the conscious mind are intro-
spectable, whereas judgments and decisions within the
unconscious mind can only be known (if at all) by turning
our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. And just such
a view seems to be endorsed by some of those who have
been most prolific in demonstrating the reality of metacog-
nitive attitude attribution via processes of interpretation
and confabulation. Thus, both Wegner (2002) and Wilson
(2002) allow that we do sometimes have introspective
access to our (conscious) thoughts, even if much of the
time our access to our own propositional attitudes is inter-
pretative, and often confabulatory.
In order for this proposal to count as a realistic compe-
titor to the interpretation-only alternative, however, we
need some principled account of the two forms of mental-
ity and their relationships to each other. This isn’t by any
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means an easy thing to provide. For we need to know what
it is about some judgments and decisions that makes them
available for introspection, while others are cut off from
such availability. What kind of cognitive architecture can
underlie and explain these patterns of availability and
unavailability in anything more than an ad hoc way? I
take up this challenge in the next section, where the only
such account that I know of is outlined and discussed. It
will turn out on closer investigation, however, that the
account actually lends no support to the introspectionist
position.
7. Is there a conscious mind?
One possible response to our challenge is to distinguish
between two different levels of mental process (conscious
and unconscious). And the only worked-out account of
these two levels that I know of is as follows. It would be
allowed that the access we have to our unconscious atti-
tudes (whether or not they get expressed in speech or
other imagery) is always interpretative, as argued earlier.
But it might be claimed that the stream of inner speech
and other forms of imagery is constitutive of a distinct
kind of (conscious) mentality (Frankish 2004). Certainly
such events are not epiphenomenal, but they often make
an important causal contribution to subsequent thought
and behavior (Carruthers 2002; 2006; Clark 1998). And
it might be said that such events are routinely available
to introspection.
This suggestion comports very naturally with an idea
that has been gaining increasing ground among those
who work on the psychology of reasoning (Evans & Over
1996; Kahneman 2002; Sloman 1996; 2002; Stanovich
1999). This is that human reasoning processes may be
divided into two very different types, often now referred
to as “System 1” and “System 2. System 1 (which is
really a set of systems, arranged in parallel) is fast, uncon-
scious, hard to alter, universal to all thinkers, and evolutio-
narily ancient. System 2, in contrast, is slow and serial,
characteristically conscious, malleable in its principles of
operation, admits of significant variations between individ-
uals, and is evolutionarily novel. And a number of authors
have emphasized the important constitutive role played by
imagery (especially inner speech) in the operations of
System 2 (Carruthers 2009; Evans & Over 1996; Frankish
2004). Likewise, others have demonstrated the crucial role
played by inner speech in the performance of tests of
executive functioning (which are likely to implicate
System 2), such as the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task
(Baddeley et al. 2001). For when inner speech is sup-
pressed by the need to shadow an irrelevant speech
stream while performing the task, performance collapses.
In order for this account to be successful, however, it is
obviously crucial that the conscious imagistic events in
question should play the right sorts of causal role, consti-
tutive of the roles of the various attitude types. Not any
old causal role will do. Thus, it is a conceptual constraint
on an event being an instance of deciding, for example,
that it should fit one of two causal profiles (Bratman
1987; 1999). In the case of a decision to act here-and-
now, the decision should issue in motor instructions
without the intervention of any further practical reasoning.
A decision is supposed to end the process of practical
reasoning and to settle what I do (unless something goes
awry with my motor system, of course). Something
similar is true of a decision to act in the future: this
should settle that I act (unless something significant
changes in the interim) and what act I shall perform. Any
further reasoning in the future should be confined to the
question of how to act. Intentions for the future place con-
straints on our practical reasoning. They have the form of
partial plans, in which details may be left blank to be
filled in later, but in which the overall structure is fixed.
A similar point can be made about judgments. Just as a
decision is an event that ends a process of practical (action-
oriented) reasoning, so a (non-perceptual) judgment is an
event that concludes a piece of theoretical (belief-
oriented) reasoning. A judgment, then, is an event that
will normally (a) immediately (without further inference)
give rise to a stored standing-state belief with the same
content, and (b) will immediately be available to inform
practical reasoning, interacting with the subject’s goals
(where appropriate) in the construction of plans. If an
event is genuinely a judgment, then there should be no
further cognitive activity standing between it and the
normal roles of judgment (the formation of belief and
the guidance of action).
We need to ask, therefore, in what way is it that the
events that constitute System 2 achieve their characteristic
effects. For only if these events have the right sorts of
causal roles, can they be said to be propositional attitude
events of judging, deciding, and the like. And so, only if
they have the right sorts of roles, can our introspective,
non-interpretative, awareness of them (which I grant) con-
stitute introspective, non-interpretative, awareness of a set
of propositional attitudes.
The processes that take place in System 2 don’t simply
mirror those that take place in System 1, of course, track-
ing them one-for-one. Rather, sequences of imagery can
occur in accordance with well-practiced rules or habits,
or they can be guided by subjects’ beliefs about how
they should reason, often issuing in an assertoric state-
ment, for example, that isn’t simply the expression of a
pre-existing (System 1) judgment.8 So let us consider
such a case. As a result of an episode of System 2 conscious
activity, I might formulate and rehearse the assertoric
utterance, “Polar bears are endangered.” Under interpret-
ation, this event will likely be heard as an assertion that
polar bears are endangered. And as a result, I will think
and act in the future much as if I had formed just such a
judgment. I shall, for example, reply positively if asked
whether or not polar bears are endangered. And if one
of my goals is to try to protect endangered species, then
I might, in consequence of this event, begin writing a suit-
able letter to my congressional representative.
How does the rehearsed assertion achieve these effects?
There are a number of possibilities. (These aren’t mutually
exclusive, I should stress. On the contrary, a pluralist pos-
ition concerning the realization of System 2 processes is
probably correct; see Carruthers 2009.) One is that the
event causes me to believe of myself (unconsciously, at
the System 1 level) that I believe polar bears to be endan-
gered. Then this, together with a standing desire to think
and act consistently, will lead me to answer positively
when asked whether or not I believe that polar bears are
endangered. And it might also issue in letter-writing beha-
vior. For if I believe myself to believe that polar bears are
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endangered, and want to do something to help endan-
gered species, then consistency requires that I should act.
Another possibility is that my mentally rehearsed
assertion causes me to believe I have committed myself
to the truth of the proposition that polar bears are endan-
gered. And then a standing (System 1) desire to execute
my commitments will lead me to act in ways I consider
to be appropriate to that commitment. And yet another
possibility is that the rehearsed sentence is treated by
my cognitive systems much as if it were an item of testi-
mony from a putatively reliable informant, and after
checking for coherence with existing belief, it is then
stored as a first-order (System 1) belief, which then
issues in appropriate behavior in the normal way.
The important point to notice is that on each of these
three accounts, the rehearsal of the assertion “Polar
bears are endangered” does not give rise to a standing-
state belief immediately, without the mediation of
any further cognitive processing. Nor is it immediately
available to guide planning with respect to endangered
species. For in each case further, down-stream, cognitive
activity must occur first. Either I must form the belief
that I believe polar bears to be endangered, which then
interacts with a higher-order desire to guide activity con-
sistent with my possessing such a belief. Or I must form
the belief that I have made an appropriate commitment,
which again has to interact with a higher-order desire to
execute my commitments in order to guide behavior. Or
the assertion must be evaluated in something like the
way that the testimony of other people is (checking for
coherence with existing belief, and so on; see Harris
[2002a; 2002b] who shows that even young children
don’t automatically accept the testimony of others, but
evaluate it in light of a variety of “gate-keeping” criteria
first). In each of these cases the relevant assertion does
not have the right sort of causal role to be a judgment.
For it does not by itself settle what I believe.
An exactly parallel argument can be constructed for
System 2 episodes that might be candidate decisions,
such as saying to myself (in inner speech) at the conclusion
of a period of System 2 activity, “So, I shall write to my con-
gressional representative.” This utterance does not, by
itself, settle anything. For it first has to give rise to the
belief that I have decided to write, or to the belief that
I have committed myself to write, and then the causal path-
ways operate as described. So in each case, then, although
there is a conscious System 2 event to which I have intro-
spective access, it is not an event of deciding on an
action, or of forming a new judgment. And this argument
generalizes to other candidate types of propositional atti-
tude, such as supposing something to be the case, or
fearing that something is the case, and so forth.
(Interestingly, however, System 2 conscious activity is
constitutive of thinking. For there are few significant con-
ceptual constraints on what sorts of processes can count as
thinking. Roughly speaking, any sequence of content-
bearing events that makes some difference to subsequent
attitude-formation or to behavior can count as thinking. So
we do have introspective access to some forms of thin-
king – specifically to imagistically expressed System 2
thinking – even if, as I have argued, we don’t have such
access to any propositional attitudes.)
I conclude there is, indeed, such a thing as conscious
mentality. In addition to globally broadcast experiences
of various sorts, there are also sequences of visual and
auditory imagery that make an important difference to
our cognitive and practical lives. But our introspective
access to these events doesn’t thereby give us introspective
access to any propositional attitudes. On the contrary, our
only form of access to propositional attitudes of judging,
deciding, and so forth, is interpretative.
8. The evidence of unsymbolized thinking
Recall from section 1 that a “mindreading is prior” account
makes two distinctive predictions. The first is that it should
be possible for subjects to be misled, in attributing prop-
ositional attitudes to themselves, by being presented
with manipulated behavioral or sensory data. As we have
seen in sections 6 and 7, this prediction is amply con-
firmed, in ways that the opposed accounts cannot easily
accommodate. But the second prediction is that subjects
should be incapable of attributing propositional attitudes
to themselves in the absence of behavioral or sensory
data. All three of the opposing positions, in contrast,
make the opposite prediction. Because they maintain
that introspection for propositional attitudes exists, sub-
jects should generally have no need of evidence of any
kind when making self-attributions. The presence of beha-
vioral and sensory cues should be entirely accidental.
However, we have already seen in section 5.1 that many
kinds of metacognitive judgment – such as judgments of
learning – are actually dependent upon sensory cues.
Hence, in these cases, at least, the sensory cues are not
accidental. The present section evaluates some additional
evidence that bears on this matter.
The data in question derive from“introspection sampling”
studies conducted with normal subjects, using the method-
ology devised by Hurlburt (1990; 1993). Subjects wear a
paging device throughout the day, via which they hear a
“beep” at randomly generated intervals. Subjects are
instructed to “freeze” the contents of their consciousness
at the very moment of the beep, and to make notes of it, to
be discussed and elaborated in a later meeting with the
experimenter. All normal subjects report, in varying pro-
portions, the occurrence of inner speech, visual imagery,
and emotional feelings. But many subjects also report the
presence of “purely propositional,” unsymbolized thoughts
at the moment of the beep. In these cases subjects report
thinking something highly determinate – such aswondering
whether or not to buy a given box of breakfast cereal – in the
absence of any visual imagery, inner speech, or other sensory
accompaniments.
So far there isn’t any difficulty here for a “mindreading is
prior” account. For such an account doesn’t have to claim
that all thinking should be imagistically expressed. Indeed,
quite the contrary: the thoughts generated by themindread-
ing system itself will characteristically remain unexpressed.
What the account does claim is that self-attributions of
thought should be dependent on the presence of either
sensory/imagistic or behavioral/circumstantial data. And
what is striking about a good many of the instances of
self-attributed unsymbolized thought is that they occur
in circumstances in which a third-party observer might
have made precisely the same attribution. If you saw
someone standing motionless, looking reflectively at a
box of breakfast cereal on a supermarket shelf, for
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example, you might well predict that she is wondering
whether or not to buy it. Our suggestion can therefore
be that when prompted by the beep, subjects turn their
mindreading systems on their own behavior and circum-
stances (together with any sensory or imagistic cues that
might be present), often enough interpreting themselves
as entertaining a specific thought. Provided that the
process happens swiftly, this will then be self-attributed
with all of the phenomenological immediacy and intro-
spective obviousness as normal.
Although a great many of the examples in the literature
can be handled in this way, not quite all of them can. For
instance, at the time of the beep, one subject reported
that she was wondering whether her friend who would be
picking her up later that day would be driving his car or
his truck. This thought seemed to occur in the absence of
any inner speech or visual imagery. Yet there was nothing
in the subject’s immediate circumstances or behavior
from which it could be derived, either. What cannot be
ruled out, however, is that the thought in question was
self-attributed because it made the best sense of sensory
activity that had been taking place just prior to the
beep – for example, two memory images deriving from
previous experience, in one of which the friend arrives in
his car and in the other of which he arrives in his pickup
truck. Since Hurlburt’s methodology makes no provision
for collecting data on experiences occurring shortly
before the beep, we simply don’t know. An extension of
the methodology might provide us with a valuable test,
however. Another possible test would be to look for corre-
lations between the extent to which different subjects
report purely propositional thoughts (with quantities of
inner speech and visual imagery controlled for) and the
speed of their mindreading abilities in third-person tasks.
Because subjects will only have the illusion of introspecting
if they can reach a self-interpretation smoothly and swiftly,
I predict that there should be a positive correlation.
Hurlburt and Akhter (2008) concede that it is possible
that attributions of unsymbolized thought to oneself
might result from swift and unconscious self-interpretation.
But they present the following consideration against
such a possibility. Subjects are initially quite reluctant
and hesitant in describing instances of unsymbolized
thought, presumably because they share the commonly
held folk theory that all conscious thinking is accompanied
by images of one sort or another. But explicitly held folk
theories are one thing; assumptions built into the oper-
ations of the mindreading faculty are quite another. And
there is no reason to think that the latter will share all of
the culturally developed assumptions made by the folk.
Hence, the mindreading system might have no hesitation
in attributing a thought to the self in the absence of any
sensory cues, even though the person in whom that
system resides does so hesitate. I conclude this section,
therefore, with the claim that although there is no
support to be derived for a “mindreading is prior”
account from the introspection-sampling data, neither is
there, as yet, any evidence to count against it.
9. The evidence from schizophrenia
Recall from section 1 that two of the three competitor
models (namely, models 1 and 2) predict that there
should exist cases in which mindreading is intact while
metacognition is damaged. The “mindreading is prior”
account, in contrast, must deny this. Nichols and Stich
(2003) cite certain forms of schizophrenia as confirming
the former prediction. More specifically, patients with
“passivity” symptoms, who claim that their own actions
are not under their control and that their own episodes
of inner speech are somehow inserted into their
minds by other people, are supposed to demonstrate
such a dissociation (presumably on the grounds that
such patients no longer have normal introspective
access to their own behavioral intentions).9,10 This is
because such patients perform normally when tested on
batteries of mindreading tasks.
There is no reason to think that the symptoms of passiv-
ity forms of schizophrenia are best explained by a failure of
metacognitive competence, however. Rather, the damage
lies elsewhere, resulting in faulty data being presented
to the mindreading system. Frith et al. (2000a; 2000b)
provide a detailed account designed to explain a range of
disorders of action and awareness of action (including
passivity-symptom schizophrenia). The account builds
on well-established models of normal action control,
according to which an “efference copy” of each set of
motor instructions is transformed via one or more body
emulator systems and used to construct a “forward
model” of the expected sensory consequences of the
movement. This can then be compared, both with the
motor intention itself and with the incoming perceptual
data, allowing for swift correction of the action as it
unfolds (Grush 2004; Wolpert & Ghahramani 2000;
Wolpert & Kawato 1998). Frith et al. think that the symp-
toms of passivity and “alien control” in schizophrenia can
be explained as issuing from damage to this action-
monitoring system, which results in no forward model
ever being created for comparison.
Now the important point to note for our purposes is that
the kind of action-monitoring just described is entirely
first-order in character, and qualifies as “metacognitive”
only in the weak and irrelevant sense distinguished in
section 5.1. There is no reason to think that it should
involve metarepresentions of our own motor intentions,
let alone introspective access to them. And indeed, the
speed with which the monitoring process operates
suggests very strongly that introspection is not involved
(Jeannerod 2006).
But why should the absence of a forward model lead
subjects to feel that their actions are not their own?
Frith et al. (2000a) point out that the forward model is nor-
mally used to “damp down” experiences resulting from
movement that are of the sort predicted in the forward
model. This is why it is normally impossible to tickle your-
self, whereas if you wear special gloves that introduce a
slight delay in your movements, then self-tickling suddenly
becomes possible (Blakemore et al. 1998; Weiskrantz et al.
1971). And it is also why when you unwrap a candy at the
opera you barely hear it while those around you are dis-
turbed. If no forward model is created, however, then
perceptions resulting from your actions will be experi-
enced with full vividness, just as if the movements had
been caused by another person. The suggestion is that pas-
sivity-symptom schizophrenics have the sense that their
actions are caused by others because those actions literally
feel that way to them.
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In addition, one might expect the comparator process to
give rise to heightened attention and feelings of anxiety in
cases where there is too great a mismatch between the
forward model and the perceptual data received. These
feelings would be especially enhanced in cases where
there is no forward model, as a result of some pathology.
For the comparator system would be receiving perceptual
input of an action being performed, but without receiving
the normally attendant input deriving from an efference
copy of a motor intention. So this would, as it were, be a
case of maximum mismatch. An additional suggestion,
then, is that these feelings of anxiety might signal to the
mindreading system that something is amiss, perhaps
reinforcing the impression that the actions are not one’s
own. Put differently: Only when everything is going
smoothly, with no feelings of anxiety or surprise specifi-
cally attending one’s action, does the mindreading
system attribute agency to the self by default.
I conclude that passivity-symptom forms of schizo-
phrenia are not best interpreted as instances of a dis-
sociation between mindreading and metacognitive
capacities. Rather than being cases in which mindreading
is intact while introspection is damaged, the damage is to
lower-level forward modeling and/or comparator systems.
This results in experiences that are naturally interpreted as
indicating that one’s actions (including one’s mental
actions, such as inner speech) are not one’s own.
10. The evidence from autism
The final major area in which the relationship between
mindreading and metacognition can be assessed concerns
autism. Almost everyone agrees that third-person mind-
reading is significantly impaired in autism. (There is,
however, disagreement over whether this impairment
lies at the heart of the syndrome.) In which case the pre-
diction of a “mindreading is prior” account will be that
autistic people’s access to their own propositional attitude
states must be impaired as well. Nichols and Stich (2003)
and Goldman (2006) each maintain, in contrast, that intro-
spection is intact in autism, with difficulties in other-
understanding arising from difficulties in supposing or
empathizing.
One set of data concerns an introspection sampling
study conducted with three adult autistic men (Frith &
Happe´ 1999; Hurlburt et al. 1994). All three were able
to report on what was passing through their minds at the
time of a randomly generated “beep,” although one of
them experienced significant difficulties with the task.
This is interpreted as demonstrating that introspection is
intact in autism. There are two points to make. First,
none of these three subjects was entirely deficient at mind-
reading. On the contrary, two of them could pass second-
level false-belief tasks, and the third could pass simple
first-level false-belief tasks. So no one should predict
that any of them would be entirely deficient at self-
attribution, either. (It is worth noting, moreover, that the
experimenters found a strong correlation between the sub-
jects’ abilities with third-person tasks and the sophisti-
cation and ease of their introspective reports. This
finding is problematic for the view that introspection is
undamaged in autism.) Second, the form of “mindreading
is prior” account being defended here predicts that people
with autism should have no difficulty in reporting the
occurrence of perceptions, images, or emotional feelings,
provided that they possess the requisite concepts. For
these events will be globally broadcast and made directly
accessible to their (damaged but partially functioning)
mindreading faculties. And indeed, much of the content
of the introspective reports of the three autistic subjects
concerned visual imagery and emotional feelings.
Reports of their own occurrent attitudes tended to be
generic (“I was thinking . . .”), and one of the three men
(the one who could only pass first-level false-belief tasks)
had significant difficulties in reporting his own attitudes
at all.
Another set of data of the same general sort concerns
the autobiographical reports of adults with autism, who
are often able to describe with some vividness what their
mental lives were like at ages when they almost certainly
wouldn’t have been capable of attributing mental states
to other people. Nichols and Stich (2003) comment that
(provided we accept the memory reports as accurate),
the individuals in question must have had reliable intro-
spective access to their own mental states prior to having
any capacity for mindreading. But actually we have no
reason at all to believe that memory is itself a second-
order (metarepresentational) process. When I observe an
event, a first-order representation of that event may be
stored in memory. When that memory is later activated,
I shall describe it by saying that I remember seeing the
event in question (say). But it doesn’t at all follow that
the original event involved any metarepresentation of
myself as seeing something. Likewise for other sorts of
memories and other sorts of mental events. The fact that
autistic adults give metarepresentational reports of their
mental lives as children does not show that autistic chil-
dren are capable of metarepresenting their own mental
states. It just shows that they are capable of memory
formation.
Nichols and Stich (2003) also place considerable
reliance on a study by Farrant et al. (1999), who tested
autistic children, as well as learning-disabled and normal
children matched for verbal mental age, on a range of
metamemory tasks. Since they were able to find no signifi-
cant differences between the groups, the authors conclude
that metacognition is unimpaired in autism. Two prelimi-
nary points should be emphasized about this study,
however. One is that almost all of the autistic children
tested were sufficiently well advanced to be able to pass
first-order false-belief tasks. So we should predict that
they would have some understanding of their own
minds, and that they would be capable of completing
simple metacognitive tasks. Another point is methodologi-
cal: The small group sizes meant that statistically signifi-
cant differences were not detected even when a trend
(namely weaker performance by the autistic children)
was plainly visible in the raw data. We simply don’t
know whether those trends would have been significant
had larger groups of children been used.
A deeper problem with the Farrant et al. data is that
none of the experimental tasks was metacognitive in the
right sort of way, requiring access to the subject’s
current propositional attitudes. On the contrary, they
could be solved by anyone who possessed the requisite
mental concepts who was also a smart behaviorist. For
example, one experiment tested whether children with
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autism were aware that it is easier to learn a small number
of items than a larger number. Not surprisingly, the chil-
dren did well on this test. But they would have had
ample opportunity over a number of years of schooling
to have established a reliable correlation between the
number of items studied in a task and the number of
responses later given that are evaluated as correct. (Note
that the average age of the autistic children in this exper-
iment was 11 years.)
It is true that many of the autistic children in question
could give simple verbal descriptions of some memoriza-
tion strategies. But many of these involved such tasks as
looking in likely places (for an object that had been
mislaid) or listening carefully to the instructions (from
someone reciting a list of things to remember). This is
metacognitive only in the minimal sense of mentioning
looking and listening. Moreover, in order to develop a cog-
nitive strategy like mental rehearsal (which a number of
the autistic as well as normal subjects suggested), it is
doubtful that much mindreading ability is required.
Rather, children just need to notice a positive correlation
between a behavior (rehearsal) and an outcome (getting
the correct answer), which should be well within the
reach of even a clever behaviorist (provided that the
latter had access also to inner behavior, such as inner
speech).
Thus, the data from autistic people considered by
Nichols and Stich (2003) and by Goldman (2006) do not
support their introspectionist positions against an inter-
pretative, “mindreading is prior” account. But there are
other data that these authors don’t discuss, which
suggest that people with autism are decidedly poor at attri-
buting propositional attitudes to themselves. Let me
describe just a couple of strands of evidence here.
Phillips et al. (1998) tested children with autism against
learning-impaired controls (matched for verbal mental
age) on an intention reporting task. The children had to
shoot a “ray gun” at some canisters in the hopes of obtain-
ing the prizes contained within some of them. But the
actual outcome (i.e., which canister fell down) was surrep-
titiously manipulated by the experimenters (in a way that
even adults playing the game couldn’t detect). They
were asked to select and announce which canister they
were aiming at in advance (e.g., “The red one”), and the
experimenter then placed a token of the same color next
to the gun to help them remember. After learning
whether they had obtained a prize, the children were
asked, “Did you mean to hit that [for example] green
one, or did you mean to hit the other [for example] red
one?” The autistic children were much poorer than the
controls at correctly identifying what they had intended
to do in conditions where there was a discrepancy
between intention and goal satisfaction. For example, if
they didn’t “hit” the one they aimed at, but still got a
prize, they were much more likely to say that the canister
that fell was the one they had meant to hit.11
Likewise Kazak et al. (1997) presented autistic children
with trials on which either they, or a third party, were
allowed to look inside a box, or were not allowed to look
inside a box. They were then asked whether they or the
third party knew what was in the box, or were just gues-
sing. The autistic children got many more of these ques-
tions wrong than did control groups. And importantly for
our purposes, there was no advantage for answers to
questions about the child’s own knowledge over answers
to questions about the knowledge of the third party. This
result is especially striking because the children could
have answered the self-knowledge version of the question
merely by asking themselves the first-order question,
“What is in the box?”, without needing to engage in meta-
cognitive processes at all (except when transforming the
result into a metacognitive answer to the experimenter’s
question).
I conclude that data from people with autism provide
no support for the view that metacognition can remain
intact in the absence of mindreading. On the contrary,
the evidence suggests that if mindreading is damaged,
then so too will be metacognition. Now admittedly,
this by itself is just as consistent with model 2 (“one mech-
anism, two modes of access”) as with model 4 (“mindread-
ing is prior”). But our discussion in section 9 failed to find
the alleged evidence that might speak in favor of the
former (i.e., individuals in whom mindreading is intact
but metacognitive access is blocked). And we have dis-
cussed a variety of other forms of evidence that support
the latter.
11. Conclusion
This target article has evaluated four different accounts of
the relationship between mindreading and metacognition,
three of which endorse the existence of introspection for
attitudes, whereas the fourth denies it. Since we know
that people have the illusion of introspecting even when
they demonstrably aren’t doing so, and since design con-
siderations suggest that the mindreading faculty would
picture the mind as having introspective access to itself,
I have argued that no weight should be placed on the
introspective intuition. In which case the “mindreading
is prior” account should be accepted by default, as the sim-
plest of the four possibilities. In addition, I have argued
that various predictions made by the three accounts that
endorse introspection for attitudes are not borne out by
the data. In contrast, the central prediction of the “mind-
reading is prior” account is confirmed: This is that subjects
should be caused to misattribute attitudes to themselves
by misleading sensory or behavioral data. Although an
introspection theorist can attempt to save this data post
hoc, such attempts are less than convincing. Hence, the
“mindreading is prior” account is, overall, the best sup-
ported of the four alternatives.
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NOTES
1. One might wonder why the dedicated input channels
between the various perceptual systems and the metarepresenta-
tional faculty couldn’t be damaged while leaving those systems
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themselves intact. The answer is that there are no such channels.
Rather, the attended outputs of perception are globally broadcast
to all conceptual systems, including the metarepresentational
faculty inter alia. See section 2 for some discussion and
references.
2. All of these authors endorse broadly “theory-theory”
accounts of mindreading. A very different kind of “mindreading
is prior” account is defended by Gordon (1986; 1996), who
develops a form of simulation theory that denies any need for
introspection. But this account makes both mindreading
and metacognition dependent upon the acquisition of natural
language. Likewise, Dennett (1991) is a sort of theory-theorist
who denies introspection for attitudes, but he, too, appears
to make our knowledge of our own mental states dependent
upon their expression in language. Discussion of these issues
would take us too far afield. For present purposes I assume, as
seems plausible, that basic capacities for both mindreading and
metacognition are independent of our capacity for natural
language.
3. Note that for this reason Nichols and Stich’s (2003) intro-
duction of a separate perception-monitoring mechanism is
wholly unnecessary. Since the mindreading system would need
to have access to the agent’s own perceptual states in order to
do its work, there is simply no need for a distinct system to
monitor and self-attribute those states.
4. In allowing that perceptual judgments are introspectable,
I don’t mean to imply that perceptually based beliefs are likewise
introspectable. On the contrary, once formed and stored, the
only way that those beliefs can be consciously accessed is via
their expression in visual imagery (in the form of an episodic
memory, perhaps) or in inner speech. But such events, although
introspectable, will need to be interpreted to extract the infor-
mation that they are, indeed, expressive of belief (as opposed,
for example, to supposition or mere idle fantasy). See section
2.1 for further discussion.
5. An alternative account to the one sketched here is outlined
by Wilson (2002), who suggests that the introspective assumption
may make it easier for subjects to engage in various kinds of adap-
tive self-deception, helping them build and maintain a positive
self-image. In fact, both accounts might be true.
6. We also know that in other domains – such as physics –
the unconscious theories that guide behavior often make false,
but simplifying, assumptions. See, for example, McCloskey
(1983).
7. This isn’t quite accurate. For, to the extent that apes, for
example, do have limited mindreading abilities (e.g., in respect
of perception and goal-directed action), to that extent one
might expect to find metacognitive processes also. At any rate,
this is what a “mindreading is prior” account would predict.
8. Sometimes a System 2 utterance does express an underlying
System 1 judgment with the same content, no doubt. But in such
a case it is all the clearer that the utterance in question isn’t itself
a judgment. Nor does the expressibility of judgments in speech
provide any reason for believing in introspection, as we saw in
section 2.1.
9. Similar claims are made by Bayne and Pacherie (2007).
They argue against an interpretative account of self-awareness
of the sort defended here, preferring what they call a “compara-
tor-based” account. But I think they mis-characterize the models
of normal action-monitoring that they discuss. Properly under-
stood, those models lend no support for the claim that metacog-
nition is damaged in schizophrenia. See the paragraphs that
follow.
10. The claim that we have introspective access to our own
motor intentions seems also to underlie the idea that “mirror
neurons” might play an important role in the development of
mindreading (Gallese & Goldman 1998). For what would be
the use, for purposes of social understanding, of an activation
of one’s own motor system in response to an observation of the
action of another, unless one could acquire metacognitive
access to the motor plan in question? (For a variety of criticisms
of this account of the mirror neuron system, see Csibra [2007]
and Southgate et al. [2008].)
11. Russell and Hill (2001), however, were unable to replicate
these results. This is probably because their population of autistic
children, although of lower average age, had higher average
verbal IQs, suggesting that their autism was much less severe.
Since most researchers think that intention-reading is among
the easiest of mindreading tasks, one might predict that only
very young or more severely disabled individuals with autism
would be likely to fail at it.
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Abstract: This commentary suggests an alternate definition for
metacognition, as well as an alternate basis for the “aboutness” relation
in representation. These together open the way for an understanding of
mindreading that is significantly different from the one advocated by
Carruthers.
Carruthers suggests that cognitive scientists are confused
about the meaning of “metacognition,” citing our work as an
illustrative example. In fact, we follow a standard definition
of the term, adopted from Nelson and Narens (1990). (This
particular formulation appears in Anderson & Oates [2007],
but the definition is in widespread use. See, e.g., Dunlosky
2004; Dunlosky & Bjork 2008; Dunlosky & Metcalfe 2009;
Metcalfe 1993; Metcalfe & Shimamura 1994.) The definition
runs as follows:
Imagine two components X and Y (where X and Y could be the
same), related in such a way that state information flows from Y
to X, and control information flows from X to Y. Component X is
in a monitoring and control relationship with Y, and when Y is a
cognitive component, we call this relationship metacognitive moni-
toring and control.
This offers an information-theoretic characterization of meta-
cognition that is neutral regarding the form that information
takes, or the processing it undergoes. Thus, it is quite incorrect
to say that cognitive scientists use the term “in two quite distinct
ways, often without noticing the difference” (target article, sect.
5.1, para. 2). We use the term consistently in a way that leaves
open the various ways in which such a relationship could be
implemented. We are not confused about the difference
between systems that involve “metarepresentations of [its] own
first-order cognitive processes as such” (sect. 5.1, para. 2) and
those that don’t; rather, this distinction is not relevant to the
definition of metacognition.
In fact, some of the processes in the systems we implement
are indeed metacognitive in Carruthers’ more restricted sense.
To take just one example, mentioned by Carruthers: If an
active logic system notices the presence of both P and : P
in its knowledge base (KB), it will assert Contra(P, : P, t).
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That is a statement about – a metarepresentation of – the
state of the KB at time t (i.e., that it contained that contradic-
tion). Our systems can reason about this fact with that meta-
representation, and consequently take various control steps, the
simplest of which is to refrain from using these premises in
further deduction (Anderson & Perlis 2005a). But other pro-
cesses in active logic systems, and other of our metacognitive
systems, effect such monitoring and control without explicit
metarepresentations of this sort (see, e.g., Anderson et al.
2006).
Of course, Carruthers is free to define his terms and circum-
scribe his interests as best serves his argument, and if this were
merely a terminological dispute, we would not be submitting a
commentary. But there is a more substantive point in the back-
ground, which potentially affects Carruthers’ overall proposal.
Carruthers writes: “Generally the term is used, as it has been
throughout this article, to mean cognition about one’s own cogni-
tion. Metacognition, in this sense, is inherently higher-order,
involving metarepresentations of one’s own first-order cognitive
processes as such” (sect. 5.1, para. 2, emphasis in original). The
implication seems to be that for something to be about another
requires a higher-order metarepresentation. But we would like
to suggest that this associates higher-order-ness with meta-ness
and aboutness (if we can be forgiven the neologisms) in a way
that is not necessary.
First, it is not clear that aboutness requires higher-order-ness.
Surely a representation or a process can be about another
without being at a different level, or in a different represen-
tational language. Indeed, can’t a process (or representation)
be about itself? (See, e.g., Perlis 1985; 1988; 1997; 2000; Perlis
& Subrahmanian 1994.) It is a common bias, perhaps stemming
from Tarski, that there must be a hierarchy of meta-languages,
each standing back from the one it refers to. But Tarski
adopted that approach to avoid technical difficulties in formal
logic; it is not necessary a priori.
Second, it is not clear that meta-ness requires higher-order-
ness. In related writings, we have suggested that representation
requires only the following: tokens, whatever their form/
content, that can be used to guide actions with respect to
certain targets (Anderson & Perlis 2005b; Anderson & Rosenberg
2008). On these accounts, the information being used and
manipulated during cognition is representational just in case it
is used to guide behavior with respect to targets in various cir-
cumstances. Likewise, a metacognitive monitoring and control
process represents a cognitive process, just in case it allows the
metacognitive component to guide actions with respect to the
cognitive process. Such monitoring and control is indeed (we
maintain) cognition about cognition – is thus metacognition –
without having to be/utilize higher-order representations of
cognition as such.
As should be clear from the preceding, we have a some-
what different understanding of what the representational
aboutness relation requires. This most definitely applies to
self-representation as well (Anderson & Perlis 2005b), although
it is perhaps worth noting that the account of self-awareness we
develop in the cited paper is – despite differences in the funda-
mental criteria for aboutness – nevertheless compatible with
the “mindreading is prior” framework that Carruthers
advocates.
So why might all of this matter to Carruthers? Because of
Carruthers’ understanding of what aboutness requires, he is
driven to adopt a higher-order, meta-representational account
of what having certain thoughts about another’s thoughts (“mind-
reading”) requires. In contrast, the less restrictive option offered
by us opens the door for a broader range of theories of what our
responsiveness to the mental states of others requires. This would
include, for instance, Shaun Gallagher’s interesting, and interest-
ingly different, interaction-based account of understanding
self and others (Gallagher 2004; 2005). It would have been
useful and instructive to see how this rather broader portrayal
of the competing possibilities might have affected Carruthers’
argument, discussion, and conclusions.
Is feeling pain just mindreading? Our
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Abstract: Carruthers claims that “our knowledge of our own attitudes
results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves” (target
article, Abstract). This may be true in many cases. But like other
constructivist claims, it fails to explain occasions when constructed
knowledge is accurate, like a well-supported scientific theory. People
can know their surrounding world and to some extent themselves.
Accurate self-knowledge is firmly established for both somatosensory
and social pain.
Brain imaging studies show that social pain (like social rejection,
embarrassment, and guilt) activates brain regions characteristic
of painful bodily experiences. The brain regions that are activated
by both evoked social and physical pain include the anterior cin-
gulate cortex, the right prefrontal lobe, the insula, amygdala, and
somatosensory cortex. Even deep brain structures, such as the
brainstem periaqueductal gray (PAG), are known to be evoked
by mother–infant separation, marked by intense and repeated
distress cries. These functions are highly conserved among
mammals and, perhaps, birds (Eisenberger & Lieberman 2004;
Nelson & Panksepp 1998).
This evidence contradicts Carruthers’ hypothesis that we learn
about ourselves by turning our social mindreading capacities
upon ourselves. No doubt we do learn about ourselves based
upon what we have learned about others. After all, we constantly
transfer knowledge between different domains of reference.
However, it is simply not the case that all of our introspective
self-knowledge is of this kind. Children acquire “theory of
mind” abilities in about the fourth year of life. But long before
that time we can observe, pain and pleasure perception, the
distress of abandonment, anticipatory fear and joy, and a wide
spectrum of social and imaginary emotional experiences.
Carruthers could maintain that such emotional experiences are
not true cases of “metacognition” and “introspection.” It is poss-
ible to define such terms in very limited ways, but there is no
doubt that emotional feelings express propositional attitudes:
They are about something, namely the well-being of the self.
Thus, hunger, thirst, air-hunger, social distress, fear of rejection
by the mother, peer envy, and numerous other infant emotions
are by no means simple “reflexes.” They are socially contingent,
though not explicitly deliberated, reactions to real-world events
that are critical to the infant’s survival. This crucial self-related
information has extraordinary breadth of conservation among
mammals, suggesting an evolutionary history of some 200
million years (Baars 2005).
Pain is not the only kind of introspective experience humans
have with minimal social input, but it is perhaps the most compel-
ling. Metacognitive self-report (“introspection”) has been used
for two centuries in psychophysics. It is a well-established meth-
odology that converges extremely well with other empirical evi-
dence, such as brain recording methods (Baars & Gage 2007).
Science is a constructive enterprise, but it is tightly constrained
by evidence. That is why, like other human activities such as
farming and tax accounting, it is not merely constructed, but
also bound by considerations of accuracy and predictability.
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That is true for humans, but it is equally true for animals, who
must survive real-world challenges in environments in which
errors lead to extinction. Brain evolution is not separate from
the ability to observe and know the real world. On the contrary,
when we are given truthful feedback about the world, humans
and other animals become quite reality-based. There is no con-
tradiction between constructivism and realism.
How “weak” mindreaders inherited the earth
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Abstract: Carruthers argues that an integrated faculty of
metarepresentation evolved for mindreading and was later exapted for
metacognition. A more consistent application of his approach would
regard metarepresentation in mindreading with the same skeptical
rigor, concluding that the “faculty” may have been entirely exapted.
Given this result, the usefulness of Carruthers’ line-drawing exercise is
called into question.
Carruthers’ recent work on metacognition in the target article
(and in Carruthers 2008b) can be seen as an extended exercise
in “debunking” metarepresentational interpretations of the
results of experiments performed on nonhuman animals. The
debunking approach operates by distinguishing “weak” metacog-
nition, which depends only on first-order mechanisms, from
“genuine” metacognition, which deploys metarepresentations.
Shaun Gallagher (2001; 2004; with similar proposals explored
by Hutto 2004; 2008) has been on a similar debunking mission
with respect to metarepresentation in human mindreading abil-
ities. Gallagher’s position stands in an area of conceptual space
unmapped by Carruthers’ four models, which all presuppose
that an integrated, metarepresentational faculty is the key to
mindreading. Gallagher argues that most of our mindreading
abilities can be reduced to a weakly integrated swarm of first-
order mechanisms, including face recognition and an ability to
quickly map a facial expression to the appropriate emotional
response, a perceptual bias towards organic versus inorganic
movement, an automated capacity for imitation and propriocep-
tive sense of others’ movements (through the mirror neuron
system), an ability to track the gaze of others, and a bias
towards triadic gaze (I-you-target). Notably, autistic individuals
have deficiencies throughout the swarm.
Someone pushing a “metarepresentation was wholly exapted”
proposal might argue as follows: Interpretative propositional atti-
tude ascription is a very recent development, likely an exaptation
derived from linguistic abilities and general-purpose concept-
learning resources. Primate ancestors in social competition
almost never needed to think about others not within perceptual
range; in the absence of languagewhich could beused to raise ques-
tions and consider plans concerning spatially or temporally absent
individuals, there would have been little opportunity to
demonstrate third-person mindreading prowess. After developing
languages with metarepresentational resources, our ancestors’
endowment with the swarm would have left them well placed to
acquire metarepresentational mindreading and metacognition
through general learning. While such abilities were likely favored
by cultural evolution in comparatively recent history, it is not
clear that any further orders to genetic evolution needed to be
placed or filled. Evolutionary “just so” stories come cheap; if Car-
ruthers wants to make a strong case that the faculty evolved in
response to social pressures (instead of just excellence with the
swarm and/or other general aspects of cognition thought to be
required for Machiavellian Intelligence, such as attention, execu-
tive control, and working memory), he needs further argument.
Two issues must be overcome for the swarm proposal to be con-
sidered a serious alternative. First, the concurrent appearance of
success on verbal first- and third-person false-belief tasks must be
explained. Here, we point the reader to Chapter 9 of Stenning
and Van Lambalgen (2008), which makes a strong case that the
logic of both tasks requires a kind of conditional reasoning which
does not develop until around age 4 and is also affected by autism
(and see also Perner et al. [2007] for a related account). Second,
there is the work on implicit false-belief tasks with prelinguistic
infants (Onishi & Baillargeon 2005). These findings are both intri-
guing and perplexing (consider, for example, that the infants’
“implicit mastery” at 15 months is undetectable at 2.5 years), and
the empirical jury is still out as to whether the evidence of prefer-
ential looking towards the correct location can support the weight
of the metarepresentational conclusions which have been placed
on it (see Perner & Ruffman 2005; Ruffman & Perner 2005). The
infants’ preferential looking can be explained if they quickly learn
an actor-object-location binding and register novelty when the
agent looks elsewhere. More recent studies (e.g., Surian et al.
2007) claiming to rule out alternatives to the metarepresentational
explanation have produced findings that are ambiguous at best
(Perner et al. 2007).
One might concede that the mechanism generating the gaze
bias in infants is not itself metarepresentational, but nevertheless
hold that it evolved because it enabled its possessors to develop
metarepresentation – likely wielding a poverty of the stimulus
(PoS) argument to the effect that even with language, metarepre-
sentational mindreading does not come for free. We suggest that
such reasoning no longer carries the weight it once did. Recent
work on neural network modeling of the hippocampus, which
highlights its ability to quickly discover abstract, informationally
efficient bindings of stimulus patterns (especially when fed
neutral cues like words – e.g., see Gluck & Myers 2001; Gluck
et al. 2008) dulls the PoS sword. Finally, even if the PoS argu-
ment is accepted, there remains a huge leap to the conclusion
that the bias evolved because of its ability to bootstrap metarepre-
sentation – and not for something simpler.
In light of the swarm alternative, the usefulness of Carruthers’
distinction between “weak” and “genuine” forms of mindreading
and metacognition becomes questionable. Our overarching
worry is that Carruthers’ emphasis on a single faculty of metare-
presentation, combined with his acknowledgment of the rich
heritage of cognitive abilities shared between humans and
animals, leaves the faculty almost epiphenomenal in human cog-
nition (except, perhaps, for Machiavelli himself) – a position that
Carruthers has previously been driven to adopt with respect to
his account of phenomenal consciousness (Carruthers 2005;
see also Shriver & Allen 2005). An alternative approach might
be to tone down the deflationary invocation of first-order mech-
anisms, and focus instead on what creatures endowed with a
swarm of weakly integrated mechanisms can do and learn.
Once we abandon the assumption that mindreading is centra-
lized in a single metarepresentational faculty, we can investigate
whether something like Gallagher’s swarm could implement
various degrees of competence in reacting adaptively to the
mental states of others. This perspective focuses us on the flexi-
bility and adaptive significance of the evolved mechanisms which
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constitute the swarms, for a wide range of organisms in a variety
of social environments (including humans in theirs). These sug-
gestions are in the spirit of Dennett (1983), who advocated the
usefulness of metarepresentational hypotheses in devising new
experiments, accepting from the beginning that animals and
humans will “pass some higher-order tests and fail others”
(p. 349). Ultimately, we think that the questions Carruthers
raises about the relationship between self-regarding and other-
regarding capacities are interesting and should be pursued; and
they can be pursued without engaging in the line-drawing exer-
cise which de-emphasizes the significance of good comparative
work for understanding human cognition.
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Abstract: Fifty years or so after the cognitive revolution, some cognitive
accounts seem to be converging on treatments of how we come to know
about ourselves and others that have much in common with behavior
analytic accounts. Among the factors that keep the accounts separate is
that behavioral accounts take a much broader view of what counts as
behavior.
Roughly half a century has passed since the cognitive revolution
declared behaviorism dead and promised solutions to long-standing
problems of philosophy and psychology. Carruthers provides an
opportunity to assess the progress that has taken place. Mind
remains central in his account, and its hierarchical structure is
illustrated in the pivotal roles of metarepresentations and meta-
cognitions. In place of behavior and events in the world, the
action takes place in the dynamics of their surrogates, such as
perceptions and intentions and beliefs and concepts and atti-
tudes, none of which lend themselves to measurement in the
units of the physical or biological sciences. Most of the entities
in Carruthers’ account existed in the vocabularies of the mid-
1950s, though typically more closely anchored to their origins
in colloquial talk, which since then has sometimes been called
folk psychology.
What has most obviously changed are the linkages among the
mentalistic terms. Carruthers deals with the particular priorities
of mindreading and metacognition. Are they independent mech-
anisms or a single mechanism with two modes of access? Is one a
prerequisite for the other? Carruthers concludes that metacogni-
tion is grounded in mindreading. If one argues that judgments
about oneself must be distinguished from judgments about
others, his conclusion is sound. But this conclusion is one that
a variety of behaviorism reached long before the advent of the
cognitive revolution. In his “Behaviorism at 50,” Skinner (1963)
recounted the history of Watsonian methodological behaviorism
in the early decades of the twentieth century and its rejection of
introspection (see also Catania 1993), but he also noted the
unnecessary constraints that Watson’s account had imposed on
theory.
Skinner’s later radical behaviorism rejected the Watsonian
constraints and extended his approach to the origins of the
language of private events. As a contribution to a symposium
organized by his advisor, E. G. Boring, Skinner (1945) made
explicit his interest in “Boring from Within.” The 1945 paper,
“The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms,” was a renun-
ciation of operationism, but, more important, it provided an
account of how a vocabulary of private events (feelings, emotions,
etc.) could be created even though those who taught the words
and maintained consistencies of usage had access only to
shared public accompaniments of those private events.1 Given
these origins of the private or introspective language, Skinner’s
resolution of the issue in terms of the public practices of the
verbal community is the only feasible way of dealing with the
problem that Carruthers has so aptly described in terms of his
mindreading system, which never has access to what others are
imagining or feeling. To the extent that it does have access to
what one feels or imagines oneself, one can speak of those
events only in a vocabulary that is anchored in public correlates.
Carruthers’ point that instances of self-attributed unsymbolized
thought occur in circumstances in which a third party might
have made the same attribution is perfectly consistent with this
argument.
The irony, then, is that with respect to introspection, judg-
ments about the behavior of others (mindreading) and judgments
about one’s own behavior (metacognition), Carruthers has
reached conclusions that are consistent with Skinner’s. One can
guess that he took so long only because of the complexity of
the terms that entered into his account. Skinner’s account is far
more parsimonious. Skinner does not begin with something
called discriminating and follow it with differential responding;
the differential responding is itself the discriminating. He does
not say that perceiving and sensing and thinking are something
different from behaving; they are kinds of behavior, defined
not by whether they involve movement but rather by whether
they are involved in contingent relations with environmental
events (for this reason, Carruthers notwithstanding, a lot of beha-
vior goes on even when one is sitting quiet and motionless, and
one has just as much access to this behavior as to that of standing
or walking). There is no more need to appeal to seeing and
hearing as prerequisite concepts than there is to say that we
cannot sit or stand or walk without concepts of sitting or standing
or walking; these are all names for things we do. To invoke them
as explanations does not serve our theories well.
Carruthers’ account also converges on other concepts that
have been elaborated by Skinner. For example, his System 1
and System 2 have features that are closely paralleled by what
Skinner (1969) respectively called rule-governed and contin-
gency-shaped behavior, and Carruthers is surely on the right
track in saying that speech is an action that does not begin with
metacognitive representations of thought (a more detailed
account is beyond the scope of this commentary, but see
Catania 2006, Chs. 14 and 15). Furthermore, in considering
the different environmental contingencies that operate on
verbal and nonverbal classes of behavior, the behavioral
account has no trouble dealing with the various confabulations
that Carruthers has surveyed. Just as speech errors can tell us a
lot about language structure, so confabulations may tell us a lot
about the nature of our judgments about ourselves and others.
It is good to see cognitive science at last converging on con-
clusions that had once been reached in behavioral accounts. If
that were the only point, this commentary would serve little
but a historical purpose. But there is extensive behavior analytic
research relevant to these issues (in particular, see Wixted &
Gaitan 2002), and some of it may prove useful to those of any
theoretical orientation. Of course, it would be not at all surprising
if the suggestions here are not well received. That likelihood is
enhanced by the fact that this has been a necessarily brief and
superficial presentation of the behavioral case. But the literature
is there, so perhaps a few will check it out.
NOTE
1. Two articles by B. F. Skinner cited in this commentary (Skinner
1945; 1969) were reprinted in Behavioral and Brain Sciences (Vol. 7,
December 1984).
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Abstract: We agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in
species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the
metacognition-is-prior account and against the mindreading-is-prior
account. We discuss this existing evidence and explain why an
evolutionary perspective favors the former account and poses serious
problems for the latter account.
Carruthers acknowledges that evidence for metacognition in
species lacking mindreading would provide dramatic evidence for
the metacognition-is-prior view and against the mindreading-is-
prior view, and he asserts that the existing evidence can be
explained using a first-order system of belief and desire strengths
(target article, sect. 5.2; see also Carruthers 2008b). We evaluated
similar response strategies using formal modeling (Smith et al.
2008) and found indeed that some animal metacognition findings
could be explained using first-order strategies. Yet Carruthers’
use here of the field’s earliest paradigms and oldest data to make
his argument is unfortunately selective. More recent paradigms
often do not support his first-order argument and description.
Smith et al. (2006) dissociated monkeys’ uncertainty responding
fromany reinforcement and stimulus cues that couldhaveorganized
Carruthers’ gradients of first-order beliefs and response tendencies.
It was clear in that study that monkeys’ uncertainty-response
strategies were adjudicated cognitively and decisionally, not using
first-order cues. They followed the animal’s subjective decisional
construal of the task. Couchman et al. (submitted) extended this
dissociation to situations of broader task transfer in which animals
had to establish functional regions of judged difficulty and uncer-
tainty even when forced to self-organize their task performance.
Recent cross-species research on uncertainty monitoring also
speaks against first-order interpretations of uncertainty-monitor-
ing performances. Beran et al. (in press) gave capuchin monkeys
a Sparse-Uncertainty-Dense task that was matched to a Sparse-
Middle-Dense task. Capuchins used the middle (first-order)
response easily and naturally. They almost never used the uncer-
tainty response, despite having the reinforcement history needed
to do so. Likewise, elegant research by Shettleworth and her
colleagues (Inman & Shettleworth 1999) has shown that
pigeons also do not express an uncertainty-responding capability,
even when there are strong first-order reasons for them to do so.
It is an important implication from these cross-species results
that the organizing psychology underlying uncertainty respond-
ing is not first-order, because adept first-order animals such as
capuchins and pigeons cannot find and use that psychology.
Inotherwritings,Carruthers (2008b) also acknowledges that first-
order beliefs and desires will not explain the wide-ranging empirical
findings of uncertainty monitoring and information seeking by
animals. He devises a secondary mental construct to explain why
an animal uses the uncertainty response in too-close-to-call situ-
ations. He suggests that some species have a gate-keeping “mechan-
ism . . . which when confronted with conflicting plans that are too
close to one another in strength will refrain from acting on the
one that happens to be strongest at that moment, and will initiate
alternative information-gathering behavior instead” (p. 66 ).
The gatekeeper mechanism operates on first-order cognition’s
outputs to assess their ability to produce a correct response. It
meets the definition of a second-order controlled cognitive
process. It produces a qualitative change in behavior and cogni-
tive strategy (information seeking, uncertainty responses, etc.).
It typifies the metacognitive utility that all theorists have
envisioned. Even in Carruthers’ own description of animals’ cog-
nitive self-regulation, it seems, metacognition is prior.
Another analytic problem in the target article concerns the
different standard of evidence that is applied to studies of animal
metacognition and studies of animal mindreading. It seems
highly unlikely, and it goes completely undefended in the target
article (sect. 5, para. 2) that all the metacognition paradigms fall
prey to behaviorist explanations, but that all the mindreading para-
digms are veridical. They clearly are not (Heyes 1998).
Carruthers makes a valid suggestion that, if metacognition is
prior, one should be able to explore the evolutionary pressures
that produced a free-standing metacognitive utility. Fortunately,
James (1890/1952), Dewey (1934/1980), Tolman (1938), and
many others have provided this evolutionary narrative (see also
Smith et al. 2003). Animals often encounter doubtful and uncer-
tain situations in which their habitual stimulus-response associ-
ations do not clearly indicate a safe and adaptive response.
They would benefit enormously in those situations from having
an online cognitive utility that will let them assemble the relevant
facts and recollections and choose an adaptive course of action.
Metacognition provides exactly this utility.
It is also a remarkable phylogenetic fact that there appear to be
no species that show mindreading ability but fail to show meta-
cognitive ability. This could be used to support more than one
of the possibilities discussed in the target article. However, it
clearly supports least of all the mindreading-is-prior account.
Finally, we believe that an evolutionary perspective on this issue
raises a serious problem for themindreading-is-prior account. The
author’s accountmay, in principle, explain thedevelopmentofmeta-
cognition ontogenetically, especially if one assumes a parent is con-
stantly informing you of the intentions of others. Your mother may
tell you, “Johnny wants a cookie” while you see Johnny reaching
for the cookie jar, and the next time you find yourself reaching for
the cookie jar, you may well apply “wants a cookie” to yourself.
This works only because humans communicate their knowledge of
concepts and intentions from one generation to the next.
The first mindreading animal would have no basis for which to
make an attribution of a mental state. How would it be possible or
beneficial to attribute “wants a cookie” to Johnny, if the attributer
has no known experience with “wanting,” no understanding of
“what it is like to want” and no idea that it has ever “wanted”?
The mindreading-is-prior account must explain how, from
nothing but observed physical behavior, and with no reason to
ever attribute anything but cause-and-effect mechanical pro-
cesses, animals came to attribute subjective belief and desire
states to others. This would be equivalent to knowing there is
something “that it is like” to be a bat (Nagel 1974) prior to
knowing that there is anything “that it is like” to be you!
Indeed, exactly the opposite seems to be true. We have great
access to and a rich understanding of our own mental states
and only a very limited understanding of the mental states of
others. We first knew what it was like to know, and then
assumed that others might be having an analogous experience.
This process of extending mental concepts outward is surely a
more plausible and tractable evolutionary narrative. Within that
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Abstract: This excellent target article helps to resolve a problem for dual-
process theories of higher cognition. Theorists posit two systems, one of
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which appears to be conscious and volitional. It seems to control some
behaviours but to confabulate explanations for others. I argue that this
system is only conscious in an illusory sense and that all self-
explanations are confabulatory, as Carruthers suggests.
I have long held (Evans 1980) that while we can introspect on our
mental experiences, we have no access to the processes which
underlie our behaviour, and I have equally long held the view
(Evans 1989; Wason & Evans 1975) that strategy reports fre-
quently reflect confabulations. Crossing the disciplinary divide
with philosophy, this accords well with Carruthers’ claims that
(a) we have no introspective access to our propositional attitudes
and (b) that we may have an illusion of conscious control result-
ing from applying our “mindreading” abilities to ourselves as well
as others. Although Carruthers seeks to reconcile his massively
modular view of the mind with dual-process theories of reasoning
(see also Carruthers 2006), it is not clear how many tenets of the
standard theory he would accept. I therefore examine his “mind-
reading is prior” argument with respect to this standard dual-
process approach.
Dual-process theorists propose that humans have two distinct
forms of cognitive processing: one fast, automatic, and high
capacity (Type 1), and another slow, controlled, and low capacity
(Type 2) (Evans 2008). It is commonly assumed that these two
modes of thought reflect two distinct forms of knowledge:
implicit and explicit (Carruthers does not appear to endorse
this distinction). Implicit knowledge may be encapsulated in cog-
nitive modules or acquired from associative or procedural learn-
ing. Explicit knowledge has some propositional format and can
be “called to mind.” Neuroscientific evidence strongly supports
the existence of dissociable implicit and explicit memory
systems (Eichenbaum & Cohen 2001). Intuitive and reflective
judgments are assumed to reflect access to these two forms of
knowledge and to comprise two distinct cognitive systems. This
can explain, for example, why people seem to possess implicit
attitudes and stereotypes, which may conflict and compete with
their explicit social attitudes (Smith & DeCoster 2000).
There is, however, a point of discomfort within dual-process
theory to which the current target article is highly relevant.
Since theorists claim that there are two systems with functional
control of behaviour, System 2 – the “conscious” one – cannot
be epiphenomenal. On the other hand, as Carruthers correctly
states, the evidence that people frequently confabulate expla-
nations for their behaviour is overwhelming. Evans and Over
(1996) were clearly struggling with this issue, when they stated
(p. 160) that “we do not regard explicit thinking as simply
serving to rationalise behaviour, and believe that decisions and
actions can result from explicit processes.” Does this mean that
Type 2 processes sometimes really control a response and at
other times confabulates an explanation for a Type 1 response?
Could we not instead argue that all strategy reports are self-
interpretations in just the same way as Carruthers argues for
propositional attitudes?
The problem as I see it (Evans 2008; 2009) is that it is a mistake
to use consciousness in the definition of the distinction between
Systems 1 and 2. A more satisfactory definition is that the latter
requires access to central working memory, whereas the former
does not. For sure, this implies that something about a Type 2
process is conscious, as the contents of working memory tend
to reflect in conscious experiences (Andrade 2001). However, it
can still be the case that (a) most of the workings of System 2
are unconscious – for example, the processes that direct our
current locus of attention, and those that retrieve memories rel-
evant to the current context, and (b) that we lack introspective
access to the nature of System 2 processing. (Note that [b] may
be at odds with Carruthers’ claim that we do have a conscious
mind.) Introspection provides no access to Type 1 processes,
that either (preconsciously) pass information into working
memory for further processing, or by-pass it altogether (Evans
2009). Because System 2 uses working memory, something
about it can be introspected – the locus of our attention, for
example, or relevant perceptual and emotional experiences.
These will be used as inputs to the self-interpretation process
that Carruthers discusses, together with contextual knowledge
and any current goals we are pursuing. Because we generally
have good theories of our own behaviour, we can often
produce veridical reports. On other occasions, we confabulate,
but I suggest that mental processes in either case are exactly
the same.
I suggest that it is unhelpful to describe dual-process theories
as contrasting conscious and nonconscious processing, and that
the theory in no ways rests upon either introspective access or
any notion of conscious control. Dual-process research
methods depend instead on the assumptions that (a) Type 1
and Type 2 processing are qualitatively and measurably distinct
in their characteristics and outputs, and (b) that the balance
between the two forms of processing is related to a number of
well-defined variables. These include cognitive ability, motiv-
ation, time available for reasoning, and the presence of compet-
ing or distracting tasks. However, we still need some account of
why confabulation is common and why we do feel as though we
have conscious control of our behaviour. This is where I find
Carruthers’ “mindreading is prior” argument helpful. If our
brains have an in-built folk psychology for understanding the
minds of others, why would the same system not interpret our
own behaviour?
In summary, Carruthers’ account helps to resolve a problem
for standard dual-process accounts of higher cognition. People,
he argues, are conscious of perceptual and quasi-perceptual
experiences, the latter being formed by mental rehearsal that
involves inner speech and/or imagery. It is precisely such proces-
ses – that involve working memory – that cause people to confa-
bulate. People do not confabulate accounts of Type 1 processes
such as those underlying recognising a face, or understanding a
sentence; they do confabulate explanations for Type 2 processes
such as decision making. As Carruthers says, people will also con-
fabulate on the basis of behavioural data, but they omit reference
to relevant Type 1 processes when they do so. For example,
people never refer to a number of well-documented perceptual,
cognitive, and social biases in their verbal reports, for folk psy-
chology knows nothing of such matters. This also explains our
chronic tendency to overly attribute conscious reasons for
actions in ourselves and in others.








Abstract: Inner experience is proposed as a basis for self-interpretation in
both children and adults, but young children’s inner experience may
not be comparable to our own. I consider evidence on children’s
attribution of inner experience, experience sampling, and the
development of inner speech, concluding that Carruthers’ theory should
predict a developmental lag between mindreading and metacognition.
Carruthers’ “mindreading is prior” model holds that we gain
knowledge of our own propositional attitudes through applying
our mentalizing capacities to our own behavior and inner
experience. In evaluating this claim, Carruthers considers the
question of developmental asymmetry between self- and other-
knowledge. Both the “two independent mechanisms” and the
“metacognition is prior” views would predict that metacognition
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should appear before mindreading. These two models do not,
however, exhaust the possibilities for non-interpretative accounts
of metacognition (specifically, they leave “one mechanism, two
modes of access” as a remaining competitor account). This fact,
together with recent evidence for very early mentalizing compe-
tence which, for methodological reasons, cannot be matched by
data on early metacognition, means that such evidence cannot
discriminate between Carruthers’ interpretative account and a
non-interpretative alternative.
There is one respect, however, in which a developmental
asymmetry between mindreading and metacognition could
have a bearing on Carruthers’ model. Carruthers proposes that
self-interpretation can proceed on the basis of information
about overt behavior and physical circumstances, along with
elements of inner experience such as inner speech, visual
imagery, and feelings. He notes that there will be some instances
where, behavioral data being lacking (as in the example of
someone sitting quietly in their living room), self-interpretation
will be based exclusively on information about inner experience.
The question, then, is what sort of information that could
support self-interpretation is available to young children. Pre-
sumably, young children have the same possibilities for interpret-
ing external information as adults do. But is their inner
experience comparable? At least three sources of evidence lead
us to scepticism on this point.
First, there are the findings of experimental research on chil-
dren’s understanding of inner experience. For example, consider
the findings of Flavell and colleagues (e.g., Flavell et al. 1993;
2000) that preschool children frequently deny the presence of
inner experience in individuals (including themselves) when it
would be appropriate to attribute such experience. These
results are usually interpreted as evidence that young children
have only weak powers of introspection. But an alternative
interpretation is that young children do not experience a
stream of consciousness in the way that older children and
adults do, and that this accounts for their weak understanding
of the inner experience of others (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel
2007, sect. 11.1.7.8; Meins et al. 2003).
A second line of evidence comes from the limited data from
experience sampling in children. Descriptive Experience
Sampling (DES; Hurlburt & Heavey 2006) involves careful inter-
viewing around records made of inner experience shortly preced-
ing a random electronic beep. Hurlburt describes an episode of
DES with a nine-year-old boy who reported an image of a hole
in his backyard containing some toys (Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel
2007, Box 5.8). When asked whether this image was an accurate
description of his backyard, the participant replied that he had
not yet had time to put all of the toys into the image. Hurlburt’s
conclusion from this and other instances of childhood experience
sampling is that constructing a visual image is a skill that takes
time to develop. Although much remains to be done in adapting
experience sampling techniques for use with young children, the
evidence currently available invites caution in making assump-
tions about young children’s inner experience.
Third, there are theoretical reasons for not assuming that
certain aspects of children’s inner experience, particularly inner
speech, are comparable to those of adults. The most fully devel-
oped theory of the development of inner speech is that of
Vygotsky (1934/1987). In his theory, inner speech is the develop-
mental outcome of the internalization of social speech via the
transitional stage of private speech. Findings from the study of
private speech suggest that its transformation into inner speech
is unlikely to be complete until middle childhood (Winsler &
Naglieri 2003). The view that there is a general shift towards
verbal mediation of cognition in the early school-age years is sup-
ported by findings that phonological recoding of visually pre-
sented material in short-term memory tasks is linked to private
speech use at this age (Al-Namlah et al. 2006). Speech that is
still in the process of being internalized is likely to appear to
the child’s consciousness as something other than adult-like
inner speech (Fernyhough et al. 2007). Further experimental
research on the transition to verbal mediation, complemented
by more developmentally sensitive experience sampling studies,
should provide a clearer indication of when inner speech can
be assumed to be present in young children.
There are reasons, then, for doubting that young children have
access to the full range of inner experiences proposed by Car-
ruthers to form the basis of self-interpretation. Because inner
speech is one of the main sources of evidence supposed to feed
into individuals’ interpretations of their own propositional atti-
tudes, the emergence of metacognition should be developmen-
tally constrained by the emergence of inner speech. Other
aspects of inner experience, such as visual imagery, are also
likely to take time to develop. Given what we know about the
timetable for the emergence of mindreading capacities (particu-
larly the evidence for some mentalizing competence in the
second year of life), Carruthers’ theory should predict a develop-
mental lag between mindreading and metacognition. An alterna-
tive for Carruthers would be to argue that behavioral and
contextual evidence was sufficient for self-interpretation in
young children, but then his account would be indistinguishable
from that of Gopnik (1993).
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Abstract: Carruthers’ arguments depend on a tenuous interpretation
of cases from the confabulation literature. Specifically, Carruthers
maintains that cases of confabulation are “subjectively
indistinguishable” from cases of alleged introspection. However, in
typical cases of confabulation, the self-attributions are characterized by
low confidence, in contrast to cases of alleged introspection.
What is confabulation? Carruthers’ central argument hinges on
this notion, so we need to get clear on what he has in mind. Car-
ruthers doesn’t present an explicit characterization, but the
overall discussion suggests that the relevant confabulations are
a class of first-person mental state attributions that are generated
by an “interpretative” process, as opposed to an “introspective”
process. By “interpretative,” Carruthers means any process
“that accesses information about the subject’s current circum-
stances, or the subject’s current or recent behavior, as well as
any other information about the subject’s current or recent
mental life” (sect. 1.4, para. 3). This characterization seems too
broad because introspection itself is supposed to be a process
that accesses information about the subject’s current mental
life. But Carruthers means to count as interpretative only those
processes that do not employ any “direct” access or any mechan-
ism specifically dedicated to detecting one’s current mental
states.
On Carruthers’ view, all attributions of propositional attitude
events are, in fact, interpretative. So what is the relation
between “confabulation” and “interpretation”? Here are several
different possibilities:
1. Confabulations include all self-attributions that result from
interpretation.
2. Confabulations include all false self-attributions that result
from interpretation, and accurate interpretative self-ascriptions
do not count as confabulatory.
3. Confabulations include only a proper subset of false self-
attributions resulting from interpretation.
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We doubt that Carruthers has possibility 1 in mind, as this would
mean that one is confabulating even when one quite consciously
uses interpretative processes to discern one’s past mental states.
If Carruthers has option 3 in mind, then we need to know much
more about what distinguishes the proper subset. As a result, we
proceed on the assumption that possibility 2 captures what Car-
ruthers has in mind.
Our experience with identifying our own current mental states
is characteristically quick, accurate, and confident. By contrast,
when it comes to attributing mental states to others, our attribu-
tions seem much slower, more accident prone, and unsure. This
subjective difference is thought to provide prima facie evidence
that we have (non-interpretative) introspective access to our
own mental states. Carruthers attempts to defeat this prima
facie consideration by proclaiming that confabulated reports
are subjectively indistinguishable from cases of alleged introspec-
tion. People confabulate attributions of their own propositional
attitude events “while being under the impression that they are
introspecting” (sect. 6, para. 1). Thus, we have no reason to
think that canonical cases of “introspection” differ from confabu-
lation in this respect (i.e., that we are interpreting in the latter
case but not the former). Carruthers goes on to argue that
since there is no other positive reason to believe in the reality
of introspection for the attitudes, the best explanation is that all
self-attribution (confabulation and alleged introspection) is sub-
served by the same kinds of processes: that is, interpretative ones.
Carruthers’ argument depends on the claim that people confa-
bulate attributions of propositional attitudes while being under
the impression that they are introspecting. But we are given no
evidence that this has been systematically investigated. Certainly
no one has ever asked participants in these cases whether they
think they are introspecting or interpreting. Without some
more direct evidence, Carruthers is not warranted in claiming
that when people confabulate they are often “under the
impression that they are introspecting.”
A closer look at the confabulation cases gives further reason to
doubt the argument. The evidence on confabulation cited by
Carruthers is all anecdotal, but even the anecdotes are illuminat-
ing if one looks at the behavior a bit more closely. For we find that
across many different paradigms in which people confabulate,
the confabulations are not reported with a sense of “obviousness
and immediacy.” Consider the following examples:
a. In a classic misattribution study, subjects took more shock
because they thought a pill caused their symptoms. In a debrief-
ing procedure subjects were asked, “I noticed you took more
shock than average. Why do you suppose you did?” Nisbett
and Wilson (1977) present one instance of confabulation and
claim it as typical. The confabulation begins as follows: “Gee,
I don’t really know . . .” (p. 237).
b. In a dissonance reduction experiment involving shocks,
Zimbardo reports that a typical confabulation would have
been, “I guess maybe you turned the shock down” (Nisbett &
Wilson 1977, p. 238).
c. Thalia Wheatley, one of the most inventive researchers
using hypnotic suggestion (e.g., Wheatley & Haidt 2005),
reports that when she has participants perform actions under
hypnotic suggestion, she often asks them why they performed
the action. Although they do often confabulate, their initial
response to the question is typically “I don’t know” (T. Wheatley,
personal communication).
In each of these research paradigms, we find typical confabu-
lations delivered with manifestly low confidence, rather than the
sense of obviousness and immediacy that is supposed to be
characteristic of introspective report.
Carruthers also draws on widely cited cases of confabulation
involving split-brain patients. And, although Carruthers claims
that split-brain patients confabulate with a sense of obviousness
and immediacy, the situation is not so clear. In footage of split-
brain patients, we find them showing little confidence when
asked to explain behavior issuing from the right hemisphere.
For instance, in a typical study with split-brain patient Joe, Joe
is shown a saw to his right hemisphere and a hammer to his
left. He is then told to draw what he saw with his left hand. Pre-
dictably, Joe draws a saw. Gazzaniga points to the drawing and
says, “That’s nice, what’s that?” Saw. “What’d you see?” I saw a
hammer. “What’d you draw that for?” I dunno (Hutton &
Sameth 1988).
Carefully controlled studies are clearly needed. However,
these anecdotes provide prima facie reason to think there are sys-
tematic differences in confidence levels between confabulation
and apparent introspection, which in turn suggests a difference
in underlying mechanism. The fact that confabulations are
accompanied by low confidence does not, of course, provide con-
clusive evidence in favor of introspection. But it does suggest that
given the present state of the evidence, the confabulation argu-
ment is toothless.
How we know our conscious minds:
Introspective access to conscious thoughts
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Abstract: Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to
which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but
introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty.
Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the
mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional
introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.
In section 7 of the target article, Carruthers considers the propo-
sal that we have two levels of mentality, conscious and uncon-
scious, corresponding to the two reasoning systems posited by
many psychologists, and that we have different forms of access
to the attitudes at the two levels – merely interpretative access
to those at the unconscious level, but introspective access to
those at the conscious level. Prima facie, this mixed position is
an attractive one, which does justice both to the evidence for
psychological self-interpretation cited by Carruthers and to the
everyday intuition that we can introspect our conscious thoughts.
Carruthers rejects the option, however. Although conceding that
we have introspective access to conscious thinking, he denies that
we have such access to conscious judgments and decisions.
I argue here that this conclusion is too hasty.
Carruthers’ argument turns on the claim that judgments and
decisions terminate reasoning processes and produce their
characteristic effects directly, without further processing. Con-
scious thinking, on the other hand, involves rehearsing mental
imagery, especially inner speech, and this has only an indirect
influence on thought and action. The route may be metacogni-
tive: A rehearsed assertion with content p may give rise to an
(unconscious) metacognitive belief, to the effect that one believes
that p or that one is committed to the truth of p, which, together
with suitable desires, will lead one to think and act as if one
believes that p. Or the rehearsed assertion may be processed as
testimony, leading one to form the first-order belief that p,
which will then guide behaviour in the normal way. On either
route, Carruthers argues, the conscious event gives rise to the
effects of a judgment only through the mediation of further
cognitive processing, and so does not count as a judgment
itself. Similar considerations apply to decisions, although here
Carruthers mentions only the metacognitive route.
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I am sympathetic to Carruthers’ account of conscious thinking,
and I agree that imagistic rehearsals influence thought and action
through the mediation of unconscious cognitive processes. But
this is not incompatible with the commonsense view that some
conscious events are judgments and decisions. To see this, we
need to take seriously the suggestion that the conscious mind is
a distinct level of mentality. Carruthers has himself developed a
version of this view, arguing that the conscious mind (the psy-
chologists’ System 2) is not a separate neural structure, but
rather, a higher-level “virtual” one, realized in cycles of operation
of a more basic unconscious system (System 1), which, among
many other tasks, generates and processes the imagery involved
in conscious thinking (Carruthers 2006; 2009; for a related
version, see Frankish 1998; 2004; 2009). And from this perspec-
tive it is natural to regard appropriate utterances in inner speech
as genuine judgments and decisions – at least when they achieve
their effects via the metacognitive route. For these events will
terminate reasoning processes at the higher level and on the rel-
evant topic. The further processing occurs at the lower level and
is devoted to a different topic. When I rehearse the sentence,
“Polar bears are endangered” in assertoric mode, this terminates
my reasoning about polar bears. The subsequent unconscious
reasoning is about how to interpret and respond to this assertion,
not about whether the conclusion it expresses is correct. These
processes can be thought of as implementing the higher-level atti-
tude, and their existence does not compromise the status of the
conscious event as a judgment.
It is true that the lower-level processes may sometimes fail to
generate the appropriate effects (for example, if the desire to
execute one’s commitments is overridden by a stronger desire),
but this is irrelevant. On every view there are some implementing
processes, at least at a neurological level, and these processes
may go awry. And if we have a settled habit of interpreting appro-
priate utterance rehearsals as expressions of belief or commit-
ment, and a settled desire to act consistently or to discharge
our commitments, then the right effects will follow most of the
time. Similar considerations apply to decisions.
The only peculiarity of the two-level view is that the processes
that implement conscious judgments and decisions are cognitive
ones. But why should that matter? Compare the way the judg-
ments and decisions of a company are implemented. The edicts
emerging from the boardroom require further processing in
order to affect the activities of the organization, and this proces-
sing involves reasoning on the part of the staff involved. (Again,
this will have a metarepresentational character, involving
beliefs about what the directors have concluded.) But we still
want to say that the judgments and decisions were made in the
boardroom, rather than in the cubicles of the junior staff.
What about cases in which a rehearsed utterance generates its
effects via the second route, being processed as testimony and
generating a first-order belief? Here I think Carruthers is right.
If further processing serves to evaluate the conclusion reached
rather than simply to implement it, then this does disqualify
the conscious event from judgment status. But note that in
such cases, the agents themselves will not think of the conscious
events as judgments. For if they did, they would naturally come
to believe that they believed, or were committed to, the con-
clusions expressed, and the subsequent processing would follow
the metacognitive route. Thus, there is no reason to regard such
events as candidates for judgments in the first place. (We might
think of them as hypotheses or self-suggestions.) Again, the same
goes for decisions.
I conclude that Carruthers’ case against a mixed position is not
compelling. It is important to stress that the proposed mixed pos-
ition does not involve positing additional introspective mechan-
isms. Carruthers allows that we have introspective access to
conscious (System 2) thinking; I am simply claiming that some
of the introspectable events can be legitimately classified as judg-
ments and decisions. The proposal is merely a reconceptualiza-
tion of the processes Carruthers describes. But it is a natural
one, given a two-level view of the sort Carruthers endorses,
and one that accords with intuition. For these reasons it should
be preferred. Of course, it would be ad hoc if a two-level view
were not independently motivated, but it is (see aforementioned
citations).
Non-interpretative metacognition for true
beliefs
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Abstract: Mindreading often requires access to beliefs, so the
mindreading system should be able to self-attribute beliefs, even
without self-interpretation. This proposal is consistent with Carruthers’
claim that mindreading and metacognition depend on the same
cognitive system and the same information as one another; and it may
be more consistent with this claim than is Carruthers’ account of
metacognition.
Mindreading often requires access to one’s own beliefs.1 Con-
sider the following mental state attributions: Bill believes a
first-aid kit contains bandages, though the kit actually contains
feathers; Louise is an expert in British history, so she knows
that the Battle of Hastings occurred in 1066; and Sally, age 2,
desires candy when offered a choice between this and sushi as
a snack. These mental state attributions do not depend on the
interpretation of others’ speech or behavior. Instead, they pri-
marily depend on your beliefs (i.e., first-aid kits normally
contain bandages; the Battle of Hastings occurred in 1066; chil-
dren typically prefer candy over unfamiliar foods) in combination
with other principles (e.g., experts in British history know a lot
about British history).
The need to access beliefs is not restricted to just a few cases of
mindreading. Instead, such access may be the rule in belief attri-
bution: Most beliefs are true, and so one’s own beliefs are indica-
tive of what others believe. Because of this, people may have a
default tendency to attribute their “true” beliefs to others
(Fodor 1992; Leslie & Thaiss 1992; see Leslie et al. [2004] for
a review of much evidence favoring an account making this
claim). To operate according to this default tendency, the mind-
reading system requires access to beliefs.
The mindreading system’s access to beliefs is problematic for
Carruthers’ account of metacognition, which denies such
access (target article, sect. 2, para. 6).2 For if the system accesses
beliefs when attributing mental states to others, then it should
also access them when attributing mental states to the self.
For instance, if the mindreading system accesses the belief
“the Battle of Hastings occurred in 1066” when attributing it
to Louise the historian, then the system should also be able to
attribute this belief to the self. The mindreading system’s
access to beliefs allows people to engage in non-interpretative
metacognition.
This proposal does not necessarily imply non-interpretative
access to other mental states, such as intentions, desires, and
past (currently false) beliefs. Unlike currently held beliefs,
these other mental states are typically uninformative about the
world and about others’ mental states. One’s intention to drink
coffee says little about the world except perhaps that people
sometimes drink coffee; and it says little about other people
because relatively few share this intention at any time, meaning
that it will seldom be useful to quickly extend this intention to
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others. So mindreading may not require access to such mental
states. If the mindreading system lacks this access, it will also
be lacking for metacognition.
Against our proposal, it might be claimed that the mindreading
system does not access beliefs, but only inner speech and mental
imagery that express beliefs. But this claim requires people to
know which fragments of inner speech to use when attributing
mental states to others. This claim also contradicts the view
that people have a default tendency to attribute true beliefs.
And given that inner speech and mental imagery are not required
when answering questions about when the Battle of Hastings
occurred (sect 2.1, para. 1), it seems doubtful that either is
needed when answering when Louise thinks it occurred. Put
more baldly, it is difficult to believe that attributing a desire for
candy to Sally requires one to express in inner speech the
belief “young children typically like candy.”
Our proposal is not strongly challenged by evidence that
people sometimes confabulate when reporting beliefs. Confabu-
lation is only problematic to the extent that it involves metacog-
nitive errors in which people misreport beliefs. But such errors
are difficult to distinguish from accurate reporting of irrational
beliefs. When subjects reported that the rightmost of four iden-
tical pantyhose was softest (Nisbett & Wilson 1977), they might
have been misreporting a belief (i.e., reporting a belief they
did not have), but they also might have been faithfully reporting
a false belief formed while deciding which item was softest.
Also, that people sometimes err in reporting beliefs does not
imply that they never have non-interpretative access to their
beliefs. Self-interpretation and metacognitive errors may be
particularly common for certain sorts of beliefs, and perhaps
they are particularly common when people are motivated to
report beliefs they do not actually have. In the pantyhose exper-
iment, subjects might have had no belief about which item was
softest, but still might have felt compelled to answer. Coming
to this answer might open the way for metacognitive errors.
But this does not imply that self-interpretation would be
needed if subjects were instead asked about something they
already believed, such as whether they thought the pantyhose
samples were soft at all.
One might also challenge our proposal by conceding that the
mindreading system accesses beliefs when making attributions
about others, but then denying that it has this access for self-attri-
butions. This defense makes little sense in light of the most
detailed account of how beliefs are actually attributed (Leslie
et al. 2004). According to this account, the mindreading system
operates according to the default assumption that beliefs
are true, but sometimes overrides this assumption, as when
reasoning about beliefs that are false. This account makes little
distinction about whether beliefs are attributed to others or
to oneself.
Carruthers’ “mindreading is prior” model claims that mind-
reading and metacognition depend on the same cognitive
system and on the same information. Our proposal is consistent
with this claim and seems more consistent with it than is Car-
ruthers’ account of metacognition. Mindreading requires access
to beliefs. Carruthers denies that such access is available in meta-
cognition, which implies that the two processes draw on different
information. The account we propose claims that access to beliefs
occurs in both mindreading and metacognition, and this implies
non-interpretative self-attribution of true belief.
NOTES
1. By access we always mean non-interpretative access. This access
might involve a direct link between beliefs and the mindreading
system, or it might be indirect and mediated by some other system. We
are unsure whether this access conforms to what is normally meant by
introspection.
2. Carruthers (2006, especially pp. 181–86) discusses a different
version of this problem.
There must be more to development of
mindreading and metacognition than
passing false belief tasks
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Abstract: We argue that while it is a valuable contribution, Carruthers’
model may be too restrictive to elaborate our understanding of the
development of mindreading and metacognition, or to enrich our
knowledge of individual differences and psychopathology. To illustrate,
we describe pertinent examples where there may be a critical interplay
betweenprimitive social-cognitive processes and emerging self-attributions.
Carruthers makes a good case that self-awareness of propositional
attitudes is an interpretational process, and does not involve direct
introspective access. He also argues that mindreading and meta-
cognition rely on one cognitive mechanism; however, in this
case we are less persuaded by the evidence which hinges on Car-
ruthers’ reading of well-rehearsed data from autism and schizo-
phrenia. We think that these two predictions have distinct bases
and it is at least conceivable that there are two dissociable inter-
pretativemeta-representational systems capable of confabulation:
one self-directed, one other-directed. Thus, the argument in
favour of model 4, over, say, a version of model 1 without a
strong commitment to non-interpretative access to self-states, is
based purely on parsimony. Our intention is not to defend such
a two-system model, but rather to point out that even if one
accepts that metacognition involves interpretation, mindreading
and metacognition may still be dissociable. Furthermore, Car-
ruthers pays little attention to the differences between input chan-
nels associated with first- and third-person mindreading and the
surely distinct mechanisms (arguably within the mindreading
system) that translate them into attitude-interpretations. As a
result, we worry that Carruthers may end up with a rather impo-
verished model that struggles to do justice to the broader pheno-
type of first- and third-person mindreading, its development, and
the ways in which it may go awry in psychopathology.
Carruthers’ reading of developmental evidence is restricted to
the standard strategy of comparing children’s performance across
false-belief tasks. These are inherently conservative tests of
mindreading ability, as false-belief-attribution is neither a
common nor a particularly reliable function of the mindreading
system (Birch & Bloom 2007; Keysar et al. 2003). Clearly,
there are earlier and more common abilities central to develop-
ment of third-person propositional-attitude mindreading – for
example, referential understanding of gazes (Brooks & Meltzoff
2002; Senju et al. 2008) or pretense. However Carruthers does
not discuss development of the mechanism that is central to his
model. He also overlooks evidence that the tendency to engage
in pretence has no primacy over the ability to understand pre-
tence in others (Leslie 1987; Onishi et al. 2007).
There are other developmental areas potentially useful to
Carruthers’ argument. Several socio-constructivist accounts
(e.g., Fonagy et al. 2002; 2007) attempt to describe the develop-
mental mechanisms by which early social-cognitive competences,
expressed especially in early interactions with the attachment
figure (Sharp & Fonagy 2008), give rise to metacognitive
awareness. Arguably, the most advanced of these theories is the
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social-biofeedback model proposed by Gergely and Watson (1996;
1999; Fonagy et al. 2002; Gergely & Unoka 2008). Currently, this
model assumes that in repetitive episodes of (mostly) nonverbal
communication (Csibra & Gergely 2006) mothers provide marked
emotional “mirroring” displays which are highly (but inevitably
imperfectly) contingent on the emotional displays of the infant.
By doing so, mothers provide specific forms of biofeedback, allow-
ing infants to parse their affective experience, form separate
categories of their affective states, and form associations between
these categories and their developing knowledge of the causal
roles of emotions in other people’s behaviour.
It is important to note that socio-constructivist theory is an
essential complement to Carruthers’ model 4, bridging a poten-
tially fatal gap in his argument. People do attribute propositional
emotional states to the self, and it seems reasonable to assume
that their actual emotional states (propositional or not) play a
role in generating such attributions. Carruthers’ current proposal
under-specifies how the mindreading system, which evolved
for the purpose of interpreting others’ behaviour, comes to be
capable of interpreting primary somatic data specific to cat-
egories of affective states and of attributing them to the self.
Furthermore, according to Carruthers, when the mindreading
system does its standard job of third-person mental-state attribu-
tion, this sort of data “play little or no role” (target article, sect. 2,
para. 8). Presumably, they can contribute, for example, by biasing
the outcome of the mindreading processes (like when negative
affect leads one to attribute malicious rather than friendly
intentions). However, in first-person attributions, their function
is quite different. They are the main source of input, providing
the mindreading system with cues on the basis of which it
can recognize current emotional attitude-states. The social-
biofeedback model assumes that the mindreading system is not
readily capable of doing this job and spells out the mechanism
facilitating development of this ability. Putting it in terms of Car-
ruthers’ model 4: it explains how primary intra- and propriocep-
tive stimulation gains attentional focus to become globally
accessible and how the mindreading system becomes able to
win competition for these data.
Research on borderline personality disorder further illumi-
nates the value of the socio-constructivist model (Fonagy &
Bateman 2008). The primary deficit in borderline personality dis-
order (BPD) is often assumed to be a deficit in affect self-
regulation (e.g., Linehan 1993; Schmideberg 1947; Siever et al.
2002). We have evidence of structural and functional deficits in
brain areas of patients with BPD normally considered central
in affect regulation (Putnam & Silk 2005). Accumulating empiri-
cal evidence suggests that patients with BPD have characteristic
limitations in their self-reflective (metacognitive) capacities
(Diamond et al. 2003; Fonagy et al. 1996; Levy et al. 2006) that
compromise their ability to represent their own subjective
experience (Fonagy & Bateman 2007). There is less evidence
for a primary deficit of mindreading (Choi-Kain & Gunderson
2008). Evidence from longitudinal investigations suggests that
neglect of a child’s emotional responses (the absence of mirroring
interactions) may be critical in the aetiology of BPD (Lyons-Ruth
et al. 2005), more so even than frank maltreatment (Johnson et al.
2006). We think that the BPD model may become an important
source of new data that could illuminate relationships between
mindreading and self-awareness and their developmental antece-
dents. We suggest that children who experience adverse rearing
conditions may be at risk of developing compromised second-
order representations of self-states because they are not afforded
the opportunity to create the necessary mappings between the
emerging causal representations of emotional states in others
and emerging distinct emotional self-states.
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Abstract: Carruthers offers a promising model for how “we” know the
propositional contents of “our” own minds. Unfortunately, in retaining
talk of first-person access to mental states, his suggestions assume that
a higher-order self is already “in the loop.” We invite Carruthers to
eliminate the first-person from his model and to develop a more
thoroughly third-person model of metacognition.
Human beings habitually, effortlessly, and for the most part uncon-
sciously represent one another as persons. Adopting this personal
stance facilitates representing others as unified entities with (rela-
tively) stable psychological dispositions and (relatively) coherent
strategies for practical deliberation. While the personal stance is
not necessary for every social interaction, it plays an important
role in intuitive judgments about which entities count as objects
of moral concern (Dennett 1978; Robbins & Jack 2006); indeed,
recent data suggest that when psychological unity and practical
coherence are called into question, this often leads to the removal
of an entity fromourmoral community (Bloom2005;Haslam2006).
Human beings also reflexively represent themselves as persons
through a process of self-narration operating over System 1 pro-
cesses. However, in this context the personal stance has deleterious
consequences for the scientific study of the mind. Specifically, the
personal stance invites the assumption that every (properly func-
tioning) human being is a person who has access to her own
mental states. Admirably, Carruthers goes further thanmany philo-
sophers in recognizing that themind is a distributed computational
structure; however, things becomemurky when he turns to the sort
of access that we find in the case of metacognition.
At points, Carruthers notes that the “mindreading system has
access to perceptual states” (sect. 2, para. 6), and with this in
mind he claims that in “virtue of receiving globally broadcast per-
ceptual states as input, the mindreading system should be
capable of self-attributing those percepts in an ‘encapsulated’
way, without requiring any other input” (sect. 2, para. 4). Here,
Carruthers offers a model of metacognition that relies exclusively
on computations carried out by subpersonal mechanisms.
However, Carruthers makes it equally clear that “I never have
the sort of direct access that my mindreading system has to my
own visual images and bodily feelings” (sect. 2, para. 8; emphasis
added). Moreover, although “we do have introspective access to
some forms of thinking . . . we don’t have such access to any prop-
ositional attitudes” (sect. 7, para. 11; emphasis over “we” added).
Finally, his discussion of split-brain patients makes it clear that
Carruthers thinks that these data “force us to recognize that
sometimes people’s access to their own judgments and intentions
can be interpretative” (sect. 3.1, para. 3, emphasis in original).
Carruthers, thus, relies on two conceptually distinct accounts of
cognitive access to metarepresentations. First, he relies on an
account of subpersonal access, according towhichmetacognitive rep-
resentations are accessed by systems dedicated to belief fixation.
Beliefs, in turn, are accessed by systems dedicated to the production
of linguistic representations;whichareaccessedbysystemsdedicated
to syntax, vocalization, sub-vocalization, and so on. Second, he relies
on an account of personal access, according to which I have access
to the metacognitive representations that allow me to interpret
myself and form person-level beliefs aboutmy ownmental states.
The former view that treats the mind as a distributed compu-
tational system with no central controller seems to be integral to
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Carruthers’ (2009) current thinking about cognitive architecture.
However, this insight seems not to have permeated Carruthers’
thinking about metacognition. Unless the “I” can be laundered
from this otherwise promising account of “self-knowledge,” the
assumption of personal access threatens to require an irreducible
Cartesian res cogitans with access to computations carried out at
the subpersonal level. With these considerations in mind, we
offer what we see as a friendly suggestion: translate all the talk of
personal access into subpersonal terms.
Of course, the failure to translate personal access into the idiomof
subpersonal computations may be the result of the relatively rough
sketch of the subpersonal mechanisms that are responsible for
metarepresentation. No doubt, a complete account of metarepre-
sentationwould require an appeal to amore intricate set ofmechan-
isms toexplainhowsubpersonalmechanisms can construct “the self”
that is represented by the personal stance (Metzinger 2004). As Car-
ruthers notes, themindreading systemmust contain amodel ofwhat
minds are and of “the access that agents have to their own mental
states” (sect. 3.2, para. 2). He also notes that the mindreading
system is likely to treat minds as having direct introspective access
to themselves, despite the fact that the mode of access is inherently
interpretative (sect. 3.2). However, merely adding these details to
the model is insufficient for avoiding the presumption that there
must (“also”) be first-person access to the outputs of metacognition.
After all, even with a complete account of the subpersonal systems
responsible for the production and comprehension of linguistic
utterances, the fixation and updating of beliefs, and the construction
and consumption of metarepresentations, it may still seem perfectly
natural to ask, “But how do I know my own mental states?”
The banality that I have access to my own thoughts is a conse-
quence of adopting the personal stance. However, at the subperso-
nal level it is possible to explain how various subsystems access
representations without requiring an appeal to a centralized res
cogitans. The key insight is that a module “dumbly, obsessively con-
verts thoughts into linguistic form and vice versa” (Jackendoff 1996).
Schematically, a conceptualized thought triggers the production of a
linguistic representation that approximates the content of that
thought, yielding a reflexive blurt. Such linguistic blurts are proto-
speech acts, issuing subpersonally, not yet from or by the person,
and they are either sent to exogenous broadcast systems (where
they become the raw material for personal speech acts), or are
endogenously broadcast to language comprehension systems
which feed directly to the mindreading system. Here, blurts are
tested to see whether they should be uttered overtly, as the mind-
reading system accesses the content of the blurt and reflexively gen-
erates a belief that approximates the content of that blurt. Systems
dedicated to belief fixation are then recruited, beliefs are updated,
the blurt is accepted or rejected, and the process repeats. Proto-lin-
guistic blurts, thus, dress System 1 outputs in mentalistic clothes,
facilitating system-level metacognition.
Carruthers (2009) acknowledges that System 2 thinking is rea-
lized in the cyclical activity of reflexive System 1 subroutines.
This allows for a model of metacognition that makes no appeal
to a pre-existing I, a far more plausible account of self-knowledge
in the absence of a res cogitans.








Abstract:Carruthers viewsunsymbolized thinking as “purelypropositional”
and, therefore, as a potential threat to his mindreading-is-prior position.
I argue that unsymbolized thinking may involve (non-symbolic) sensory
aspects; it is therefore not purely propositional, and therefore poses no
threat to mindreading-is-prior. Furthermore, Descriptive Experience
Sampling lends empirical support to the view that access to our own
propositional attitudes is interpretative, not introspective.
Section 8 of Carruthers’ target article considers my Descriptive
Experience Sampling (DES) work, particularly its finding of
unsymbolized thinking (Hurlburt 1990; 1993; 1997; Hurlburt &
Akhter 2008; Hurlburt & Heavey 2006). Carruthers implies
that I characterize unsymbolized thinking as being purely
propositional: “many subjects also report the presence of
‘purely propositional,’ unsymbolized thoughts at the moment of
the beep” (sect. 8, para. 2). As a result, he supposes that my
claim that unsymbolized thoughts are introspected (Hurlburt
1990; 1993) might present a difficulty for his mindreading-is-
prior view, which holds that purely propositional events are not
introspected but are, instead, interpreted.
Against this supposition, Carruthers argues that the introspec-
tion of unsymbolized thinking is an illusion; what is mistaken for
introspection is a swift but unconscious interpretation of external
events (Carruthers 1996b) and/or internal events such as images
(present target article). As a result, he concludes in the target
article that DES is neutral regarding Carruthers’ mindreading
view: “although there is no support to be derived for a ‘mindread-
ing is prior’ account from the introspection-sampling data,
neither is there, as yet, any evidence to count against it” (sect.
8, para. 5, emphasis in original).
I think Hurlburt and Akhter (2008) successfully rebutted Car-
ruthers (1996b), and the target article does not change my mind.
But I agree that unsymbolized thinking does not threaten Car-
ruthers’ mindreading-is-prior position, not because unsymbo-
lized thinking is an unconscious interpretation but because it is
not “purely propositional.” Unsymbolized thinking is a directly
apprehendable experience that may well have some kind of
(probably subtle) sensory presentation, is therefore not purely
propositional, and for that reason is not at odds with the mind-
reading-is-prior view.
In seeking to discover why Carruthers might hold, mistakenly,
that I believe that unsymbolized thinking is “purely prop-
ositional,” I reviewed what I have written on unsymbolized think-
ing and discovered this sentence:
Unsymbolized Thinking is the experience of an inner process which is
clearly a thought and which has a clear meaning, but which seems to
take place without symbols of any kind, that is, without words,
images, bodily sensations, etc. (Hurlburt 1993, p. 5; emphasis added)
“Without . . . bodily sensations” might be understood to mean
“purely propositional,” but that is not at all what I intended. I
should have written “without . . . bodily sensory awareness”
instead of “without . . . bodily sensations.”
“Sensory awareness” is a term of art in DES: “A sensory aware-
ness is a sensory experience (itch, visual taking-in, hotness,
pressure, hearing) that is in itself a primary theme or focus for
the subject” (Hurlburt & Heavey 2006, p. 223). That is,
sensory awareness is not merely a bodily or external sensation,
but is a sensation that is itself a main thematic focus of experi-
ence. Thus, for example, Jack picks up a can of Coke, and,
while preparing to drink, particularly notices the cold, slippery
moistness against his fingertips. Jill picks up a can of Coke,
and, while preparing to drink, says to herself in inner speech,
“Carruthers is right!” Both Jack and Jill are having bodily sen-
sations of the coldness, the moistness, and the slipperiness of
the can (neither drops it). Jack’s central focus is on the cold, slip-
pery moistness; therefore, he is experiencing a sensory awareness
as DES defines it. Jill’s central focus is on her inner speech, not
on the can; therefore she is not experiencing a sensory awareness
as defined by DES (see Hurlburt & Heavey, in preparation).
Thus, unsymbolized thinking, as I and my DES colleagues
describe the phenomenon, is an experience that is directly appre-
hended at the moment of the DES beep but which does not
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involve the direct apprehension of verbal, imaginal, or other
symbols and does not involve sensory awareness as DES
defines that term. The apprehension of an unsymbolized
thought may involve the apprehension of some sensory bits, so
long as those sensory bits are not organized into a coherent,
central, thematized sensory awareness. Thus, I believe that
unsymbolized thinking is a perceptual event, just as are inner
speech, visual imagery, and feelings; it is therefore not purely
propositional and is therefore not a threat to the mindreading-
is-prior view.
Access to propositional attitudes is interpretative. Far from
being neutral, DES lends empirical support to the main thrust
of Carruthers’ analysis that propositional attitudes are inter-
preted, not observed. The DES procedure trains subjects
carefully, repeatedly, and iteratively (Hurlburt & Akhter 2006;
Hurlburt & Heavey 2006; Hurlburt & Schwitzgebel 2007) to dis-
tinguish between directly observed (Carruthers’ “perceptual”)
events and all else; that training typically requires several days.
DES tries, moment by moment, to cleave to the directly observed
and to bracket all that is inferred, supposed, presupposed. There
is no a priori assumption about what is or is not directly observa-
ble. Attitudes are not singled out; if an attitude is directly
observed at the moment of some beep, then that attitude is the
proper target of DES. If not, then it isn’t.
As a result of 30 years of carefully questioning subjects about
their momentary experiences, my sense is that trained DES sub-
jects who wear a beeper and inspect what is directly before the
footlights of consciousness at the moment of the beeps almost
never directly apprehend an attitude. Inadequately trained
subjects, particularly on their first sampling day, occasionally
report that they are experiencing some attitude. But when
those reports are scrutinized in the usual DES way, querying
carefully about any perceptual aspects, those subjects retreat
from the attitude-was-directly-observed position, apparently
coming to recognize that their attitude had been merely “back-
ground” or “context.” That seems entirely consonant with the
view that these subjects had initially inferred their own attitudes
in the same way they infer the attitudes of others. (I note that
subjects do not similarly retreat from their initial reports about
unsymbolized thinking; they continue to maintain that the
unsymbolized thought had been directly observed.)
What monkeys can tell us about
metacognition and mindreading
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Abstract: Thinkers in related fields such as philosophy, psychology, and
education define metacognition in a variety of different ways. Based on an
emerging standard definition in psychology, we present evidence for
metacognition in animals, and argue that mindreading and
metacognition are largely orthogonal.
The target article proposes that “mindreading is prior to meta-
cognition,” meaning that just as we know the minds of others
by observing what they do, we know our own minds by observing
what we do. According to this view, metacognition – that is, cog-
nition about one’s own cognition – requires mindreading abil-
ities. Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) do not appear to
possess mindreading abilities (Anderson et al. 1996; but see
Santos et al. 2006). Here we present evidence, however, that
rhesus monkeys are metacognitive. We offer a different definition
of mindreading than that used by Carruthers, and we contend
that the mechanisms of mindreading and metacognition are
largely orthogonal.
The target article reports in detail on only a few seminal studies
of metacognition in animals (see Smith et al. 2003; Smith &Wash-
burn 2005). We begin by elaborating on subsequent studies that
provide evidence of animal metacognition (reviewed by Kornell,
in press). For example, Hampton (2001) tested monkeys in a
modified delayed match-to-sample task: On each trial, a sample
picture was presented on a touch-sensitive computer monitor,
and then, after a delay, the same sample picture was presented
among three distractors, and the subject had to touch the
sample. On some trials, after viewing the sample, the monkey
could choose to skip the test and receive a small reward. If the
monkey instead chose to take the test, he could earn a large
reward, or, if his response was incorrect, forfeit reward comple-
tely. Memory accuracy was better on self-selected test trials
than on mandatory test trials. It appears that the monkeys chose
to take the test when they knew that they knew the answer, in
the same way that a student raises her hand in class when she
knows that she knows the answer (see Suda-King 2008, for
similar results in orangutans).
In another study, two male rhesus monkeys were asked, essen-
tially, to bet on their memories (Kornell et al. 2007). A given
monkey was shown six pictures sequentially for “study,” followed
by a display of nine pictures presented simultaneously, one of
which had been “studied.” The monkey’s task was to select the
studied picture. After he responded, two “risk” icons were pre-
sented, which allowed the monkey to bet his tokens (which
could be exchanged for food). A high-risk bet resulted in the
gain of three tokens if the monkey had responded correctly,
but a loss of three tokens otherwise. Choosing low-risk resulted
in a sure gain of one token. The monkeys made accurate confi-
dence judgments: They bet more after correct responses than
after incorrect responses. This finding was especially impressive
because the monkeys were originally trained on tasks that
involved neither pictures nor remembering (e.g., select the
longest line); following that training, they were able to respond
metacognitively beginning on the first day of the picture-
memory task. The monkeys appear to have learned a general
metacognitive response, not one that was task-specific.
In addition to being able to make judgments about their mem-
ories, monkeys have demonstrated that they can choose behaviors,
based on metacognition, that advance their own knowledge – that
is, they have demonstrated metacognitive control (see Nelson &
Narens 1990). To investigate this ability, we allowed two monkeys
to request information when they were uncertain, just as a person
might ask for a hint when answering a difficult question (Kornell
et al. 2007). The monkeys could request a “hint,” that is, a blinking
border that surrounded the correct response, on some trials in a list-
learning experiment. As themonkeys’ response accuracy onno-hint
trials improved steadily, their rate of hint requests showed a corre-
sponding decline. By requesting hints when they were unsure, the
monkeys went beyond making an uncertain response; they took
steps to rectify their ignorance.
Based on the studies described above, we conclude that
monkeys have metacognitive abilities – that is, they can
monitor the strength of their own internal memory represen-
tations. According to the target article, these findings fall short
of metacognition, however. Carruthers writes, “It is only if a
human reports that she acted as she did, not just because she
was uncertain, but because she was aware of being uncertain,
that there will be any conflict [with the metacognition is prior
account]” (sect. 5.2, para. 3). We do not agree that metacognition
requires awareness; we have previously argued that the metacog-
nitive abilities that animals possess are not necessarily conscious
(Kornell, in press; Son & Kornell 2005; also see Reder 1996).
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For example, a monkey might make a high-risk bet without being
aware that it is monitoring its internal memory trace.
We are not arguing that mindreading cannot subsume meta-
cognitive functions. Indeed, we can learn much about ourselves
by observing our own behavior: for example, after playing a
round of golf, we decide we are not quite ready for the pro
tour. Moreover, numerous experiments have shown that meta-
cognition is largely based on unconscious inferential processes,
not direct examination of memories; for example, we infer that
we know something well based on the fluency (i.e., ease and
speed) with which it comes to mind (Schwartz et al. 1997).
Given the way we, and many other cognitive psychologists,
define metacognition, we assert that it is likely that metacognition
and mindreading are separate processes. The argument that one
should only see metacognition in species that can mindread is, to
the best available evidence, false. For example, some have
suggested that dogs, which have shown no metacognitive abilities
but show high levels of social cognition, may have rudimentary
mindreading abilities (Horowitz, in press; Tomasello et al.
1999). Conversely, we offer rhesus monkeys as a case study in
a metacognitively competent animal that fares poorly at mind-
reading. In the tasks we describe, metacognitive processing can
lead to positive outcomes that are evolutionarily adaptive.
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Abstract: While Carruthers denies that humans have introspective
access to cognitive attitudes such as belief, he allows introspective
access to perceptual and quasi-perceptual mental states. Yet, despite
his own reservations, the basic architecture he describes for third-
person mindreading can accommodate first-person mindreading
without need to posit a distinct “introspective” mode of access to any of
one’s own mental states.
Carruthers argues that passivity symptoms (e.g., thought insertion)
in schizophrenia result not from a special metacognitive deficit, but
from “faulty data being presented to themindreading system” (sect.
9, para. 2). Although I endorse Carruthers’ Frith-inspired (Frith
et al. 2000a; 2000b) appeal to efference-copy deficits in the expla-
nation of passivity symptoms, his claim that the mindreading
faculty itself is undamaged raises questions. First, any attribution
of one’s own thoughts to another is equally a mistake in first- and
third-person mindreading (false positives count as errors just as
much as false negatives do). Carruthers should therefore hold
that mindreading – first- and third-person – is deficient in these
forms of schizophrenia; this still allows him to deny any dissociation
between mindreading and metacognitive abilities, in line with what
his theory predicts. It also avoids his having tomake the hard-to-test
claim that it is intermittently faulty data and not an intermittently
faulty mechanism that is to blame for passivity symptoms.
Second, Carruthers holds that humans have introspective
access to some mental states (e.g., perceptual states, imagery,
and inner speech), but not to cognitive attitudes such as belief.
But if information is extracted from globally broadcast perceptual
states in third-person mindreading without introspection occur-
ring, why think that the extraction of information from inner
speech and visual imagery during first-person mindreading
involves an introspective process different “in kind” from the
way we form beliefs about the mental states of others? If, as
Carruthers argues, passivity symptoms result from faulty data
being input to the mindreading system (data that should have
been interpreted as internally generated is interpreted as exter-
nally generated), then it seems the very determination of
whether an input is self or other-generated – and thus whether
one is seeing or visualizing, hearing or sub-vocalizing – requires
an inferential or interpretative step (Langland-Hassan 2008).
Carruthers would likely respond that this inner-or-outer infer-
ential step involves nothing more than the “trivial” form of infer-
ence that occurs in any layered representational scheme, where
representations at one level can, in a “supervisory” role, intervene
on those at another. However, many instances of third-person
mindreading are equally fast and automatic, and they are implicit
in the very cases of metacognition that, on Carruthers’ theory,
would be achieved through the “encapsulated” process of intro-
spection. Consider a visual representation had by someone who
looks up and sees another person staring at him. Suppose this
visual perceptual state is accessed by the mindreading system,
which issues in the introspective judgment: “I see a man seeing
me.” This judgment contains within it a judgment that another
person is having a visual experience of a certain kind (cf.
Jeannerod & Pacherie’s [2004] “naked intentions”). So, unless
the mindreading faculty in its introspective mode lacks the con-
cepts needed for this judgment (unlikely, since it must have
the concepts of self and of sight in order to issue any introspec-
tive judgments about visual experience), third-person mindread-
ing can occur through the encapsulated “introspective” process
that Carruthers describes. Yes, some cases of third-person mind-
reading require much more sophisticated feats of interpretation,
but so too do many cases of first-person mindreading, as revealed
by the confabulation data Carruthers discusses (Gazzaniga 1995).
Thus, even if it is possible to draw a line between mindreading
that is informationally encapsulated and that which is not, it will
not cut cleanly across cases of first- and third-person mindreading.
Nor is the existence of such domain-specificmechanisms supported
by recent neuroimaging studies (Decety & Lamm 2007). What we
have instead are inferences, concerning both first- and third-person
mental states, that require greater or lesser degrees of supporting
information; none of this implies a special mode of access to facts
about one’s own mental states. This is obscured by the tendency
of researchers to compare easy cases of metacognition (e.g., infer-
ring one’s intentions from one’s own inner speech) with difficult
cases of third-person mindreading (e.g., inferring what someone
thinks based solely on their posture and facial expression) – for it
creates the impression that first-person mindreading occurs
through some more “direct” process. But if we instead compare
the third-person mindreading that occurs when we judge that a
person believes what we hear her saying, to the first-person mind-
reading that draws on “listening” to one’s own inner speech, there
is less intuitivepressure to posit a difference in the kind of inference.
Of course, if there were genuine dissociations revealed between
third- and first-person mindreading abilities, as Nichols and Stich
(2003) and Goldman (2006) claim, then we would have reason to
posit differences in the kinds of mechanisms and inferences
involved in each; but Carruthers is at pains to deny any such dis-
sociations, and his alternative explanations are plausible enough.
The issue can be reframed in terms of the larger evidence base
we have for first-person rather than third-person mindreading.
Carruthers notes that the resources available to first-personmind-
reading are different because, “unless subjects choose to tell me, I
never have access to what they are imagining or feeling” (sect. 2,
para. 8). This is potentially misleading; the situation is rather
that the single mindreading system, as he describes it, only ever
has access to globally broadcast perceptual and quasi-perceptual
representations (and memory), and, with this single source of
information, must accomplish both its first- and third-person
mindreading tasks – one of which is to determine whether the
signal counts as a case of imagining or perceiving in the first place.
The fact that we have so much more “evidence” for first-person
mindreading than third-person may still tempt some to posit
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a special form of access. Yet, if humans always audibly narrated
their inner speech and expressed the contents of their visual
imagery, the evidence bases for first- and third-person mindread-
ing would be comparable. So it may be a contingent fact about
how humans behave that accounts for the difference in evidence
bases, not a special mode of access.
I therefore urge Carruthers to adopt a more thoroughgoing
anti-introspectionism. Not only can first-person mindreading
be explained without appeal to the introspection of propositional
attitudes, it can be explained without granting a distinct intro-
spective form of access to any of one’s own mental states.
Carruthers’ marvelous magical mindreading
machine
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Abstract: Carruthers presents an interesting analysis of confabulation
and a clear attack on introspection. Yet his theory-based alternative is a
mechanistic view of “mindreading” which neglects the fact that social
understanding occurs within a network of social relationships. In
particular, the role of language in his model is too simple.
In his analysis of four identifiable accounts of the relationship
between “mindreading” and “metacognition,” Carruthers makes
a bold attempt to explain a major inconsistency in three of
these and assert the primacy of “mindreading” as a precursor
to self-understanding. He does this mainly by highlighting a
common key feature in the literature in neuropsychology, reason-
ing, and psychopathology: why adults with sophisticated skills in
accounting for their own and others’ thoughts still seem to show
flaws in their abilities to demonstrate and reconcile these skills.
However, we make three connected points to argue that his
account falls short of a clear answer to his main concerns about
the nature of the two processes and how they relate.
First, Carruthers treats the terms “metacognition” and “mind-
reading” as unproblematic, distinct, and clearly grounded within
an overarching, internalist cognitive architecture. Yet, the article
is unclear about how this architecture fits together into a working
psychological system. There is more than a hint of a homunculus
in Carruthers’ descriptions of how we access and use these skills
(Kenny 1971/1991). Let’s look at the role of the role of language
in mindreading as an example.
Early in the target article Carruthers dismisses the importance of
language in a note because it seems “plausible” to him “that basic
capacities for both mindreading and metacognition are indepen-
dent of our capacity for natural language” (target article, Note 2).
Yet in his analysis of reasoning (sect. 8), he acknowledges its import-
ance in certain circumstances, but does not convincingly show how
this contradiction can be reconciled. Then, in the bulk of the article,
speech only serves as input for Carruthers’ “magical mindreading
machine,” revealing a view that thinking is computation and
meaning is mechanistic, entailing a code model of language. All
of these assumptions havebeen repeatedly critiqued (e.g.,Bickhard
2001; Goldberg 1991; Heil 1981; Proudfoot 1997; Tomasello 2003;
Turnbull 2003; Wittgenstein 1968). For example, problems have
been pointed out with how the symbols involved in computation
could acquiremeaning, andwhether understanding can adequately
be conceived of as a process of computation (Proudfoot 1997).
These criticisms have been applied to the theoretical approach
that Carruthers advances.
Carruthers claims to have considered four different theories.
However, since he starts with such a restricted set of theories to con-
sider, knowing that he declares his version of theory-theory as the
winner in this contest tells us nothing about how the many other
approaches would fare. The one place where we do agree with
Carruthers is that assuming introspection as a source of social
understanding is problematic. We find it odd, however, that he
ignoresWittgenstein’s far stronger arguments against introspection.
Alternative accounts based upon a more sophisticated grasp of
language deal more easily with the confabulation literature that is
sowell described in the target article (sect. 6), but not fully explained.
Indeed, second, the theory-theory’s response to these criticisms
is simply to ignore it (Carpendale & Lewis 2004; Leudar & Costall,
in press). Carruthers’ perspective is symptomatic of an insularity
that has been commented upon repeatedly in the wider literature,
but which barely gets a mention in the “mainstream.” The idea of
the 1980s that we, or something inside ourselves, can manipulate
our own social understanding was criticised by Bruner (1986;
1990), who rejected a cognitive system that is bereft of serious
contact with the outside world.Many commentators have repeated
this claim.Carruthers buys into forms of attributingmental states to
ourselves and others which assume the theory metaphor so loosely
as to be bereft of meaning (see Campbell & Bickhard 1993). The
fact that this movement has been as immune to debate in the
outside world as the cognitive system that they depict has led its
critics (e.g., Leudar & Costall, in press, Ch. 1) to use the term
ToMism to refer to the assumption that the individual is trapped
behind a mindreading mechanism that filters their interpretation
and observations of social interactions.
Third, in his neglect of the growing literature which attempts
to explore the interactional basis of social understanding, Car-
ruthers’ account is both parasitic upon the evidence from devel-
opmental psychology and simultaneously dismissive of its analysis
of the nature of the two processes. We suspect that without a
clear analysis of development of “mindreading” and/or “meta-
cognition,” Carruthers’ definition of these two terms remains
grossly underspecified. There is a large body of recent work that
attempts to explore the dynamics of interaction in early (Reddy
2008) and later infancy (Moll & Tomasello 2007) and in child-
hood (Carpendale & Lewis 2004), as well as with reference to
special populations (Hobson 2002), which describes how social
understanding, as opposed to some miraculous yet unspecified
mindreading system, gradually emerges in social interaction. In
these approaches there is no Cartesian split between the individ-
ual in the spectator’s role observing others’ physical movements
and having to attribute mental states. Without a reference to
this expanding and exciting literature, and its data and critique
of the solipsism of theory-theory, Carruthers’ argument is a
better description of atypical “mindreading” like autism, not an
account of how we understand ourselves and others.
What neuroimaging and perceptions of
self-other similarity can tell us about the
mechanism underlying mentalizing
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Abstract: Carruthers’ “mindreading is prior” model postulates one
unitary mindreading mechanism working identically for self and other.
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While we agree about shared mindreading mechanisms, there is also
evidence from neuroimaging and mentalizing about dissimilar others
that suggest factors that differentially affect self-versus-other
mentalizing. Such dissociations suggest greater complexity than the
mindreading is prior model allows.
The “mindreading is prior” model proposed by Carruthers pos-
tulates that one mechanism (mindreading) is all that is needed
to understand the mental states of oneself and others.
Although we agree that shared mechanisms can implement
the computations underlying both self- and other-mentalizing,
we question whether all types of mentalizing use this one
mechanism in an identical fashion. We present evidence
from functional neuroimaging and research suggesting that
mentalizing differs when the target individuals are of differing
similarity to oneself.
Because the “mindreading is prior” model asserts that one
mechanism is used indifferently for self- and other-mentalizing,
this generates three predictions that all need to be satisfied in
the brain. First, there should be an identical neural implemen-
tation of mentalizing for self and other. Thus, the same brain
regions that code for self-mentalizing computations should also
be recruited for other-mentalizing. Second, such identical
neural implementation should occur to a similar degree for
both self and other. Thus, activation in shared regions should
be equal in self- and other-mentalizing. Finally, there should
be no other areas in the brain that are recruited specifically for
just self- or just other-mentalizing.
In our own recent work (Lombardo et al., submitted) we
find evidence that while predictions 1 and 3 are satisfied, pre-
diction 2 is not. We find that although the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vMPFC), posterior cingulate/precuneus
(PCC), and right temporo-parietal junction (RTPJ) are all
recruited for mentalizing about both self and other, they do
so in a target-biased fashion. The vMPFC is recruited more
for self-mentalizing than other-mentalizing, whereas PCC and
RTPJ are recruited more for other- than self-mentalizing.
Thus, while it is the case the identical neural mechanisms
are implementing self- and other-mentalizing computations,
they do not do so in an equal fashion. Some of these shared
neural representations are tailored more for handling self-
mentalizing, whereas other shared representations are tuned
in to handle other-mentalizing. The “mindreading is prior”
model is silent about how one unitary mindreading mechanism
can be tuned preferentially for mentalizing about self more
than other, or vice versa.
In addition to these neuroimaging results, there is behavioral
evidence in individuals with autism spectrum conditions (ASC)
that the magnitude of impairment in self- and other-mentalizing
is unequal (Lombardo et al. 2007). In the domain of emotion
understanding, on measures of other-mentalizing involving
reading complex emotions (Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test;
Baron-Cohen et al. 2001), adults with ASC show less impairment
(Cohen’s d ¼ 0.61) than on measures assessing understanding
one’s own emotions (Toronto Alexithymia Scale; Cohen’s
d ¼ 1.40). Thus, although impairment may exist in both self-
and other-mentalizing in ASC, the impairments are unequal in
magnitude. This evidence presents a paradox: How can one
unitary mechanism working identically for self and other affect
self and other in a differential manner?
The “mindreading is prior” model is also silent about what
happens when an individual mentalizes about an individual of
varying similarity to oneself. Carruthers treats the “other” as
completely distinct from oneself, and he bases his theory on
such a “monolithic other.” However, social psychological
research suggests that the mechanisms for mentalizing about
others functions differently depending the degree to which an
individual perceives the other person to be similar or dissimilar
to oneself. When another is perceived to be dissimilar to
oneself, mentalizing responses follow a pattern similar to stereo-
typing; we expect dissimilar individuals to share mental states of
individuals from the salient group that they belong to. However,
when another individual is similar to oneself, social inference
proceeds in a congruent manner to what we ourselves think or
feel (Ames 2004).
A similar distinction can be seen within neuroimaging
research on this topic. Jason Mitchell and colleagues (Jenkins
et al. 2008; Mitchell et al. 2006) present elegant work
showing that similar neural responses occur in vMPFC
during self-mentalizing and mentalizing about similar others,
but not during mentalizing about dissimilar others. Mentalizing
about dissimilar others involves processing in the dorsomedial
prefrontal cortex (dMPFC) rather than the vMPFC. Further-
more, when stereotyping is applied in the context of mentaliz-
ing about others, areas involved in semantic retrieval and
selection such as the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC)
are recruited, but not the vMPFC or dMPFC (Mitchell
et al., in press).
Thus, behavioral and neural distinctions can be made about
the mechanism underlying mentalizing about others of differing
similarity to oneself. In the case of similar others, the regions
involved in both self- and other-mentalizing may overlap con-
siderably. However, different regions appear to be at work
when making inferences about the mental states of dissimilar
others. How does the “mindreading is prior” model account for
such differences in the mindreading mechanism, solely based
on the perceived similarity of others to oneself?
Finally, in our own work, we find that even in ASC the mech-
anism underlying mentalizing about self and similar others may
be different to mentalizing about dissimilar others (Lombardo
et al. 2007). We asked participants to make judgments about per-
sonality traits (e.g., honest, caring, anxious) in relation to them-
selves, a similar close other, and a dissimilar non-close other.
In a control task, they were asked to simply count the syllables
in personality trait words. In a surprise recognition memory
test, we found that individuals with ASC had no impairment in
memory for words encoded by syllable counting or in relation
to a dissimilar other. However, when looking at memory for
self-encoded or similar other-encoded traits, we found substan-
tial impairment. Individuals with ASC had an impairment in pro-
cessing linked to thinking about themselves and similar others,
but no deficit in regards to a dissimilar other. Such dissociations
for similar and dissimilar others imply the mindreading mechan-
ism may conceal a greater complexity than is suggested by
Carruthers’ model.
Feigning introspective blindness for thought
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Abstract: I argue that the very reasons Carruthers gives for why the
“mindreading is prior” account should allow introspective access to
perceptual/quasi-perceptual states, can be given for thought, as well. I
also argue that we have good subjectively accessible grounds for the
intuition in introspective thoughts, notwithstanding Carruthers’
argument to the contrary and his attempt to explain the intuition away.
I. Carruthers argues that a consequence of the “mindreading is
prior” account is that the mindreading faculty should have intro-
spective access to perceptual and quasi-perceptual states. Two
reasons are given. First, because the mindreading faculty must
have access to perceptual inputs about the actions of others
(targets), it “should be capable of self-attributing those percepts
in an ‘encapsulated’ way, without requiring any other input”
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(target article, sect. 2, para. 4). But arguably the mindreading
faculty would not have evolved unless it were able to predict
the behaviors of others; and for this, the faculty must have
access to non-perceptual beliefs about past and general facts
about particular targets. If a mindreading animal, for example,
observes a target orient its eyes toward food and thereby attri-
butes sees-food, it is unlikely that it will be able to predict what
the target will do unless it has access to relevant past and
general facts about the target that are not perceptually available
in the scene or hardwired into the faculty itself (e.g., that the
target is a member of its own group/family, has recently eaten,
has shared food in the past, etc.). By parity of reasoning, since
the mindreading faculty must have access to non-perceptual
beliefs, the faculty should be capable of self-attributing
such thoughts in an “encapsulated” way without requiring any
further input.
Carruthers argues that introspection of quasi-perceptual
states is also likely on the “mindreading is prior” account
because, being perceptual, they are (when attended to) “globally
broadcast” to all concept-forming systems, including the mind-
reading faculty. But arguably attended-to thoughts are “globally
broadcast” as well. In fact, Baars (1997) argues that attended-to
thoughts, just as much as attended-to percepts, “create a vast
access to perhaps all parts of the nervous system” (p. 59). For
example, if one were to observe a subject looking at a red
apple, one’s mindreading faculty would likely infer that the
subject sees the color of the apple; however, this default infer-
ence would have been prevented if, prior to observing the
subject, the thought should have occurred to one that this
subject had recently informed one that she was color-blind. It
is quite plausible, therefore, that attended-to thoughts are also
broadcasted to the mindreading factually, and by parity of
reasoning, the faculty should be capable of self-attributing such
thoughts in an “encapsulated” way without requiring any
further input.
II. The standard argument in support of introspective access to
thoughts runs as follows (see Goldman 2006, p. 230, for an
example):
1. Sometimes we know what we think, and yet what we think is
quite unrelated (for interpretative purposes) to any of the con-
tents to which we have subjective access (such as the contents
of perception, proprioception, episodic memory, or the contents
of introspection regarding perceptual and quasi-perceptual
states).
2. Therefore, it is unlikely in such cases that we know what we
think as a result of an interpretation from the subjectively acces-
sible contents rather than as a result of an introspective access to
the thought itself.
This is an inductive argument to the best explanation. Hence,
the more interpretatively irrelevant the subjectively accessible
contents are to the self-ascribed thought, the more likely the
process is introspection. Furthermore, because the processes
involved in interpretation and introspection are unconscious, it
is to be expected that the greater the degree of interpretative
relevance the subjectively accessible contents bear to the self-
ascribed thought, the greater the chances are that it will appear
to the subject as if he knows what he thinks on the basis of intro-
spection when it is actually the result of interpretation. I suspect
that this is what is happening in the split-brain case that Car-
ruthers describes. The subject has access to the contents of his
perceptual and proprioceptive states that represent him as
walking out of the testing van, and he probably has access to
the contents of his memory which represent the location of the
van to the house, and that the house has a Coke in it, and so
on. All of this would likely allow him to interpret (at an uncon-
scious level) himself as going to get a Coke from the house.
Is it possible for it to always appear as if our knowledge of our
own thoughts is introspective when it is interpretative? Yes, but
it is unlikely the more interpretatively unrelated these contents
are to the self-ascribed thought.
The preceding argument assumes that the belief in introspec-
tive thoughts is the result of an inductive argument and is not
simply built into our pre-theoretic concept of the mind’s episte-
mic access to itself. Carruthers disagrees. He argues that on the
“mindreading is prior” account, it is to be expected that the
mindreading system should represent this epistemic access as
introspection and not interpretation, since doing so would
“greatly simplify” the system’s computational operations
without any significant loss in reliability. However, if the mind-
reading system’s concept of introspection is Carruthers’ broad
and negative definition (roughly, a reliable method for
forming metacognitive judgments that is not interpretative and
is different in kind from our access to other minds), then in
order for the mindreading system to apply its concept of intro-
spection to a subject, it will need to assume or have reason to
believe that the subject’s access to its mind is not interpretative.
This would seem to undermine Carruthers’ claim of there being
a greater degree of simplification in the operations of a mind-
reading system that represented the mind’s access to itself as
introspection compared to one that represented it as interpret-
ation only, since the former would require the possession and
application of the concepts of introspection and interpretation,
whereas the latter would require the possession and application
of the concept of interpretation only. It is more plausible to
suppose that the mindreading system’s model of the mind’s
access to itself would simply be that of a reliable judgment-
forming process that is different in kind from that used to
form judgments about other minds. But such a model of the
mind’s access to itself would be neutral regarding whether it
is introspection (as Carruthers defines it) or interpretation – at
least, with respect to the kind of interpretivism that Carruthers
defends in the “mindreading is prior” account, which also holds
that the mind’s interpretative access to its own thoughts is
reliable and different in kind from its access to the thoughts
of others.
Getting to know yourself . . . and others
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Abstract: Carruthers rejects developmental evidence based primarily on
an argument regarding one skill in particular: understanding false beliefs.
We propose that this rejection is premature; and that identifying and
examining the development of other subcomponent skills important for
metacognition and mindreading, such as the ability to assess levels of
knowledge, will in fact be useful in resolving this debate.
Although we find his proposal thought-provoking, we disagree
with Carruthers’ conclusion that “developmental evidence is of
no use” (target article, sect. 4, para. 3) in determining the
relationship between mindreading and metacognition, because
it is based primarily on an incorrect assumption that false
belief performance is the only relevant measure of mindreading
and metacognition in children. False beliefs tasks are just one
way of measuring mindreading, and not necessarily a good way
(Bloom & German 2000). Indeed, most developmental psychol-
ogists believe that mindreading and metacognition involve a
number of subcomponent skills. Some of these skills, such as
the ability to understand that others have intentions, may be mas-
tered by infants and toddlers (e.g., Meltzoff 1995), whereas
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others, such as the ability to appreciate false beliefs, are mastered
in the early preschool years (Wellman et al. 2001). Other skills,
such as the ability to understand that a person can have conflict-
ing desires (e.g., Choe et al. 2005) or the ability to accept that two
people can interpret the same information in different ways (e.g.,
Carpendale & Chandler 1996), are not grasped until middle
childhood. Indeed, many of the component skills that enable
mindreading and metacognition are unaccounted for in Car-
ruthers’ account of why developmental evidence is not useful.
Thus, by examining self/other comparisons in the development
of these skills, developmental data can help us better understand
potential asymmetries in the emergence of mindreading and
metacognition.
Carruthers identifies one possible area for further examin-
ation. In his introduction, he points out that mindreading
involves not only intentions and beliefs (which are measured in
the false belief task), but also components such as knowledge.
However, his review of the developmental literature does not
take into account the growing body of research examining
young children’s assessments of what other people know versus
what they themselves know.
Determining what another person is likely to know can be con-
sidered mindreading because it requires an understanding of the
contents and limitations of that person’s thoughts. In order to
make a judgment about what another person knows, children
cannot always rely on associations or broad generalizations.
Rather, the evidence suggests that young children have a sophis-
ticated understanding of what other people know or do not know.
For instance, they understand that one person can be knowledge-
able about some things but not knowledgeable about other things
(e.g., Harris 2007; VanderBorght & Jaswal, in press). Even 3-
year-olds, who might be considered poor at mindreading based
on the false belief task, are often adept at identifying knowledge-
able individuals when contrasted with ignorant or inaccurate
sources (e.g., Birch et al. 2008; Jaswal & Neely 2006; Koenig &
Harris 2005; Sabbagh & Baldwin 2001). By age 4, children are
also capable of drawing inferences about another person’s knowl-
edge that go beyond familiar associations to reflect an under-
standing of the underlying principles that make up a person’s
expertise (e.g., Lutz & Keil 2002). This suggests that young chil-
dren understand both the contents and limits of another person’s
knowledge.
Conversely, young children’s ability to assess their own knowl-
edge accurately – a form of metacognition – is quite weak
(Flavell et al. 1970; Mills & Keil 2004). For instance, 4- to 5-
year-old children are notoriously poor at realizing how much
they have learned of a new piece of information (Esbensen
et al. 1997; Taylor et al. 1994). The younger they are, the more
children overestimate their understanding (and underestimate
their ignorance) of familiar objects and procedures, often not
appropriately assessing their own level of knowledge until age 9
or later (Mills & Keil 2004). Thus, despite the evidence that chil-
dren accurately judge what other people know, there seems to be
a real developmental gap in applying these principles to their
own knowledge.
One obstacle in applying this research to determining
whether metacognition or mindreading is mastered first is that
the kinds of questions used to ask children to reflect on their
own knowledge are very different from the questions used to
measure children’s understanding of others’ knowledge.
Research examining how children think about their own knowl-
edge often requires them to evaluate their own knowledge level
using a scale or to estimate the number of problems they can
answer correctly. In contrast, studies examining how children
think about the knowledge of others typically require them to
choose the source that would be able to give the most helpful
or accurate information. Given that little research has been
conducted directly comparing children’s accuracy estimating
the knowledge of others to their own knowledge, many open
questions remain.
Therefore, in order to provide direct evidence in favor of or
against Carruthers’ hypothesis, we propose that additional
research is necessary. Comparing the development of an under-
standing of one’s own knowledge with an understanding of
others’ knowledge, or making self/other comparisons based on
the other subcomponent skills required for mindreading and
metacognition besides false belief, can provide information
regarding the developmental trajectory for these skills. In design-
ing this research, it is essential to identify analogous subcompo-
nent skills important for mindreading and metacognition and
test them using parallel measures. For instance, one could
compare children’s ability to identify what they know about a
novel object versus another person’s knowledge, given the
same exact experience with the object. We believe such develop-
mental evidence could go a long way in resolving this debate, and
that, based on the research so far, it is likely to support
Carruthers’ hypothesis.
To conclude, there may be times when developmental evi-
dence is of little use in resolving philosophical debates, such as
when the debate is over the existence of free will or whether
God exists. We do not believe this is one of those times; rather,
Carruthers’ proposal addresses a debate that is perhaps best
understood in terms of child development. Certainly his hypoth-
esis that mindreading is essential for metacognition poses specific
empirical questions that can be tested using developmental
methods. We feel strongly that careful research identifying ana-
logous subcomponent skills necessary for mindreading and meta-
cognition and examining their developmental trajectory will
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Abstract: Carruthers is right to reject the idea of a dedicated piece of
cognitive architecture with the exclusive job of reading our own minds.
But his mistake is in trying to explain introspection in terms of any one
mindreading system. We understand ourselves in many different ways
via many systems.
I agree with Carruthers that there is no piece of human cognitive
architecture dedicated to introspection. But the right response is
to abandon the search for one introspective metacognitive
system, whether dedicated or coopted. We become aware of
our states of mind by a variety of methods, which depend on a
variety of systems.
Consider Hurlburt’s experiments. Carruthers suggests that
subjects employ their mindreading systems on their own beha-
vior and circumstances when beeped. But he worries that not
all cases can be handled like this, since there is nothing going
on at the time of the beep that looks like evidence for one
interpretation or another. To save the self-mindreading view,
Carruthers is forced to conclude that subjects are basing their
interpretation on their immediately prior behavior. This is a
rather desperate expedient. People do not seem to report any
awareness in these cases of their own behaviour or even, very
often, their own states of mind. This supports the view that we
put ourselves into a position to assert a state of mind by doing
whatever we do to get into that state in the first place (Evans
1982).
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When Hurlburt (1997) discusses the case of Donald, for
instance, he does not show that Donald was interpreting
himself at all when he was beeped. Donald noted, for instance,
that his son had left the record player on again (Hurlburt 1997,
p. 944). He reported attending to a fact about his environment.
He was later brought to see the facts he noticed as evidence
that he harbored unacknowledged anger toward his son.
Donald went over his own transcript after beeping and inter-
preted his behaviour as he might anyone else’s. This case helps
Carruthers in one way, but it also shows something he misses
about the beep cases. Donald did not report anything about his
own mind or engage in any self-interpretation when he was
beeped.
Many of Hurlburt’s subjects do not, when beeped, report any-
thing that looks like introspection or any other self-examination.
They report thinking about the world, not about themselves.
Carruthers mentions a subject who is wondering what her
friend will be driving later; this is not a thought about one’s
own state of mind at all, and it is not clear why we need to call
this interpretation. The subject is not self-interpreting. She is
in a first-order state of wondering about the world, and being
in that state is what lets her express it; she knows what she
thinks by looking at the world, not by treating her deliberations
as evidence for self-mindreading.
The assumption that ordinary deliberation must be
accompanied by mindreading for one to report it is unnecessary
and it gets Carruthers into trouble with those cases where sub-
jects lack interpretative evidence from their own behaviour. Sub-
jects report what they are thinking about, and often it is not
themselves. If they were really engaged in self-mindreading,
you would expect them to talk explicitly about their own beliefs
and desires. But they often don’t, which suggests that we
should understand them as doing something other than either
self-monitoring or self-interpretation. The absence of evidence
for interpretation that Carruthers frets about is real, but it
doesn’t support the view he opposes. Rather, it supports the
view that that we often know what we think by thinking about
the world and not about ourselves. This supports the picture of
self-attribution of belief that we find in Evans (1982, pp. 223–
26), in which it is often just a matter of making up one’s mind.
Carruthers acknowledges that in cases of settled belief we can
access our beliefs through memory. He reads Evans as showing
that metacognitive access can arise through turning our mind-
reading capacities on our memory reports. But that is needlessly
baroque. The simplest theory is that belief self-attributions are
often just episodes of remembering.
I can assert a belief that p via the same procedure that would I
go through in order to assert that p. This might be the result of
working out what I believe via self-mindreading. But in other
cases, when I state my belief that p, I am just remembering
that p is true. Interpretative evidence is not needed. We do not
have to assume that any interpretation is going on at all. In
other cases, I put myself in a position to assert a belief by wonder-
ing if it is true. This is the way to handle the case of the woman
who wonders what car she will go home in; we do not need to
think of her as interpreting herself at all. Rather, the beeper
leads her to say where her attention is focused, and it is
focused on the world, so that is what she talks about. And attend-
ing to the world is not introspection or self-interpretation, even if
it lets you say what you are thinking about.
Carruthers remains in needless thrall to the idea that metacog-
nition needs a device that is directed at the mind. But when you
self-attribute a propositional attitude, you are often not using an
inward glance but an outward one: you are thinking about the
world. Evans is concerned with this wider capacity to figure
things out. When he talks of putting oneself in a position to
report a belief, he is thinking of our abilities to deliberate
about the world. Carruthers has isolated one way in which we
may think about objects in the world – that is, we may treat
them as things with minds, and we may look at our own behavior
in that light too. But there is no reason to suppose that all our self-
attributions come from self-mindreading. Introspection does not
rely on any one system, neither an inner eye nor a mindreading
device; it depends on all the ways one might think of states of
affairs as believable or desirable. We can know our thoughts by
looking at the world.
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Abstract: Carruthers claims that global workspace theory implies that
sensory states, unlike propositional attitudes, are introspectible in a
non-interpretative fashion. I argue that this claim is false, and defend a
strong version of the “mindreading is prior” model of first-person
access, according to which the self-ascription of all mental states, both
propositional and sensory, is interpretative.
According to the strong version of the “mindreading is prior”
model (MPM), all metacognition is interpretative. On the weak
version, we have non-interpretative access to both sensory
states and propositional attitudes. Carruthers’ version of MPM
is a middle-ground position. In accord with the strong version,
he insists that first-person awareness of propositional attitudes
is always self-interpretative and, hence, never “introspective”
(in his quasi-pejorative sense). However, he denies that self-
attribution of “sensory-imagistic” states is interpretative, claiming
that such states are introspectively available as data for the mind-
reading system. On his view, “the mindreading system can
receive as input any sensory or quasi-sensory (e.g., imagistic or
somatosensory) state that gets ‘globally broadcast’ to all [cogni-
tive] systems” (sect. 2, para. 3). The set of such states includes
“perceptions, visual and auditory imagery (including sentences
rehearsed in ‘inner speech’), patterns of attention, and emotional
feelings” (sect. 2, para. 6).
I argue that Carruthers’ appeal to the distinction between
sensory states and propositional attitudes involves an error, and
that avoiding this error leads to the collapse of his view into
one of the competing versions. The preferable collapse is, I
argue, toward the stronger view.
The states that Carruthers takes to be introspectively available
are supposed to be “sensory-imagistic,” not conceptualized or
propositional. But it is not obvious that perceptual judgments
satisfy this description. Perceptual judgments are plainly a
species of propositional attitude. True, such states may also
have qualitative properties, but they are nevertheless constituted
by concepts, and have “sentence-sized” intentional contents. Car-
ruthers acknowledges this in discussing how the mindreading
faculty would make use of perceptual judgments:
Receiving as input a visual representation of a man bending over, for
example, [the mind-reading system] should be capable of forming
the judgment, “I am seeing a man bending over.” (At least, this
should be possible provided the visual state in question has been par-
tially conceptualized by other mental faculties, coming to the mindread-
ing system with the concepts man and bending over already attached).
(target article, sect. 2, para. 4, my emphasis)
In explaining why perceptual judgments appear on his list of
introspectible states, Carruthers’s appeals to global workspace
theory. That perceptual judgments are introspectible is, in his
view, “pretty much mandatory once we buy into a global broad-
casting architecture” (sect. 2, para. 8). That’s because, in percep-
tion, “the initial outputs of the visual system interact with a
variety of conceptual systems that deploy and manipulate
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perceptual templates, attempting to achieve a ‘best match’ with
the incoming data. . . . [T]he result is globally broadcast as part
of the perceptual state itself” (sect. 2, para. 10).
Although this is certainly plausible, Carruthers neglects the
fact that similar grounds are available for the claim that other
propositional attitudes are broadcast as well. Indeed, given his
concession that global workspace theories allow for the broad-
casting of at least one propositional attitude, one wonders why
he assumes that such theories would not allow for the broadcast-
ing of all the rest. On the face of it, the claim that all propositional
attitudes can be globally broadcast has much going for it. Inten-
tions, for instance, routinely recruit a wide array of cognitive
resources, as do the conceptual-intentional aspects of emotions
like fear and anger (e.g., that one is being attacked). Why not
count these as instances of global broadcasting? Carruthers
does not say.
Pending further argument, we should assume, pace Car-
ruthers, that global workspace theory does allow for the broad-
casting of all propositional attitudes. If so, then whatever we
say about first-person access to sensory states, we should say
the same about first-person access to propositional attitudes.
Do these considerations support the view that the mindread-
ing system has direct, non-interpretative access to all mental
states, both propositional and sensory? Not if one also rejects
Carruthers’ assumption that globally broadcast states are ipso
facto available to the mindreading system in a non-interpretative
fashion. Below, I explore grounds for adopting the strong version
of MPM, according to which self-attribution is interpretative in
the case of all mental states.
Interpretation takes place by deploying a propositional attitude
that emerges from a background of theoretical commitments.
Consequently, the cost of embarking on an interpretative
venture is the possibility of partial misconstrual or wholesale
error. These characteristics of interpretative activity fit well
with Carruthers’ usage of the term “interpretative,” as applied
to mechanisms of self-attribution.
As Rosenthal (2005) has argued, self-attribution is a matter of
tokening potentially erroneous, theoretically loaded prop-
ositional attitudes – occurrent higher-order thoughts (HOTs).
On this view, confabulation and error occur even with regard
to sensory states. Dental fear, for instance, is a phenomenon in
which dental patients under the drill mistake fear, anxiety, and
a sensation of vibration for pain in a fully anaesthetized or nerve-
less tooth – a compelling demonstration that HOTs need not be
veridical.
Nevertheless, judged on independent grounds, self-attributions
of sensory states are often relatively accurate. Doubtless, this
consideration compels theorists to posit a reliable monitoring
mechanism, such as Carruthers’ mindreading system. But, as
Rosenthal points out, simply positing such a mechanism
amounts to no more than stipulating a solution to the problem
of explaining the frequent accuracy of HOTs about sensory
states. An explanatory account of the mechanism’s accuracy is
not provided.
Extending Sellars’s (1956/1997) treatment, Rosenthal argues
that HOTs concerning sensory states arise as a result of a crea-
ture’s reflection on cases in which its perceptual judgments are
mistaken. The creature formulates a rudimentary theory, in
effect positing qualitative sensory states as the causes of non-
veridical perceptual judgments. Against the background of
such a theory, the creature is disposed, for instance, to con-
strue itself as having a sensation of red when perceiving a
red object.
Carruthers gives no grounds for rejecting this alternative and
appealing picture. Global broadcast theory does not, by itself,
settle the issue, for it is consistent with the claim that the
mindreading system relies on a tacit theory in interpretatively
self-ascribing sensory states. Nor does the data from autistic chil-
dren disconfirm Rosenthal’s view, which allows that even nonlin-
guistic, cognitively unsophisticated creatures may come to have
HOTs concerning their sensory states. All that is required is
that such creatures take note of their perceptual errors and
account for them.
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Abstract: Judgments vary in the extent to which they are based on
interpretation versus relatively direct access to mental contents. That is,
a judgment might require a trivial amount of interpretation (e.g.,
translating one’s immediately accessible “inner speech”) or a rather
substantial amount of confabulation. Recognizing this continuum of
interpretation underlying judgment could be more fruitful than
debating a categorical introspection versus interpretation distinction.
Some prior authors have noted that people have no unique access
to why they believe what they believe (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson
1977). Others have gone a step further and postulated that
people do not know their own attitudes (e.g., I like ice-cream)
but must construct them when needed from other available
information that they either retrieve from memory (e.g., ice
cream tastes good) or extract from the immediate context (e.g.,
Schwarz & Bohner 2000). Carruthers takes this “constructivist”
position to the ultimate extreme by arguing that people have
no direct access to any attitudes or relevant beliefs. According
to this view, introspection does not exist, and is merely an illusion.
Furthermore, he provides many examples where people either
clearly or plausibly are confabulating when they express what
they believe. In his view, at best individuals only know what
they feel and perceive, not what they think. In our view, it is
not clear why an intelligent organism would have evolved to
have direct access to its feelings and perceptions but not its
cognitions.
Nevertheless, Carruthers has an important point. Whenever
someone expresses a belief or has a thought, some degree of
interpretation likely is involved, if only to understand the
meaning of the “inner speech” in which the thought is
expressed. Thus, if a person has a positive reaction to some
stimulus (ice-cream), this can be translated into “it’s good”
(Fazio 1985). Or even if the word “good” immediately springs
to mind, the meaning of the word must be understood by the
self if an internal thought, or by others if expressed. However,
this very minimal form of “interpretation” is very different
from the kind of interpretation involved in most of the examples
of confabulation provided by Carruthers. Indeed, we argue that
it may not be wise to think of introspection and interpretation as
dichotomous categories in which to place any given judgment.
Rather, there are various degrees of interpretation. At the low
end of the interpretation continuum, judgments are introspec-
tion-like in that they involve at most some trivial interpretation.
At the other end of the continuum, the judgment is totally con-
fabulated from external sources also available to outside
observers.
Although dichotomous categories can be useful in understand-
ing some phenomena, as illustrated by the distinction between
primary and secondary (meta-) cognition, we believe that it is
not conducive to understanding human information processing
Commentary/Carruthers: How we know our own minds
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2009) 32:2 157
to simply lump all judgments into the same overarching
“interpretation” category and stop there. This is because
putting all judgments into the same category might suggest that
there are no meaningful differences within the catetory. In con-
trast to lumping all judgments together into one interpretation
category, we espouse a continuum view in which people
express beliefs based on very little interpretation in some cases
but based on extensive confabulation in others. We further
argue that differences in the degree of interpretation are
meaningful.
Previous research on psychological elaboration provides one
instance of the usefulness of the continuum view. The term
“elaboration” is used in social psychology to describe that
people add something of their own to the specific information
provided, for example, in a persuasive communication. In the
domain of social judgment, variations in elaboration are conse-
quential. For example, when people are relatively unmotivated
or unable to think, they are more likely to rely on immediately
accessible information that originates either internally (one’s
attitude) or externally (e.g., the attractiveness of the message
source). When people are more motivated and able to think,
then these initial reactions and the judgments that follow from
them can be overridden by more complete interpretative ana-
lyses. Furthermore, judgments based on high levels of elabor-
ation are more consequential than those based on low levels
(Petty & Cacioppo 1986).
Viewing interpretation as a continuum has a number of impli-
cations. Most obviously, it means that interpretation can go from
zero (i.e., introspection) to extensive. More interestingly, the con-
tinuum view suggests that the point on the continuum that corre-
sponds to minimal or trivial interpretation has more in common
with zero interpretation than it does with extensive interpret-
ation. One can draw an analogy to a distinction that attitude the-
orists used to favor between attitude formation versus attitude
change. Different mechanisms of influence were thought to be
operative depending on whether a person had an existing attitude
or did not (a categorical view). Today, it is more common to think
of attitudes as falling along a continuum such that they can vary in
how accessible they are or upon how much knowledge they are
based. An attitude formation situation would be present when
a person has no prior attitude. But, a continuum approach to atti-
tudes suggests that a person who has an attitude that is difficult to
bring to mind and based on little information (Person B) has
more in common with an individual who has no attitude
(Person A) than a person who has an attitude that comes to
mind spontaneously and is based on much knowledge (Person
C). That is, the first two individuals – A and B – are more
similar to each other in psychologically relevant ways than they
are to C, despite the fact that a dichotomous approach places
Person B in a different category from A and in the same category
as C. So too is it the case that a judgment based on minimal
interpretation (B) is closer to a judgment based on no interpret-
ation (A) than it is to a judgment based on extensive interpret-
ation (C; see Fig. 1).
In sum, we conclude that an all-or-none frame regarding the
existence of introspection may not be the best way to make
the most progress in understanding social judgment. Instead,
drawing from the literature on elaboration and attitude strength,
we suggest that it might be more fruitful to approach
interpretation as a continuum where the low end is anchored
at introspection. That is, sometimes interpretation can be quite
minimal as when people recall their birth-date or liking of a
favorite book. At other times, interpretation can be quite exten-
sive, such as when there is either nothing relevant to recall or
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Abstract: PeterCarruthers correctly claims thatmetacognition in humans
may involve self-directed interpretations (i.e., may use the conceptual
interpretative resources of mindreading). He fails to show, however, that
metacognition cannot rely exclusively on subjective experience. Focusing
on self-directed mindreading can only bypass evolutionary considerations
and obscure important functional differences.
Carruthers’ main goal is to show that metacognition is a form of
self-directed interpretation, akin to other-directed mindreading.
Introspection, he claims, defined as “any reliable method for
forming beliefs about one’s own mental states that is not self-
interpretative and that differs in kind from the ways in which
we form beliefs about the mental states of other people” (sect.
1.4, para. 3, emphasis in the original), is not needed to have
access to one’s own mental attitudes. One can agree with the
author that metacognition in humans may involve self-directed
interpretations (i.e., may use the conceptual interpretative
resources of mindreading), without accepting the stronger
claim that metacognition can never be based on “introspection.”
In cognitive science, “metacognition” refers to the capacity
through which a subject can evaluate the feasibility or completion
of a given mental goal (such as learning a maze, or discriminating
a signal) in a given episode (Koriat et al. 2006). In Carruthers’
use, however, metacognition refers to first-person metarepresen-
tation of one’s own mental states; as a result, the theoretical
possibility that metacognition might operate in a different rep-
resentational format cannot be raised (Proust, in press b). Revis-
ing the meaning of a functional term such as “metacognition” is a
bold strategy. It generally seems more adequate to leave it an
open empirical matter whether a capacity of type A (reading
one’s own mind) or type B (evaluating one’s cognitive disposi-
tions) is engaged in a particular task. A revision is deemed necess-
ary, according to Carruthers, because “B” capacities in fact
always involve self-directed mindreading; therefore apparent
contrary cases (self-evaluation in non-mindreading animals)
either (1) are simply instances of first-order types of learning,
and/or (2) are capacities “too weak to be of any interest” (Car-
ruthers 2008b, p. 62; cf. target article, sects. 5.1 and 9).
Two methodological problems, however, hamper the discus-
sion so conceived. First, it is quite plausible that, in human
forms of metacognition (as instantiated in speech production,
metamemory, etc.), judgments of self-attribution redescribe
elements of metacognitive experience. Metacognitive feelings
might, on this view, represent subjective uncertainty and guide
noetic decision-making, without needing to involve a conceptual
interpretative process. What needs to be discussed, in order to
establish the superiority of model 4, is whether or not subjects
can rely on dedicated feelings alone to monitor their ongoing
cognitive activity.
A second, related problem is that Carruthers’ discussion con-
flates two domains of self-control, namely, the control of one’s
Figure 1 (Petty & Brin˜ol). Continuum of extent of interpret-
ation underlying judgment
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physical actions through perceptual feedback and the control of
one’s mental actions through metacognitive feedback (see sects.
5.1 and 9). Meta-action, however, is only functionally similar to
metacognition when a metarepresentational reading is imposed
on both, in spite of their different evolutionary profiles (Met-
calfe & Greene 2007; Proust, in press a). If extracting, from a
given task context, an evaluation of the mental resources avail-
able to complete the task were just another case of first-order
action control, then one might agree that B-metacognition is
nothing other than executive function. But metacognitive and
executive abilities can be dissociated in schizophrenia (Koren
et al. 2006). Mental action control is thus distinct both from
executive memory as usually understood and from physical
action control.
These methodological problems strongly bias the discussion
against models 1 and 3. Here are three examples.
1. Our metacognitive interventions don’t require introspec-
tion; they have no direct impact on cognitive processing (sect.
5.1).
From a B-sense viewpoint, prediction and evaluation of one’s
mental states and events presuppose appreciating one’s subjec-
tive uncertainty regarding correction, adequacy, and so on, of
first-order decisions or judgments; this evaluation does not
require that the target states are represented qua mental. For
example, a child chooses to perform one memorization task
rather than another by relying not on what she knows about
memory, as the author claims, but on the feeling she has that
one task is easier than another (Koriat 2000; Proust 2007). The
impact on decision is quite direct, and it is independent of
mindreading.
2. A combination of first-order attitudes is sufficient to explain
how animals select the uncertainty key in Smith et al.’s metaper-
ceptual paradigm (sect. 5.2).
If this is correct, how can monkeys rationally decide to opt out
when no reinforcement of the uncertainty key is offered, and
when, in addition, novel test stimuli are used? Why should
there be transfer of the degree of belief associated with first-
order items to novel tasks where these items are no longer
included? A second rule must apply, as Carruthers (2008b)
himself admits: having conflicting impulsions to act or not to
act on a given stimulus, the subject becomes uncertain of its
ability, say, to categorize. So the decision to act depends, after
all, on subjective – not objective – features. Can these subjec-
tive features influence behavior only through their being metar-
epresented ? This is the crucial question that fails to be raised.
3. “Evidence suggests that if mindreading is damaged, then so
too will be metacognition” (sect. 10, para. 10).
Clinical research on autism and on schizophrenia suggests
rather a dissociation of metacognitive and mindreading skills as
predicted by model 1 (cf. Bacon et al. 2001; Farrant et al.
1999; Koren et al. 2006). However, its relevance for the
present discussion is downplayed as a smart behaviorist effect;
introspection in patients with autism is rejected because it is
not “metacognitive in the right sort of way” (sect. 10, para. 5).
Negative results in meta-action from patients with autism are
presented as evidence for impaired metacognition. Such apprai-
sals implicitly appeal to the preferred metarepresentational
interpretation of metacognition under discussion. Similarly,
rejecting the relevance of metacognitive capacities which are
“too weak to be of any interest” presupposes recognizing the
superiority of model 4 over models 1 and 3.
A fair examination of the contribution of “introspection” in
metacognition in models 1 and 3 would require studying the
respective roles of control and monitoring in nonhuman and
human epistemic decisions, in experimental tasks engaging meta-
perception, metamemory, and planning (Koriat et al. 2006;
Proust, in press a). Focusing on self-directed mindreading can
only bypass evolutionary considerations and obscure important
functional differences.
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Abstract: Carruthers argues that there is no developmental or clinical
evidence that metacognition is dissociable from mindreading, and
hence there is no reason to think that metacognition is prior to
mindreading. A closer look at the evidence, however, reveals that these
conclusions are premature at best.
In psychology, evidence of dissociation comes in one of two
forms: synchronic or diachronic. Two capacities are synchroni-
cally dissociable if there are adults in whom the first capacity is
defective and the second capacity is intact, or vice versa. Evi-
dence for dissociation of this sort comes from studies of clinical
mental disorders, such as autism and schizophrenia. Two
capacities are diachronically dissociable if the first capacity
emerges before the second capacity does, or vice versa. Evidence
for dissociation of this sort comes from studies of normally
developing children. A central issue in the target article is the
dissociability – or lack thereof – of metacognition (first-person
metarepresentation) frommindreading (third-person metarepre-
sentation). After waving the issue of diachronic dissociation
mostly to one side (sect. 4), Carruthers argues that there is no
good evidence of synchronic dissociation (sects. 9 and 10).
With respect to the first point, his dismissal of the developmental
evidence is premature; on the second point, he makes a slightly
better case, but the evidence isn’t all in – so the jury is still
out. Or so I argue.
Let’s start with the case of synchronic dissociation and the view
from developmental psychology. Carruthers opens his discussion
here by citing a large-scale meta-analysis that found no evidence
of developmental self-other asymmetries on metarepresentation
tasks (Wellman et al. 2001). This is grist for the “mindreading is
prior” mill but only up to a point. That’s because the meta-analy-
sis byWellman et al. was exclusively concerned with studies using
standard false-belief tasks and no other measures of metarepre-
sentational capacity. And once we take into account the results
of studies using such nonstandard measures, the idea that meta-
cognition is developmentally prior to mindreading becomes more
plausible (Nichols & Stich 2003; see also Robbins 2006).
A key piece of evidence here comes from a study by Wimmer
et al. (1988) using a version of the “seeing leads to knowing” para-
digm. (Curiously, Carruthers never cites this study, though he
does cite a later study of children with autism that employed
much the same paradigm, albeit with different – and for his pur-
poses, more favorable – results; see Kazak et al. 1997.) In this
study, done with normally developing 3-year-olds, subjects
were divided into two groups. In the first group, the children
were instructed to look inside a box; in the second group,
visual access to the interior of the box was denied. Subjects in
both groups were then asked whether or not they knew what
was in the box, and most of the children in each group gave
the correct answer: those in the first group said yes, those in
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the second group said no. Subsequently, children in both groups
observed another person either looking inside of the box or
not looking into it. They were then asked whether or not the
person they had observed knew what was inside the box. The
answers they returned were surprising (especially for anyone
familiar with the literature on egocentric biases). For example,
14 children represented their own epistemic state correctly
while misrepresenting the epistemic state of the other person,
whereas only 2 children displayed the opposite pattern of
responses (i.e., correct for other, incorrect for self) – a highly
significant contrast (p , .01). In short, results from the
Wimmer et al. study suggest that young children are better at
reporting their own knowledge state than the knowledge state
of others with whom they knowingly share access to the relevant
information. Because knowledge is a propositional attitude par
excellence, this looks like good support for the synchronic dis-
sociability of metacognition from mindreading in precisely the
domain of interest, namely, the metarepresentation of prop-
ositional attitudes.
Let’s turn now to the issue of synchronic dissociation. Car-
ruthers points out that passivity symptoms in schizophrenia,
such as thought insertion and delusions of control, need not be
(and probably are not) due to a breakdown in metacognition,
and hence that studies of passivity-symptomatic schizophre-
nia – a condition in which mindreading appears to be relatively
intact – do not support the idea that metacognition is defective
in this condition. But this is a double-edged sword. For if the
“mindreading is prior” view is correct, then metacognition
should be impaired in those subtypes of schizophrenia in which
mindreading is defective. Passivity-symptomatic schizophrenia
is unrepresentative in this respect, in that patients with this
subtype of the disorder tend to perform normally on standard
first- and second-order false-belief tasks (Corcoran 2000). By
contrast, individuals in the paranoid subtype of schizophrenia
perform poorly on a wide range of mindreading tasks, including
tasks involving the attribution of intentions and the understand-
ing of jokes, hints, and conversational implicatures (Bru¨ne 2005).
Indeed, the defining symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia
include persecutory delusions and delusions of self-reference,
both of which involve misattributing to other people intentions
toward oneself. Exactly what explains this tendency is a matter
of controversy, but its characterization in terms of a deficit in
the mindreading system is not (Blackwood et al. 2001). Hence,
if the “mindreading is prior” view is right, then we should
expect to find impaired metacognition in these patients,
especially in the domain of intention attribution; otherwise, we
should conclude that metacognition and mindreading are disso-
ciable after all. As things stand, however, there appears to be
no credible evidence to this effect.
There are at least two possible explanations for this fact, only
one of which is immediately damaging to Carruthers’ position.
The first possibility is that evidence of metacognitive impair-
ments in paranoid schizophrenia is lacking because metacogni-
tion is spared in this disorder. That would be bad news for the
“mindreading is prior” view. A second possibility, however, is
that evidence of this sort is lacking simply because the requisite
empirical studies have not been done yet. This second possibility
seems at least as likely as the first, especially as far as the meta-
cognition of propositional attitudes like intention is concerned.
Schizophrenia researchers have paid more attention to the meta-
cognition of emotions, that is, nonattitudinal mental states. But
here the news isn’t good for Carruthers either, for it appears
that third-person deficits, such as difficulties with face-based
emotion recognition, need not be accompanied by first-person
deficits, such as difficulties with recognizing one’s own emotions
(Brunet-Gouet & Decety 2006). It is entirely possible, then, that
future studies of the metacognition of intention in schizophrenia
will point toward a similar dissociation. And in that case, propo-
nents of the “mindreading is prior” view will have some explain-
ing to do.
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Abstract: The engineer’s look at how the mind works omits a central
piece of the puzzle. It ignores the dynamic of motivations and the
social context in which mindreading and metacognition evolved and
developed in the first place. Mindreading and metacognition derive
from a primacy of affective mindreading and meta-affectivity (e.g.,
secondary emotions such as shame or pride), both co-emerging in early
development.
William James in his 1872 publication entitled “Are We Auto-
mata?” makes the point that “a succession of feelings is not one
and the same thingwith a feeling of succession, but awholly differ-
ent thing” (James 1872, p. 5 ). James insists that: “The latter feeling
requires a self-transcendency of each item, so that each not only is
in relation, but knows its relation, to the other.” James concludes
that this “self-transcendency of data” constitutes what conscious-
ness is, in his own words “what constitutes the conscious form”
(p. 6 ). It is also what makes us nonreducible to automata.
If we agree with James that we are more than machines, an
engineer look at self-consciousness (e.g., metacognition and
introspection) and the consciousness of others (mindreading
and theories of mind) is insufficient and does not capture the
essence of the phenomena.
At the core of these issues, there is more than the rational attri-
bution of mental states to the self or to others (theories of mind).
There are also feelings and emotions, what make us sentient and
incommensurate to machines. In the social domain, “self-
transcendency” corresponds first and foremost to the feeling of
our relation to others, not just to a propositional attitude
turned toward others or onto the self (metacognition).
Children in their social-affective development tell us that
upstream to mindreading and metacognizing, there is the affective
urge to see the self as seen and evaluated by others – the deep-
seated affective propensity to have “others in mind” (Rochat 2009).
The origins of a tendency to attribute attitudes (i.e., adopt a
propositional attitude stance) toward others as well as toward
the self are rooted in the basic propensity to know where we
stand emotionally in relation to others: whether we feel affective
distance or closeness, a sense of affiliation and approval, or on the
contrary a sense of disapproval and rejection from others.
There is now much evidence showing that long before children
display signs of explicit “theorizing” about the mental states of
others, as well as their own, whether for example they have an
appreciation of their own knowledge or ignorance, they have
already developed astute implicit intuitions of whether they can
more or less “trust” someone, or “trust” themselves in what
they believe and know.
By 2 months, infants expect someone to behave in a certain
way in certain social contexts. They show distress and emotional
withdrawal toward an adult who abruptly and for no apparent
reasons adopts a frozen facial expression. They also show resist-
ance in recovering positive affects following a still-face episode
(Tronick 2005; Tronick et al. 1978). Infants are indeed highly
sensitive to the attention received from others, constantly
gauging how much others are engaged toward them (Reddy
2003). They are also quick to develop a preference for the inter-
active contingency style of their mother, generalizing such pre-
ference when encountering strangers (Bigelow & Rochat 2006).
These facts demonstrate that at the roots of mindreading and
metacognition, there is a complex pragmatics of intentional com-
municative exchanges that is not just rational, but ontologically
affective and emotional. The first nonverbal language of children
is well documented, expressed from at least 2 months of age in
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the context of face-to-face interactions, made of mutual gazes,
precise contingency of exchanges and turn taking, with compul-
sive “motherese” and other affective markers from adults.
The syntax of this early nonverbal grammar (e.g., when I smile,
the other should not scream or cry) and the semantics that chil-
dren derive from it (e.g., if I smile and the other looks away,
something is wrong) is primarily emotional and affective. These
rich and reciprocal communicative exchanges quickly determine
a proto-rationality that is expressed in the epistemic as well as
affective trust that children from the earliest age place in
others, as well as eventually into themselves.
Topal et al. (2008) provide further evidence of the deep affec-
tive and emotional roots of mindreading and metacognition.
These authors show that the famous Piagetian stage 4A-not-B
error of object permanence found in 10-month-olds and
younger infants, depends in part on the presence or absence of
subtle communicative and emotional cues (i.e., eye contact,
motherese, affective attunement, or social contingency) from
the experimenter hiding the object. Infants are inclined to inter-
pret the adult as wanting to teach them something (a hiding
game), while having a good, intimate social time of sustained
mutual attention. Topal et al. show that 10-month-olds’ perse-
verative search errors can be induced by pragmatic misinterpre-
tation of an adult’s intentions.
By the time children objectify themselves in mirrors passing
the famous mark test (Amsterdam 1972), they also begin to
express secondary emotions such as embarrassment, shame, or
pride (Lewis 1992). Early on, infants demonstrate a complex
appreciation about their public appearance, long before they
express rational theories of mind and metacognition. Affectively,
children first feel how others like or dislike them (affective
reading), gauging also how they think they might be liked or
disliked by others (meta-affectivity). Both seem to co-emerge
in development, necessarily codependent.
From a developmental vantage point, affective reading and
meta-affectivity are ontologically linked, representing two sides
of the same coin. Findings on early social and emotional develop-
ment demonstrate that there is not much empirical grounding for
conceptualizing them as separate processes.
In short, let us not forget that we are born in need of social
attention; and it is, I would suggest, in this primary motivational
context that early social expectations develop. These expec-
tations, co-constructed in the history of interactions with
others, become by 4 to 5 years of age explicit “theories” about
self and others’ propositional attitudes. This primary motivational
context represents an invaluable source of information that
cannot be dismissed or overlooked, particularly if one attempts
at capturing “how we know our own mind.”
Dealing with the question outside of any motivational context,
as done by Carruthers in the target article, is a disembodied,
abstract exercise. By analogy, it is like playing chess or moving
armies on a map instead of being physically and emotionally
engaged on the battlefield. The battlefield is riskier, but closer
to what it is all about.
Metacognition, mindreading, and insight in
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doi:10.1017/S0140525X09000806
Ben Wiffen and Anthony David
Department of Psychological Medicine and Psychiatry, Institute of Psychiatry,
King’s College London, London SE5 8AF, United Kingdom.
ben.wiffen@iop.kcl.ac.uk a.david@iop.kcl.ac.uk
www.iop.kcl.ac.uk/staff/?go¼10055
Abstract:Mindreading in schizophrenia has been shown to be impaired
in a multitude of studies. Furthermore, there is increasing evidence to
suggest that metacognition is damaged as well. Lack of insight, or the
inability to recognise one’s own disorder, is an example of such a
failure. We suggest that mindreading and metacognition are linked, but
separable.
Herewe review the evidence for deficits inmindreading (or Theory
of Mind [ToM]) tasks in schizophrenia and look at some work on
true metacognitive tasks in schizophrenia, in which schizophrenia
patients also display deficits. We argue that what psychiatrists
refer to as a “lack of insight” is an example of a failure to make
judgements of themselves that they do make of others.
Since the publication of Chris Frith’s seminal Cognitive Neu-
ropsychology of Schizophrenia (Frith 1992), research investi-
gating ToM in schizophrenia has been widespread. A deficit in
mindreading is clearly demonstrable in schizophrenia, but
whether this is specific and causally related to certain symptoms
or merely further evidence of generalised cognitive impairment
found in virtually all patients with the disorder remains unclear
(Harrington et al. 2005). Sprong et al.’s (2007) meta-analysis
showed a large and statistically significant impairment on ToM
tasks (Cohen’s d ¼ 1.26) across all schizophrenia sub-types and
tasks, larger than studies restricted to “paranoid” patients, and
claimed that there was support for mindreading impairment as
a trait marker of schizophrenia.
Studies apparently supporting Carruthers’ claim that mind-
reading is intact in “passivity” schizophrenia have had small
sample sizes in their group (e.g., 7 in Corcoran et al. 1995; 1 in
Pickup & Frith 2001). Furthermore, these studies may be con-
founded by other common symptoms; that is, someone with pas-
sivity symptoms may well exhibit paranoid or negative symptoms.
So claiming that passivity symptom patients “perform normally
when tested on batteries of mindreading tasks” (target article,
sect. 9, para. 1) is overly bold. Indeed, recent work comparing
controls with “passivity” patients showed different neural activity
in ToM tasks, even though responses were broadly similar (Bru¨ne
et al. 2008). This suggests that a different cognitive strategy is
used by such patients in mindreading tasks.
We question whether passivity “experiences” are ever pure
metacognitive failures. Although classical phenomenologists
like Kurt Schneider attempted to separate what in today’s par-
lance we would call the experience from the attribution, the
tiny corpus of examples in the literature invariably link the
experience with a “psychotic” explanation – that a person or
organisation is doing the movement or speaking through me
using some dastardly device or technology. When the experience
alone is reported, we can’t be sure that there is no abnormal attri-
bution. Our clinical impression is that the two are inextricably
linked – at least in people presenting to clinical services. We
believe this is the essence of Frith’s model: that delusions, such
as those of alien control, may build on passivity experiences
but are the result of ToM reasoning which has gone awry. One
might even say that psychosis is the result of excessive
attribution – usually of malign intent – to people or things.
People with psychosis have a theory of mind – it is just the
wrong theory.
We would also argue that there is evidence for impairment in
metacognition in schizophrenia in a truer sense than the “weak”
variety described. The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (Beck et al.
2004) shows differences between schizophrenia patients and
controls in their agreement with statements on subscales asses-
sing self-reflection and self-certainty (Warman et al. 2007). Fur-
thermore, some studies show considerable deficits in psychotic
patients’ assessment of their own poor neurocognitive function
(Medalia & Thysen 2008), although accurate assessment of
such deficits may coexist with lack of awareness of the implausi-
bility of beliefs suggesting fractionation of metacognitive aware-
ness (Gilleen et al., in press). However, metacognitive failure is
not for a want of trying. Bedford and David (2008) showed that
patients actually place time and value in self-reflection, but just
struggle to do it accurately. Additionally, patients’ metacognitive
performance on the Wisconsin Card Sort Task (i.e., the
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confidence they place in the decisions they make) predicts dis-
rupted insight in schizophrenia, suggesting a link between a
failure of metacognition in a narrow sense, to a broader one
(Koren et al. 2004).
What psychiatrists refer to as a lack of insight (the ability to
judge oneself to have a mental disorder and to “relabel” abnormal
experiences as related to such a disorder) is very common in
schizophrenia and has even been conceptualised as a core
aspect of the condition (David 2004). It seems to be an
example of a failure of metacognition. Patients fail to make accu-
rate judgements about themselves – in relation to their thoughts
and experiences – and instead choose often bizarre and imposs-
ible explanations. However, it does not seem to be the case that
patients who lack insight into their own illness are completely
unable to make accurate judgements about others. Their mind-
reading abilities remain intact to the extent that they are rela-
tively unimpaired in their attributions of “madness” to others.
Rockeach’s Three Christs of Ypsilanti (Rockeach 1964) reports
the reactions of three patients presenting with broadly the
same delusion. They all continued to believe in their identity
whilst rejecting the others as mad: “Truth is truth, no matter if
only one person speaks it” (p. 150), claims one, steadfastly
defending his identity.
Indeed, empirical studies using vignettes have shown no differ-
ences between patients and controls in attribution of illness.
Startup (1997) showed that patients could distinguish between
normal and psychotic thoughts, feelings, and behaviours in the
vignettes but this showed no correlation with the patients’
insight into their own condition. McEvoy et al. (1993) found
that patients correctly labelled characters with psychotic symp-
toms in vignettes as suffering from mental illness, but failed to
note their own similarity to the character – although it was
obvious to the patients’ doctor. Further studies assessing the
relationship of mindreading and metacognition as related to
their applications in clinical insight are required: a simple corre-
lation between the two functions seems unlikely (Pousa et al.
2008).
We note that metacognition can be enhanced by presenting
the self as if another person – for example, by replaying a
video of himself when ill to the patient (Davidoff et al. 1998).
A conceptually similar approach taken to neurological patients
with anosognosia for hemiplegia seems to yield increased aware-
ness (Marcel et al. 2004). These observations are not decisive in
dissociating mind reading from metacognition but suggest the
following hypotheses: That self-awareness may at least make
use of cognitive mechanisms which afford awareness of others’
intentions and beliefs; that this is not necessarily automatic and
may be prevented, presumably by attentional mechanisms or
strategic failures (not looking), but can be overcome by adopting
a third-person perspective to the self. Thus, some practical
benefit may accrue from considering metacognition and ToM
as linked but separable.
Metacognition may be more impaired than
mindreading in autism
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Abstract: This commentary focuses on evidence from autism concerning
the relation between metacognition and mindreading. We support
Carruthers’ rejection of models 1 (independent systems) and 3
(metacognition before mindreading), and provide evidence to
strengthen his critique. However, we also present evidence from
autism that we believe supports model 2 (one mechanism, two modes
of access) over model 4 (mindreading is prior).
Impaired metacognition in autism. We agree with Carruthers’
claim that both mindreading and metacognition are impaired in
autism, and that this speaks against models 1 and 3. However, we
wish to provide more decisive evidence for impaired metacogni-
tion in autism, given that the evidence cited by Carruthers is pro-
blematic. For example, contrary to Carruthers’ suggestion (sect.
10, para. 10), Kazak et al. (1997) did not find statistically signifi-
cant differences between participants with and without autism in
either mindreading or metacognition (see Kazak et al., p.1005).
Clearer evidence for metacognitive deficits among children
with autism emerges from Williams and Happe´ (in press a),
who assessed awareness of own intentions. Compared to age-
and ability-matched comparison children, children with autism
were significantly less likely to (a) correctly report their reflex
movements as unintentional, and (b) correctly recognise their
own mistaken actions (drawing a picture different to that
intended, through experimenter manipulation) as unintended.
The performance of children with autism on these measures
was significantly associated with performance on traditional
false belief tasks, independent of verbal ability. These findings
suggest that children with autism have a limited ability to rep-
resent their own intentions and that these difficulties are funda-
mentally associated with established difficulties in representing
others’ mental states (in this case, false beliefs). These findings
provide robust evidence against both models 1 and 3, but do
not differentiate models 2 and 4.
Impaired episodic memory in autism implies impaired
metacognition. Several researchers (e.g., McGeer 2004;
Nichols & Stich 2003; Raffman 1999) have claimed that the auto-
biographical reports of individuals with autism show that meta-
cognition is intact in autism (supporting models 1 and 3).
However, none of these authors, nor Carruthers in his target
article, distinguishes between semantic and episodic memory.
Episodic memory is associated with consciously remembering
personally experienced events, whereas semantic memory is con-
cerned with factual information. Caution must be exercised when
attributing to people with autismmemory processes of the episodic
kind. I may know that a particular event has happened to me in the
past, and hence report details of the event quite accurately, without
actually remembering the event. Only this latter kind of “remem-
bering” is thought to rely on metacognition (e.g., Perner 2000).
Contrary to models 1 and 3, it may be that people with autism
do not engage the same metacognitive processes as typical indi-
viduals do when reporting events from their past (Lind &
Bowler 2008). Lind and Bowler (under revised review; see also
Lind 2008) found that children with autism (n ¼ 53) were as
able as age- and ability-matched comparison participants to dis-
tinguish events that had occurred from events that had not
(whether or not a picture had been picked up and named
earlier in the test session). However, participants with autism
were significantly impaired at remembering the source of such
events (i.e., who – themselves or the experimenter – had
picked up the picture and named it). That is, the participants
knew that X event had occurred, but they had difficulty in remem-
bering the spatio-temporal context in which X occurred. There-
fore, the metacognitive status of the personal memories
reported by individuals with autism might justifiably be ques-
tioned, and cannot be taken as support for models 1 and 3.
A case of impaired metacognition but intact mindreading?
Distinguishing model 2 from model 4. The autism research
cited earlier supports equally models 2 and 4. As far as we can
tell, once Carruthers concedes (sect. 3) that the mindreading
system has different information available to it for the cases of
self and others, respectively, the only way in which model 2
differs theoretically from model 4 is with respect to the role of
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introspection of own propositional attitudes. Other commentators
will no doubt debate whether it is possible to introspect our
propositional attitudes directly. Here we concentrate on Car-
ruthers’ suggestion that different predictions emerge from
models 2 and 4.
Williams and Happe´ (in press b; see also Williams 2008)
addressed a potential confound within the classic “Smarties” unex-
pected contents task (Hogrefe et al. 1986), the task used most
widely to assess awareness of false beliefs in self and others. In
the Smarties task, participants state what they (falsely) believe is
inside a Smarties box before they are asked the critical false-belief
test questions. As such, it may be possible to answer the Self test
question (‘What did you think was inside the box, before you
looked?’) simply by rememberingwhat one said and not necessarily
what one believed. Although parallel performance across the Self
and Other test questions of the task is usually observed among chil-
dren with autism (e.g., Fisher et al. 2005), this potential confound
may have led to an over-estimation of the ability of children with
autism to reflect on their own false beliefs.
To test this possibility, we rigged a situation in which
participants were asked by the experimenter (who feigned mild
injury) to “get me a plaster,” and had ready access to three
different boxes: a plasters box, a crisps tube, and a sweets box.
By opening the plasters box (which actually contained candles),
participants demonstrated their (false) belief that the box con-
tained plasters. However, having never verbalised their belief,
success of the Self test question of this task (“What did you
think was in the box, before you looked?”) must reflect partici-
pants’ recall of their false belief rather than of any prior
statement.
We found that participants with autism were unique in finding
the Self test question significantly harder than the Other-person
question (“What will x think is inside the box, before s/he looks
inside?”). Almost a quarter (21%) of our sample of 52 children
with autism failed the Self question but passed the Other-person
question. In contrast, less than 4% of participants with autism
showed the opposite pattern of performance. Parallel performance
across the test questions was observed in age- and ability-matched
comparison participants, and in typically developing 3- to 5-year-
olds. These results seem to show the kind of dissociation between
mindreading and metacognition that Carruthers suggests would
follow from model 2, but not from model 4.
In conclusion, we believe the data so far from autism support
model 2 over model 4. But we are grateful for Carruthers’ bold
and exciting analysis, which helps to shape a new research
agenda to answer the fascinating question: How well can
people with autism “read their own minds”?
Making a case for introspection
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Abstract: Defending first-person introspective access to own mental
states, we argue against Carruthers’ claim of mindreading being prior
to meta-cognition and for a fundamental difference between how we
understand our own and others’ mental states. We conclude that a
model based on one mechanism but involving two different kinds of
access for self and other is sufficient and more consistent with the
evidence.
Making a case for introspection. Comparing four different
accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading
(meta-representing mental states of others) and first-person
metacognition (meta-representing one’s own mental states),
Carruthers concludes that the capacity to mindread is prior
to metacognition. According to him, basic mindreading is
either turned upon others or turned upon ourselves, the latter
constituting metacognition. Mindreading is thus the capacity to
interpret the other or the self and therefore does not require
introspection.
This brings us to the core problem of our critique: Assuming
that there is one basic meta-representational mechanism that
underlies both understanding the self and other, how can this
mechanism be characterized?
In what follows, our analysis hinges on the way Carruthers uses
the term introspection in relation to basic mindreading. Most
accounts of mindreading use introspection to describe a special
kind of access that we have to ourselves that is not available for
third-person mindreading.
Carruthers’ account dispenses with this difference of access
and the function of introspection. He gives a negative definition
of introspection as “any reliable method for forming beliefs about
one’s own mental states that is not self-interpretative and that
differs in kind from the ways in which we form beliefs about
the mental states of other people” (sect. 1.4, para. 3, emphasis
in original). Yet, in his architecture of the mind, there is no
place for an introspective capacity constituting an immediate
and direct inner perception of a belief. This conclusion results
from Carruthers’ extreme caution about the phenomenology
that characterizes introspection and his dismissal of it as
misleading.
This thesis of the unreliability of introspection and the neces-
sity to dismiss it as a mode of access to beliefs is supported by
data from confabulation and commissurotomy. However, this
does not show that one cannot know one’s beliefs to be true.
We don’t necessarily have to concede that beliefs are – or can
become – consciously uninterpreted; instead we can assume that
there are unconscious belief attitudes that can give rise to a con-
scious event whose content is a belief. In cases of confabulation,
this doesn’t mean, however, that we are not introspecting this
event; it simply means that there is a discrepancy with the under-
lying belief attitudes.
So, the data suggests that there are mental processes that we
are not conscious of. This is not a principled argument against
introspective access to our own mental states that is independent
of lengthy interpretation. The scope and quality of self-
knowledge is limited, whether it is gained by introspection or
by self-interpretation. Commissurotomy patients mistake their
beliefs for certain actions, yet they do so also under an account
of self-interpretation. Self-knowledge and its acquisition by intro-
spection has certainly been overrated in philosophy, but the
limitations are equal for self-interpretation.
Aside from this – although he claims that according to his
account of mindreading applied to the self, there is “no . . .
awareness of one’s own propositional attitudes independently
of any perceptually accessible cues that provide a basis for
self-interpretation” (sect. 1.4, para. 2) – Carruthers does not
completely differentiate introspection and self-interpretation
according to his mindreading account and does concede
there sometimes seem to be introspective qualities during
self-interpretation, such as immediacy and effortlessness
(sect. 8, para. 3).
So the question still remains of how best to characterize the
access we have to ourselves. Contrary to Carruthers, we would
like to argue that the immediacy and directness that characterizes
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introspection is also present when mindreading others and that
this is not a conscious interpretational endeavour. Just as with
the perception of the outside world, our brain makes “uncon-
scious inferences” (von Helmholtz 1866) when perceiving our-
selves. This is the basis for the experience that introspection is
direct and immediate. The same immediacy also occurs when
perceiving others (Frith 2007). Nevertheless, there is a difference
between the way we meta-represent our own and the mental
states of others. When thinking of ourselves, there are more
data available, that is, visceral and somaesthetic sensations in
addition to a richer knowledge of our own past history. Thus,
we are dealing with the same mechanism but with two different
modes, one for the self and one for the other. This corresponds to
Carruthers’ model 2 account.
It accordingly also does not matter whether the mechanism
evolved first for understanding others or for understanding
oneself. We assume both involve the same underlying mechan-
ism of meta-representation that, endowed with additional
sources of information, makes up the different modes of access.
Another point of criticism against amindreading is prior account
is that the mechanism of mindreading is third-person directed.
Thus, when I direct my mindreading capacity upon myself,
I should use a third-person stance. Apart from being an interpret-
ativeprocess, this is also an unnecessarily complex and computation-
ally expensiveway of accessing the self. It can be argued that the best
explanation is to simply accept the immediate first-person data
instead of adopting the complex third-person setup.
A further argument for introspection as a specific mode of
access for the self comes from considering why it might be valu-
able for survival: (1) we can inform others about our reasons for
acting in a certain way; (2) we can gain high-level control of our
emotion and our behaviour (e.g., Zelazo 2004). Take, for
example, a simple learning process. We can learn associations
between stimuli even when the stimuli are presented sublimin-
ally (i.e., not available to introspection). However, this learning
is slow and gradual. If the stimuli are supraliminal, then insightful
learning becomes possible through introspection. At some point
subjects notice the contingency and will immediately jump to
100% performance (Pessiglione et al., in press).
Contrary to Carruthers, we prefer his model 2 that makes use of
onemechanismbut involves twodifferent kinds of access: onewhich
is perception-based for interpreting others, and additional intro-
spective access which is available when assessing one’s own
mental states. Altogether, model 2 is more consistent and parsimo-
nious. It alsomakesbetter predictions for pathologies such as autism
and schizophrenia in which both kinds of access are impaired.
In sum, this discussion exemplifies that the understanding of how
self and other are related is an important topic for research that is
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Abstract: This response defends the view that human
metacognition results from us turning our mindreading capacities
upon ourselves, and that our access to our own propositional
attitudes is through interpretation rather than introspection.
Relevant evidence is considered, including that deriving from
studies of childhood development and other animal species. Also
discussed are data suggesting dissociations between metacognitive
andmindreading capacities, especially in autism and schizophrenia.
R1. Introduction
The target article set out to consider four different accounts
of the relationshipbetween ourmindreading andmetacogni-
tive abilities (“two independent mechanisms,” “onemechan-
ism, two modes of access,” “metacognition is prior,” and
“mindreading is prior”). It argued in support of the fourth
(“mindreading is prior”) account, according to which meta-
cognitive competence results from us turning our mindread-
ing abilities upon ourselves. The target article considered a
wide array of evidence bearing on the choice between the
four accounts. This included evidence fromchildhood devel-
opment, evidence from the role that metacognitive beliefs
play in guiding human cognitive processes and behavior, evi-
dence of confabulation in reports of one’s own attitudes,
alleged evidence of direct introspection of attitudes, com-
parative evidence of metacognitive competence in other
species, evidence from autism, and evidence from schizo-
phrenia. The commentaries take up an equally disparate
set of topics. Some raise fundamental challenges that need
to be confronted at some length, whereas others (as might
be expected) are based upon misunderstandings. Table R1
Table R1.
No. Section Commentaries
R2. The nature of the
mindreading faculty
Buckner et al.; Friedman &
Petrashek; Lurz;
Pereplyotchik
R3. The development of
mindreading
Anderson & Perlis; Buckner
et al.; Hernik et al.; Lewis
& Carpendale; Rochat




R5. What is introspection? Baars; Murphy;
Pereplyotchik; Petty &
Brin˜ol; Zinck et al.
R6. Evidence for and against
introspection
Fiala & Nichols; Hurlburt;
Zinck et al.
R7. What is metacognition? Anderson & Perlis;
Couchman et al.; Kornell
et al.; Proust
R8. Metacognition in animals? Couchman et al.; Kornell
et al.; Proust
R9. Dual processes and
judgment
Buckner et al.; Frankish
R10. The evidence from autism Lombardo et al.; Williams
et al.
R11. Neuroimaging evidence Lombardo et al.
R12. The evidence from
schizophrenia
Robbins; Wiffen & David
R13. Some friendly suggestions Evans; Huebner & Dennett;
Langland-Hassan
R14. Behaviorism bites back Catania; Lewis &
Carpendale
R15. Conclusion
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provides a guide to the structure of the present reply,
together with an indication of which commentaries are
responded to (in whole or in part) in each section (including
the notes attached to that section).
R2. The nature of the mindreading faculty
In the target article I had hoped that my argument
in support of a “mindreading is prior” account of self-
knowledge was independent of any specific commitments
concerning the character of the mindreading faculty itself,
beyond rejection of a simulation-based “metacognition is
prior” alternative. I still think that is partly correct. Cer-
tainly I can accept that the mindreading faculty is not
monolithic, but is actually a cluster of more specialized
mechanisms working together in concert, somewhat as
Buckner, Shriver, Crowley, & Allen (Buckner et al.)
suggest. Indeed, this is what I actually believe, following
Baron-Cohen (1995) and Nichols and Stich (2003). But
one powerful objection to the proposal that there is no
such thing as introspection for attitudes, raised indepen-
dently by Friedman & Petrashek and by Lurz, has
made me realize that the argument cannot be free of all
such commitments. I shall first outline the objection,
before showing how an independently motivated account
of the architecture and mode of operation of the mind-
reading faculty can accommodate it.
The objection is that the mindreading system needs to
have access to the agent’s own beliefs in order to do its
interpretative work; therefore self-attributing beliefs
should be just as trivially easy as self-attributing experi-
ences. Friedman & Petrashek claim, for example, that
in order to form the metarepresentational belief that Bill
believes that the first-aid box contains bandages, the mind-
reading system must access the attributor’s own belief that
first-aid boxes normally contain bandages. And they go on
to stress that the mindreading system’s default is to attri-
bute the subject’s own beliefs to other people, saying
that this requires it to have access to those beliefs. Like-
wise, Lurz imagines a mindreader who observes a conspe-
cific seeing some food. In order to draw any inferences
from that fact, Lurz tells us, the mindreading system
would have to access such beliefs as that the conspecific
has recently eaten, or has shared food with others in the
past. And again the moral is that the mindreading system
needs to have access to the agent’s own beliefs in order
to do its work.
In light of these plausible claims, what might motivate
one to deny that the mindreading system can access all
of the agent’s own beliefs? The answer is that the objectors
forget about the frame problem. The idea that any single
mental faculty might be conducting searches among all
of a subject’s beliefs is extremely problematic. Rather,
there are likely to be a whole swarm of different
decision-making systems that can conduct local searches
of aspects of memory (Carruthers 2006). And a large
part of the point of organizing cognition around a global
workspace is that queries posted in that space can co-opt
the resources of all the different consumer systems in par-
allel (Shanahan & Baars 2005). If the mindreading system
is one of the consumer systems for global broadcast, as the
target article assumes, then what we should predict is that
it only has access to a limited database of domain-specific
beliefs necessary to perform its computations.1 But if this
is so, then the challenge is to explain the datum that any
one of one’s beliefs can seemingly get appealed to in the
course of mindreading.
To meet this challenge, I need to make two closely
related distinctions. One is between System 1 mindread-
ing (which is comparatively fast and done “online”) and
System 2 mindreading (which is slower, more reflective,
and often involves supposition and simulation). This first
distinction should need no defense. For reasoning about
the minds of other people, like every other domain of
reasoning that we know of, should admit of both System
1 and System 2 varieties. The other distinction is
between verbally mediated forms of mindreading (such
as answering a question about what someone believes)
and kinds of mindreading that don’t involve access to lin-
guistic representations. (We can be quite sure that the
latter exist, since even severely agrammatic aphasic
people can retain their competence in nonverbal mind-
reading tasks. See Siegal & Varley 2002; Varley 1998.)
Consider, first, the fact that people will by default attri-
bute their own beliefs to other people if asked. There is no
reason to think that this requires the mindreading faculty
to access those beliefs, any more than answering a ques-
tion about one’s own beliefs requires such access, as I
argued in the target article (sect. 2.1). Rather, the execu-
tive and language-production systems cooperate (and
partly compete) with one another, searching the attribu-
tor’s own memory and issuing the result in the form of a
metarepresentational verbal report – “I think/he thinks
that P” – where the form of the report can be copied
from the form of the initial question. The mindreading
system has the power to intervene in this process when
it possesses a representation of the target’s belief that
differs from the subject’s own, but it plays no part in the
default attribution process itself. Consistent with this sug-
gestion, Apperly et al. (2007) show that people are signifi-
cantly slower when responding to a probe about a target’s
false belief than they are when responding to a reality-
probe.
Now consider a reflective, System 2, instance of mind-
reading (whether verbal or nonverbal). A query about
the target’s thoughts, goals, or likely behavior is posted
in the global workspace (either in the form of a verbal
question, or in an image of oneself in the situation of the
target, say). The entire suite of consumer systems gets to
work, drawing inferences and reasoning in their normal
way, accessing whichever of the subject’s beliefs they nor-
mally would, and the results are posted back into the
global workspace once more, where they are accessible
to the mindreading faculty as input, perhaps issuing in a
conclusion or a further query. Here the entire process, col-
lectively, has access to all of the agent’s beliefs; but the
mindreading system has access only to whatever gets
posted in the global workspace (in addition to its own
domain-specific database, of course, which is accessible
to it when processing).
Finally, consider a case of “on-line” unreflective System
1 mindreading, of the sort that might be engaged in by the
infants in the false-belief studies conducted by Onishi and
Baillargeon (2005), Southgate et al. (2007), or Surian et al.
(2007). Perceptions of the main aspects of the unfolding
events are attended to and globally broadcast, thereby
being made available to the full range of conceptual
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systems including mindreading. These systems conceptu-
alize and draw inferences from the input, with the
former being fed back and broadcast as part of the percep-
tual state itself, and with the results of the latter being held
briefly in the relevant domain-specific working memory
system. (All System 1 reasoning systems will need to
possess their own form of working memory, of course, to
hold the results of previous computations while the next
steps are undertaken. See Carruthers 2006.) Included in
these broadcasts, then, will be the information that the
target subject sees an object in one box rather than
another, for example. And the working memory system
that is internal to the mindreading faculty will contain
such information as that the target expects the object to
be where it was last seen and is ignorant of the fact that
it has been moved. When combined with a novel percep-
tual input (e.g., the target subject returns on the scene
after a brief absence), these beliefs enable an expectation
to be generated concerning the target’s likely behavior.
Notice that on this account no beliefs need to be acces-
sible to the mindreading system beyond those residing in
its domain-specific database, with the exception of those
that are made perceptually available to it, on the one
hand, and those that are immediately past products of its
own operations, on the other. This is consistent with the
fact that adults as well as children fail to take account of
the mental states of other people in their online reasoning
once the relevant facts are no longer perceptually salient
and sufficient time has elapsed for any record to have
been expunged from the mindreading system’s working
memory. See Keysar et al. (2003) for a dramatic demon-
stration of this point.
R3. The development of mindreading
Just as I had hoped tomake the argument of the target article
largely independent of assumptions about the nature of the
mindreading faculty, so I had hoped to minimize assump-
tions about the latter’s development. (Of course I do need
to assume that development does not begin with first-
person awareness of our own attitudes, in the way that
Goldman [2006] suggests.) In particular, I tried to steer
clear of the dispute between nativist or “core knowledge”
approaches, on the one hand (e.g., Fodor 1992; Leslie
et al. 2004) and constructivist or theorizing-theory accounts,
on the other (e.g., Gopnik & Melzoff 1997; Wellman 1990).
Here, too, my efforts were partly, but by no means entirely,
successful, as I now explain.
Both Hernik, Fearon, & Fonagy (Hernik et al.) and
Rochat emphasize the crucial roles played by emotion and
emotional engagement with others in the development of
mindreading; and each appears to think that this claim
conflicts with some aspect of the target article. But I see
no problem with accepting these data. Both nativists and
theorizing-theorists can believe in the developmental
importance of emotional engagement, but will interpret
the sources of that importance differently. Moreover, no
evidence is provided that an understanding of one’s own
emotions precedes an understanding of the emotions of
others in development (which would be problematic for
a “mindreading is prior” account). On the contrary,
Rochat writes: “From a developmental vantage point,
affective reading and meta-affectivity are ontologically
linked, representing two sides of the same coin.” This is,
of course, further grist for my mill.
Construed as a thesis about the architecture of the
mature mind, the “mindreading is prior” account is inde-
pendent of the debate between nativists and theorizing-
theorists about the development of the mindreading
system. But Buckner et al. are correct in pointing out
that one (though only one) of the arguments that I use
in support of the “mindreading is prior” architecture
depends upon some or other variety of nativist position
(whether this be an innately given body of knowledge, or
an innate module, or an innate domain-specific learning
mechanism). For I claim that there is a good evolutionary
explanation of the emergence of mindreading in highly
social creatures such as ourselves, whereas there are no
good evolutionary reasons for the emergence of introspec-
tion for attitudes (or else those reasons makes predictions
that are not borne out by the metacognitive data, either
human or comparative). This is supposed to count in
favor of a “mindreading is prior” account. And it plainly
commits me to some or other version of nativism about
the course of mindreading development.
Buckner et al. argue, in contrast, that metarepresenta-
tional mindreading may be a late exaptation of more primi-
tive capacities, grounded in these together with our
linguistic abilities and general-purpose concept-learning
and theorizing skills. They think that the only true adap-
tations in the social-cognitive domain are a swarm of
first-order, non-metarepresentational, mechanisms for
face recognition, eye-tracking, automated imitation via
the mirror neuron system, and so forth. But there are
two main problems with this view. One is the rapidly
expanding body of evidence of very early metarepresenta-
tional competence in infants, embracing false-belief
understanding inter alia (Bosco et al. 2006; Onishi &
Baillargeon 2005; Onishi et al. 2007; Song & Baillargeon,
forthcoming; Song et al., forthcoming; Southgate et al.
2007; Surian et al. 2007). And not all of these studies, it
should be stressed, use looking time as a measure of expec-
tation violation. On the contrary, Southgate et al. (2007)
use anticipatory looking as their dependent measure,
which is much less ambiguous.
The other major problem with Buckner et al.’s sugges-
tion is that mindreading is required in order to learn a
language in the first place. I don’t deny that syntax may
be innate, or acquired through the offices of a dedicated
domain-specific learning mechanism. But learning the
lexicon requires children to figure out the referential
intentions of the speakers around them (Bloom 2002).
And this plainly requires metarepresentation. Moreover
(and just as this account predicts), we have ample evidence
that infants can attribute goals and intentions to others in
the first year of life, significantly before they can attribute
beliefs and misleading appearances (Csibra et al. 2003;
Johnson 2000; Luo & Baillargeon 2005; Woodward 1998).
Buckner et al. write admiringly of the work of
Gallagher (2001; 2004) in this connection, as doAnderson
& Perlis and Lewis & Carpendale. But Gallagher’s work
is subject to both of the objections just outlined. Moreover,
he goes awry in his critique of the opposing approach, to
which he refers with the generic “theory-theory” (intended
to cover both nativist and theorizing-theory varieties).
In particular, it is simply false that theory-theorists must
(or do) assume that mentalizing usually involves the
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adoption of a third-person, detached and observational,
perspective on other people. On the contrary, theory-
theorists have always emphasized that the primary use
of mindreading is in interaction with others (which
Gallagher calls “second-personal”). That, after all, is
what “Machiavellian intelligence” is all about. And the
fact that our apprehension of the meaning of other
people’s behavior is often phenomenologically immediate
does not, of course, show that it isn’t underpinned by
theory-driven computations of underlying mental states.
Indeed, there is simply no other way of explaining our
competence in this domain. Appealing just to sensory-
motor skills (as Gallagher does) is plainly inadequate to
account for the flexibility of the ways in which adults
and infants can interact with others. Indeed, in order to
interact flexibly with any complex system (be it physical
or human), you need a good enough understanding of
how it works.
R4. The question of developmental priority
The target article expressed skepticism about the capacity
of developmental data to discriminate between a “mind-
reading is prior” account and its three main competitors
(sect. 4). Mills & Danovitch disagree. They cite a
number of forms of evidence suggesting that mindreading
skills of various sorts emerge in development prior to
metacognition, which they say supports a “mindreading
is prior” account. Since one of my main grounds for skep-
ticism concerned arguments for the priority of mindread-
ing that are premised on the parallel emergence of
mindreading and metacognition in development (which
fails to discriminate between the “mindreading is prior”
view and the “one mechanism, two modes of access”
account), I am happy to agree. But let me sound the fol-
lowing cautionary note. Until we have a good understand-
ing of the reasons for the two-year developmental lag
between children’s capacities to pass nonverbal and
verbal versions of mindreading tasks, arguments that rely
upon the latter need to be treated with some caution.
For it may be that the “self” and “other” versions of a
verbal task differ along whatever turns out to be the rel-
evant parameter. Put differently: you can’t control for
confounding factors that you don’t yet know about.
In response to Mills & Danovitch, I should also stress
that although a finding that mindreading competence is
developmentally prior to metacognition would support a
“mindreading is prior” account (because it would be
inconsistent with the other three alternatives), this is not
actually a prediction of the account. For the latter claims
only that it is the same system that underlies our mindread-
ing capacity that gets turned upon ourselves to issue in
metacognition. It does not claim that the first occurs in
development before the latter. (In this respect, the label
“mindreading is prior” may be somewhat misleading.
I intend it only to refer to a functional and/or evolutionary
priority.)
Fernyhough would plainly disagree with the point
made in the previous paragraph. He gives reasons for
thinking that it may take time for aspects of children’s
inner lives to develop. In particular, the transformation
of private speech (“talking to oneself”) into inner
(“silent”) speech may not be complete until middle
childhood; and capacities to build and sustain visual
images may likewise be slow to develop. Because the
target article claims that these are among the data that
the mindreading system uses when attributing prop-
ositional attitudes to oneself, Fernyhough says that the
“mindreading is prior” account must therefore predict
that metacognition should lag significantly behind mind-
reading in development. But there is no such implication.
All that follows is that there will be many more moments in
the daily lives of children at which they will be unwilling to
attribute occurrent thoughts to themselves than is true of
the daily lives of adults, because the conscious mental
events that might underlie such self-attributions simply
are not present. Nothing follows about children’s compe-
tence to self-attribute attitudes. Nor does it follow that
children will be weaker at attributing attitudes to them-
selves than they are at attributing attitudes to others,
provided that the tasks are suitably matched.
Robbins claims that I have overlooked crucial conflict-
ing evidence, which demonstrates that metacognition is
prior to mindreading in development. He cites a study by
Wimmer et al. (1998) which seems to show that young chil-
dren have awareness of their own knowledge before they
have awareness of the knowledge of other people. But
the study in question admits of an alternative explanation.
In the “self” condition, the children are allowed to look,
or not look, into a box, and are then asked whether they
know what is in the box; whereas in the “other” condition
they observe a subject either looking, or not looking, into
the box before being asked whether the subject knows
what is in the box. Answering the question in the “other”
condition requires the children to reason appropriately
from the generalization that seeing leads to knowing (or
some such). But answering the question in the “self” con-
dition requires no such thing. The children can answer
simply by accessing, or by failing to access, their knowledge
of what is in the box. They can substitute a first-order ques-
tion in place of the second-order question asked – namely,
“What is in the box?” – and answer “Yes,” that they do
know what is in the box, if an answer comes to mind, other-
wise answering “No.”
R5. What is introspection?
Baars thinks that the target article is committed to
denying that nonhuman animals and young infants feel
pain. This is because these subjects are incapable of mind-
reading, and because the target article denies the existence
of introspection. But there are two distinct misunderstand-
ings at work here.
One is based upon an unfortunate ambiguity in the use
of the term “introspection.” In one sense, introspection is
any form of looking within the body. In this sense, percep-
tions of pain or of one’s own beating heart count as intro-
spections. In another sense, introspection is a form of
looking within the mind. In this sense, the outputs of an
introspective process are always metarepresentational,
involving representations of one’s mental states as such.
And in this sense, perceptions of pain or of heartbeat are
definitely not introspections, since they issue in first-
order representations of properties of the body. It
should be stressed that it is only this latter, metarepresen-
tational, sense of “introspection” that is at stake in the
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target article. Hence, even if I denied the existence of
introspection in this sense altogether, there is no reason
why this should commit me to denying that animals feel
pain, or fear, or hunger, or thirst. For what is in question
in these cases is only introspection in the first “within the
body” sense.
Baars’s second misunderstanding lies in believing that
the target article denies the existence of introspection (in
the metacognitive sense) for all categories of mental
state. For he thinks that the view will have difficulty in
accounting for the reliability of metacognitive self-report
in psychophysics. But I specifically allow (indeed, I
insist) that globally broadcast perceptual and quasi-
perceptual states can be introspected, because they are
available as input to the mindreading faculty. Self-attribu-
tion of such states should therefore be trivial for anyone
who possesses the requisite concepts, which can then be
applied to the input-states on a recognitional (non-
interpretative) basis.
Pereplyotchik, too, misunderstands the sense of
“introspection” that is at issue. For he thinks that it will
be sufficient to demonstrate that there is no such thing
as introspection for perceptual states if it can be shown
that the mindreading system relies upon a tacit theory in
self-ascribing such states. This is a mistake. That a
process is introspective is not supposed to be inconsistent
with it involving computations or inferences of various
sorts (provided they are unconscious ones), so long as
the inferences rely only on information of a general kind,
and do not access information about the agent’s circum-
stances, behavior, or earlier mental states. For remember,
what is at stake is whether our access to our own minds is
different in kind from our access to the minds of other
people. And the latter always involves just such inferences.
This was also the reason why I defined introspection nega-
tively for the purposes of the target article. For I wanted to
leave open “inner sense” accounts as well as “application of
a tacit theory” views of introspection, according to each of
which the attribution of mental states to oneself is inferen-
tial (but still quite different from the attribution of mental
states to other people).
Zinck, Lodahl, & Frith (Zinck et al.) mistake the
nature of the intended contrast between a “one system,
two modes of access” account and a “mindreading is
prior” view. They insist that when metarepresenting our
own mental states, the mindreading system has access to
a richer array of data, such as visceral and somaesthetic
sensations, and that this therefore supports a “one
system, two modes of access” account. But I, too, claim
that the mindreading system can utilize data when attri-
buting states to the self that are not available when attri-
buting the same states to others, and I maintain that this
is consistent with a “mindreading is prior” view. As I
intend the distinction, the difference between the two
forms of account is not whether there are different data
available to the mindreading system when attributing
mental states to oneself or to another. Rather, the differ-
ence concerns whether the mindreading system employs
two different informational channels in the two cases.
The distinction is intended to be an architectural one.
Because the mindreading system utilizes the very same
mechanism of “global broadcast” of attended outputs of
perceptual systems, whether attributing mental states to
oneself or to another, this means that there are not two
different modes of access to mental states, even though
the perceptual and quasi-perceptual states that are utilized
in the two cases are often different. To provide evidence
supporting a “one system, two modes of access” account,
Zinck et al. would need to show that we can self-attribute
propositional attitude states independently of any sensory
or imagistic information accessible via global broadcast.
But they themselves seem to doubt whether any such
evidence exists.
Murphy denies that the mindreading system is always
implicated in our knowledge of our own attitudes, while
agreeing with me that there are no special mechanisms
that enable us to detect and describe those attitudes.
Rather, he thinks that we can do whatever we would nor-
mally do to determine a truth about the world and can
then use the result of that same process to self-ascribe
the resulting belief. This might well work as an account
of how we express our beliefs in speech. Indeed, so con-
strued, it is an account that I endorsed in the target
article (sect. 2.1). The language production system can
take as input the result of a belief-forming process, or
the result of a search of memory, and can formulate that
input-state into a belief report. We can imagine this hap-
pening via a two-step process: the language system
accesses a belief with the content P and draws on lexical
and syntactic resources to express this in a sentence, “P,”
before elaborating it and articulating the result in the
form, “I believe that P.” But I deny that such an account
can succeed as an account of metacognition, or as an
account of how we form beliefs about our own beliefs.
Murphy is confronted with the following dilemma.
Suppose, first, that the assertion, “I believe that P” is an
encoding into language of a previously existing metacogni-
tive belief (the belief, namely, that I believe that P). Then
the challenge is to explain how this belief is arrived at
without either implicating the mindreading faculty or
appealing to any special introspective channel. But there
would seem to be just two possible ways for whatever
process that issues in such a belief to do its work (in a
reliable enough way). One would be for it to have access
to the output of the process that issues in the belief or
memory that P (which would then surely involve some
sort of introspective channel of access to the latter). The
other would be for the metacognitive belief-forming
process to involve interpretation and inference from
other events, such as a prior tokening of the assertion,
“P,” or the occurrence of a memory-image caused by the
belief in question (which would surely then implicate the
mindreading faculty, or else some system with many of
the same powers as the mindreading faculty).
SoMurphymust intend (much more plausibly) that the
assertion, “I believe that P” can be generated directly from
the belief that P, without subjects first needing to form the
metacognitive belief that they believe that P. As described
above, the language system (working in concert with
executive systems, no doubt) can access the belief that P
but then formulate this into the sentence, “I believe that
P,” rather than the first-order sentence, “P.” But this asser-
tion is not itself a metacognitive belief (nor, by hypothesis,
does it involve one). Rather, it is a linguistic action (albeit
one with a metarepresentational content). The system that
issues in the metacognitive belief that I believe that P must
take this assertion as input and deliver the metacognitive
belief as output. But in order to do this, it would have to
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engage in interpretation, just as when hearing a similar
assertion made by another person. Because the assertion
could be a lie, or be meant ironically, or meant as a joke,
it is hard to see how the necessary interpreting could be
done except by the mindreading faculty (or else some
system with many of the same powers as the mindreading
faculty). But this is now the view endorsed by the target
article: In such cases I come to know what I believe by
hearing and interpreting what I say (whether overtly or
in inner speech). Murphy has failed to present us with a
genuine alternative.
Petty & Brin˜ol agree with the target article that self-
attributions of attitudes always involve interpretation.
But they insist that interpretation is a matter of degree,
and that sometimes interpretation can be so minimal as
to be almost indistinguishable from introspection. I
agree with the former point but not with the latter. Of
course it is true, as Petty & Brin˜ol point out, that there
is a big difference between interpretations of oneself
that rely only on publicly available information (such as
one’s own behavior and circumstances) and interpret-
ations that rely only on subjectively accessible mental
events (such as one’s own somatic feelings and/or one’s
own “inner speech”). But the main point at issue in the
target article is a dichotomous, architectural one. It con-
cerns the existence (or not) of a distinct informational
channel to our own attitudes, different from the sensory
channels that are available to the mindreading system
for use in interpreting other people. There either is such
a channel or there is not. (The target article claims the
latter, and Petty & Brin˜ol appear to agree.) Moreover,
even minimal-interpretation cases are much less similar
to introspection than Petty & Brin˜ol seem to think. Con-
sider their example of someone who says to himself, “It
is good,” when tasting some ice-cream, and thereby inter-
prets himself as liking ice-cream. The mindreading faculty,
functioning together with the language comprehension
system, has to fix on the object of evaluation (“What is
good?”), interpret the evaluative predicate (“In what
sense is it good?”), and determine what sort of speech
act is being expressed (whether literal, suppositional,
ironic, or whatever). No doubt the answers can, in
context, be settled quite easily. But they are exactly the
same answers that would need to be provided when inter-
preting the speech of another person. And no one should
think that the latter is at all similar in its nature to
introspection.
R6. Evidence for and against introspection
Fiala & Nichols challenge the claim made in the target
article that confabulators often have the impression that
they are introspecting rather than self-interpreting (sect.
3.1), which is a crucial component of the argument
against introspection for attitudes. They first point out
that no one has ever asked a split-brain subject whether
or not he thinks he is introspecting. But this would be a
bad question to ask, for a number of reasons. One is that
“introspection” is a term of art, and requiring people to
make judgments involving an unfamiliar term is unlikely
to be a reliable way of finding out what they believe.
Another is that the direct-question method is a poor way
of accessing people’s tacit beliefs in general (Scholl
2007). I doubt that many people have explicit, verbaliz-
able, beliefs about the nature of their access to their own
mental states – with the possible exception of those who
have taken an introductory course in philosophy. Rather,
the way in which people think and reason about their
own mental states just assumes that the latter are transpar-
ently accessible to them. But if asked about that access,
who knows what they might say? For they will almost cer-
tainly find the question to be confusing, and they might
revert to bits and pieces of knowledge acquired about
Freud, or about cognitive science, or whatever, when
trying to say something sensible by way of answer.
So what is really in question is whether it seems to split-
brain subjects that they are formulating beliefs about their
own mental states and processes in whatever way they nor-
mally would – in a way that doesn’t seem to them to
involve self-interpretation – not whether they have expli-
cit beliefs about the process in question. This is hard to
assess directly. But those who work with such people say
that their own sense of themselves following the split-
brain operation seems to be unchanged (Gazzaniga
1995). And even reminders of their split-brain status that
are made immediately prior to testing – and that are
given, moreover, to those who have a good theoretical
understanding of the effects of the operation – have no
effect (Gazzaniga, e-mail communication, November 8,
2006). The subject goes right on confabulating. This isn’t
what one would predict if subjects were, at any level,
aware of interpreting themselves, since one would expect
that a reminder of their split-brain status should enrich
their hypothesis pool. But it does not.
Fiala & Nichols also point out that there are many
examples from the confabulation literature where subjects
express their metacognitive thoughts with low confidence,
suggesting that they are not only interpreting themselves
but are at some level aware that they are doing so. The
point is entirely correct. But it doesn’t have the conse-
quences destructive of my argument that Fiala & Nichols
allege. This is because there are also a great many instances
in which subjects express their metacognitive beliefs unhe-
sitatingly and with high confidence. And these are all that I
require to make my case. Indeed, the self-interpretative
model of attitude self-awareness predicts that there
should be cases of both sorts. For only if an interpretation
can be arrived at smoothly and unhesitatingly will subjects
have the impression that they are introspecting. In more
problematic cases such as those that Fiala and Nichols
cite, or such as especially bizarre actions performed follow-
ing hypnosis, it will be more difficult for the mindreading
system to generate an interpretation (just as it would be dif-
ficult to interpret such behavior observed in another). And
as soon as subjects become aware of themselves as inter-
preting, they are likely to express any belief that they
formulate with some caution.
Note that exactly the same distinction can be made with
respect to other-person mindreading. In many cases the
interpretation process is swift and unconscious, and the
resulting phenomenology is that we just seem to see some-
one’s behavior as informed by certain beliefs and goals.
(Here I am in full agreement with Zinck et al.) But in
other cases an interpretation is harder to come by, and
we become aware that we are trying to interpret. (See
also the discussion of System 1 versus System 2 mindread-
ing in sect. R2.)
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In the target article I assumed that one of the biggest
challenges to a “mindreading is prior” account derives
from the “descriptive experience sampling” studies con-
ducted over the years by Hurlburt and colleagues (Hurl-
burt 1990; 1993; Hurlburt & Akhter 2008; Hurlburt &
Heavey 2006), specifically the finding that subjects will
sometimes report engaging in “unsymbolized thinking”
at the time of the beep. I took this to be evidence that
subjects are capable of introspecting their propositional
attitudes, and tried to respond. However, Hurlburt now
replies that I have misinterpreted his position. Unsymbo-
lized thoughts are merely thoughts that don’t have any
semantically relevant images, words, or other sensations
as the “primary theme or focus” of the subject’s attention
at the time of the beep. Hurlburt concedes that such
experiences are generally present in the periphery of
attention, providing a basis for self-interpretation. More-
over, he argues that the ways in which subjects respond
when probed about these episodes actually speaks in
favor of a “mindreading is prior” position on our awareness
of our own attitudes. This additional support from an
unexpected quarter is, of course, most welcome.
R7. What is metacognition?
A number of commentators accuse me of using the term
“metacognition” in a non-standard sense (Anderson &
Perlis; Couchman, Coutinho, Beran, & Smith
[Couchman et al.]; Proust).2 These commentators
allege that the normal usage in cognitive science is that
metacognition is involved in any process that has a control-
ling influence on the way that another cognitive process
unfolds. On this account, it is left open whether or not
metacognition need involve metarepresentations of the
events within the cognitive process that gets controlled.
I am happy to allow that some authors might use the
term in this (hereafter “control”) sense. But I deny that
it is a common – let alone a standard – usage. In general
in the metacognition literature in psychology, metacogni-
tion is defined in terms of thought about our own thoughts.
Indeed, Proust herself provides the standard definition
(Proust 2007, p. 271): “This is the domain of metacogni-
tion: thinking about one’s own thinking.” (See also
Dunlosky & Metcalfe 2009; Flavell 1979; Koriat 2007.)
And it is then a matter of substantive investigation
whether or not, and to what extent, metacognition has a
controlling function. (See especially Koriat et al. 2006.)
This wouldn’t even make sense if metacognition were
defined in terms of control.
It is important to emphasize that the control and metare-
presentational senses of “metacognition” are two-way
independent of one another. There are certainly many
instances in which one cognitive process exercises a causal
influence on another without the former involving any
metarepresentations of any aspect of the latter. (See sect.
5.1 of the target article for some examples.) And in connec-
tionwith anymetarepresentational form ofmetacognition, it
will always be an open questionwhether or not it has a causal
influence upon the cognitive state or process represented.
Although these points are very well understood by most
researchers, some are apt to think that they can move
freely from talk of metacognition in the control sense to
metacognition in the metarepresentational sense. This is
especially true of some of those who work in the field of
animal metacognition. Some, I think, are quite clear-
headed that they are seeking forms of metacognitive
control for which the best available explanation will be
the occurrence of a metarepresentational process. (See
especially Metcalfe 2008; Son & Kornell 2005.) But some
seem unaware that any additional argumentation is needed
to get frommetacognition in the control sense tometacogni-
tion in themetarepresentational sense. This is especially true
of the commentary by Couchman et al., as well as the
articles by members of their team cited therein, which I
discuss in section R8.
Proust raises a more substantive challenge to the
assumptions of the target article. She suggests that the
latter overlooks the possibility of nonconceptual forms of
metacognition (in the metarepresentational sense of the
latter term). Specifically, she suggests that epistemic feel-
ings like surprise and confidence should be seen as non-
conceptual representations of the underlying mental
states (such as violated expectations or high degrees of
belief). Hence, any person or animal that can use such
feelings as a cue to guide further behavior (such as
looking more closely at the target event) can be said to
be acting as a result of a metacognitive process. This is
an interesting idea, which deserves examination. It will
require us to delve a bit into competing theories of the
nature of intentional, or representational, content.
Let us assume (with Proust) that epistemic feelings like
surprise and confidence are distinctive forms of somato-
sensory experience that are caused by an underlying cog-
nitive state or process, but without involving any
conceptualization of that state or process as such. So an
animal that feels surprise has an expectation (a belief)
that is violated by what it is currently perceiving, which
in turn causes a suite of bodily reactions of which the
animal is aware (heightened alertness, widening of the
eyes, automatic orienting towards the stimulus, and so
on), but without the animal necessarily knowing that it
has an expectation that has been violated. Because the
epistemic feeling is reliably caused by a cognitive state
or event, it thereby carries information about it. And
then on any purely informational account of represen-
tational content (e.g., Fodor 1990), the feeling can count
as a nonconceptual representation of the representational
state or event in question (that is, it counts as a metarepre-
sentation). One problem with this proposal, however, is
that it makes metarepresentations come too cheap. For
almost all mental states, processes, and behaviors will
carry information about the existence of some other
mental state or process, thereby becoming nonconceptual
metarepresentations of the latter, on the proposed
account. Thus inferential processes will characteristically
carry information about (and hence metarepresent) the
presence of beliefs, decision-making processes will carry
information about the presence of beliefs and desires,
and so forth.
Moreover, few researchers in cognitive science actually
rely upon an informational account of representation in
their own work. Most adopt some or other variety of infer-
ential or conceptual role semantics (e.g., Block 1986),
according to which what a symbol represents depends
(at least partly) upon the use that the rest of the cognitive
system is apt to make of that symbol. This is probably wise,
because purely informational accounts of intentional
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content face notorious difficulties (one of which will be
mentioned further on; see Botterill & Carruthers 1999
for discussion). And then the question for us becomes:
Does the animalmake use of the epistemic feeling in ques-
tion in such a way that the feeling is thereby constituted as
a nonconceptual representation of a cognitive state?
Consider, first, paradigmatic cases of nonconceptual
representation, such as a perceptual representation of a
colored surface or of the detailed shape of an object. In
virtue of what does the perceptual state represent the
colored surface rather than, for instance, a particular
pattern of activity on the retina or in the optic nerve
(since it equally carries information about both)? A
natural answer is that the animal itself treats that represen-
tation as a representation of color – it thinks and acts in
the sort of way that would be appropriate if it were a rep-
resentation of the color of a surface. For example, perceiv-
ing the red surface of a fruit, and believing that red fruits
of that type are ripe, the animal might grasp and eat it.
Likewise, a perceptual representation of the detailed
shape of an object will be used to guide the animal’s
choice of grip size and hand orientation when it reaches
out for it. It seems that a nonconceptual representation
of some property of the world represents what it does
partly in virtue of its role in guiding thought and action
that is focused on that aspect of the world.
Consider, now, epistemic feelings, such as the feeling of
low confidence that an animal might experience when
faced with an especially difficult judgment or discrimi-
nation. This is a feeling that involves an aversive state of
anxiety, caused by the animal’s low degree of belief.
Should it be considered a nonconceptual representation
of a cognitive state (one of low degrees of belief or of con-
flicts of belief), as Proust suggests? To answer, we need to
look at how it is used by the animal. One thing that the
animal might do in consequence is opt for a high-confi-
dence, low-anxiety, option instead. But this is an action
that is targeted on the world rather than on the animal’s
own beliefs. It should lead us to say that the feeling of
uncertainty is a representation of the riskiness of certain
worldly options or events, rather than a representation of
the animal’s own low degree of belief. For the animal
doesn’t act in a way that is directed at its own beliefs;
rather it acts on the world. Likewise for an animal that is
led by its feeling of uncertainty to engage in infor-
mation-seeking behavior such as examining the object
more closely, walking around it to look at it from the
other side, sniffing it, pressing a “hint” key of the sort
employed by Kornell et al. (2007), and so on: These are
behaviors that are aimed at answering a first-order ques-
tion about the object – “Is it edible?”, “Is it safe?”,
“What comes next?”, and so on – rather than being
aimed at changing the animal’s own degrees of belief. It
seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that epistemic
feelings should not be regarded as possessing metarepre-
sentational nonconceptual content.3
Moreover, there is no reason to think that epistemic
feelings are a first evolutionary step on the road to metar-
epresentation. This is because metarepresentation
requires the development of concept-wielding consumer
systems for the bodily cues in question, which contain
implicit or explicit theories of the nature and causal roles
of the underlying mental states. (Note that even a simu-
lation theorist like Goldman [2006] needs to postulate an
innately structured set of representations in a language
of thought linked up to the different mental state kinds.)
It should be stressed that the bodily feelings in ques-
tion – that are distinctive of surprise, or the anxiety that
attends uncertainty, for examples – are just that: bodily
feelings. By themselves they give no clues as to the
nature of the mental states that cause them (a violated
expectation, in the case of surprise, and low or conflicting
degrees of belief, in the case of uncertainty). How would
an animal that as yet had no conception of those types of
mental state be expected to acquire one? Certainly not
via individual learning. And if via evolution, then it is far
from clear where the pressure to develop such theories
is to come from. Not from the benefits of metacognition
in the control sense, presumably, since by hypothesis the
animals in question already have that (see sect. R8).
Hence, the pressure is presumably social, in which case
what develops will be a mindreading system (albeit one
that is capable of taking bodily cues as input).
R8. Animal metacognition?
There are two distinct ways in which an animal might
behave in metacognitive fashion (in the control sense)
without engaging in metacognition (in the metarepresen-
tational sense). First, it might utilize degrees of belief
and desire (without metarepresenting them as such, of
course), combined with one or two simple first-order
(non-metarepresentational) mechanisms and/or acquired
first-order beliefs. This is the explanatory strategy followed
in Carruthers (2008b) and described briefly in the target
article. But second, as Proust explains, an animal might
utilize its own bodily changes and reactions (including
feelings that are distinctive of surprise, uncertainty, and
familiarity, for examples) as cues. Thus, an animal might
be innately predisposed, or might have learned, that the
bodily feeling distinctive of uncertainty is a cue to
engage in actions that obtain improved information (e.g.,
by moving its head from side to side for a better view),
or to engage in actions that have the effect of “opting
out” of the current situation and entering a new one.
(Actually, this might be one way of implementing the
“gate-keeping” mechanism postulated in Carruthers
2008b, which takes roughly equivalently motivated but
incompatible plans of action or inaction as input, and
which motivates a search for additional information or
alternative behavior.) Note that on this second alternative,
the animal does not have to recognize that it is surprised or
uncertain; indeed it need not even possess the concepts of
surprise or uncertainty. Rather, it just has to be capable of
recognizing a distinctive bodily gestalt or feeling, and initi-
ating an innately prepared or learned response. (Nor, as
sect. R7 argues in reply to Proust, does the feeling itself
possess a nonconceptual metacognitive content.) Such an
animal might display any of the metacognitive control-
behaviors currently investigated by comparative psycholo-
gists, as I shall show briefly below. But it might be wholly
incapable of metacognition in the metarepresentational
sense.
Carruthers (2008b) describes exhaustively and in detail
how all of the data cited in the commentary by Kornell,
Schwartz, & Son (Kornell et al.) are explicable in non-
metarepresentational terms, utilizing degrees of attitude
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strength. Kornell et al. make no attempt in their commen-
tary to respond to those arguments, or to demonstrate why
their own metarepresentational interpretation of their data
is superior. It wouldn’t be fruitful just to repeat the argu-
ments of my 2008b paper here. Rather, I shall show briefly
how an animal that can treat its own epistemic feelings as a
cue might behave in the ways that Kornell et al. describe
without being capable of metarepresentation. Thereafter
I shall show how Couchman et al. chronically conflate
the control and metarepresentational senses of metacogni-
tion in their commentary and other work.
Consider what is perhaps the most challenging set of
data presented by Kornell et al., citing Kornell et al.
(2007). Rhesus monkeys were initially trained in a gam-
bling task that required them to first make a difficult
perceptual discrimination before choosing between a
“high-risk” and a “low-risk” symbol. Pressing the former
would issue in a large reward if the initial discrimination
was correct but a large loss if the discrimination was
incorrect; pressing the latter would issue in a guaranteed
small reward. The monkeys were then trained on a quite
different – memory – task (initially without the gambling
option). Following training, when the “high-risk” and
“low-risk” symbols were re-introduced, the animals
immediately made adaptive use of them. Kornell et al.
take this to show that the monkeys had learned a general
metacognitive strategy for solving the tasks. Carruthers
(2008b) shows how these data can be better explained in
terms of degrees of belief combined with a capacity for
abstract rule-formation. Here let me sketch a further
alternative: that the animals might have learned to use
their own feelings of uncertainty as a cue.
We can presume that monkeys are capable of both being,
and feeling, uncertain, even if they are incapable of meta-
representation of any sort. The monkeys in the first phase
of the experiment just described could then have learned
to treat their own feeling of uncertainty when making an
initial discrimination as a cue to press the “low-risk”
symbol thereafter. They would therefore have acquired,
and learned to act upon, a rule of the form, “When that
bodily feeling/gestalt is present, press the ‘low-risk’
symbol when it arrives.” (Note that there is nothing meta-
representational contained here. The feeling in question
is a state of the body, not of the mind. See sects. R5 and
R7.) When the monkeys then entered the second phase
of the experiment they would, of course, sometimes feel
uncertain, but this time whenever they were presented
with a difficult memory task. The introduction of the gam-
bling option might then have activated, and led them to
act upon, the exact same rule.
I now turn to consider Couchman et al. It is plain that
at the outset of their commentary they actually use “first-
order” to mean “behaviorist,” and that by “metacognitive”
they mean any process that is genuinely cognitive, with the
animal taking decisions in light of its beliefs. For they
describe Smith et al. (2006) as supporting a “metacogni-
tive” account. In those experiments both feedback and
rewards were deferred until the animal had completed a
block of trials, thus preventing the creation of stimulus-
response pairings that might otherwise explain the
animals’ adaptive use of the uncertainty response. Couch-
man et al. write, “It was clear in that study that monkeys’
uncertainty-response strategies were adjudicated cog-
nitively and decisionally, not using first-order cues.”
I agree (at least, if by “first-order cues” one means “stimu-
lus-response pairings”). But the training would have given
the animals ample opportunity to acquire a set of non-
metarepresentational beliefs about the contingencies of
the experiment. By the time that they entered the test
phase, they would know that pressing the “dense” key if
the stimulus was dense would thereafter issue in a
reward, whereas pressing the “dense” key if the stimulus
was sparse would thereafter issue in a penalty, and that
pressing the “uncertain” key would issue in neither a
reward nor a penalty. These beliefs, combined with
degrees of belief that a given stimulus is dense, or
sparse, can then explain the data in an entirely non-
metarepresentational way, as Carruthers (2008b) demon-
strates.
Couchman et al. point out, quite correctly, that the
non-metarepresentational explanation adverted to in the
foregoing requires the postulation of what Carruthers
(2008b) calls a “gate-keeping mechanism” (which might
be absent in capuchins and pigeons, note, thus accommo-
dating the findings of Beran et al. [in press] and Inman &
Shettleworth [1999] that neither species makes adaptive
use of an uncertainty response). This is a mechanism
that is sensitive to the presence of beliefs or motivations
for action of roughly equal strength, issuing in a search
for additional information or alternative strategies when
receiving such states as input. Couchman et al. object
that this commits me to a metacognitive explanation of
the data, and they write, “It [the gatekeeper mechanism]
meets the definition of a second-order, controlled cogni-
tive process.” Since it is plain that the mechanism in ques-
tion need not involve any metarepresentations for it to
operate as envisaged, Couchman et al. must here be
using “metacognitive” in the control rather than the meta-
representational sense.
So far there isn’t any substantive disagreement between
Couchman et al. and myself, just “crossed wires” result-
ing from differences in the use of the term, “metacogni-
tive.” But they go on to conclude their commentary by
claiming victory for a “metacognition is prior” account
over my own “mindreading is prior” model, despite the
fact that the two are perfectly consistent with one
another if the former is taken in their control sense and
the latter is understood in my metarepresentational
sense. They also offer an account of the origins of mind-
reading that is blatantly and explicitly Cartesian, presup-
posing that we have prior awareness and understanding
of our own mental states as such (i.e., presupposing the
prior existence of metacognition in the metarepresenta-
tional sense). I fear that Couchman et al. have engaged
in a fine body of experimental work that is framed and
guided by theoretical confusion.
R9. Dual processes and judgment
Frankish takes issue with the argument of section 7 of the
target article, which claims that the conscious events that
take place at the System 2 level (e.g., verbalizing to
myself, “P,” or, “I shall do Q”) don’t have the right kind
of causal role to constitute a judgment or a decision. For
they only achieve their effects via further (unconscious)
processes of reasoning. So although these events are intro-
spectable, this doesn’t mean that any judgments or
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decisions are introspectable. Frankish replies that these
events have a System 2 role appropriate for a judgment
or decision. For they are the last System 2 events that
occur prior to the characteristic effects of judgments and
decisions. While he acknowledges that further reasoning
processes of a System 1 sort occur subsequent to those
events, mediating their causal effects on behavior, he
says that these should be thought of as belonging to the
realizing base of a System 2 judgment or decision.
However, our commonsense notions of judgment and
decision don’t make any allowance for the System 1/
System 2 distinction. A judgment is a content-bearing
event that gives rise to a stored belief with the same
content immediately, and which is likewise immediately
available to inform practical decision-making, without
the intervention of any further reasoning. Similarly, a
decision is a content-bearing event that causes intention
or action without the mediation of any further reasoning
about whether or not to act. By these lights, neither the
judgment-like event of saying to myself, “P,” nor the
decision-like event of saying to myself, “I shall do Q,”
can qualify. Moreover, while it may be true enough that
System 2 processes in general are realized in those of
System 1 (Carruthers 2009), the realizing conditions for
a particular event surely cannot occur subsequent to that
event itself. And yet it is only once the conscious events
of saying to myself, “P,” or, “I shall do Q,” are completed
that the System 1 reasoning leading to belief or action
kicks in. In addition, if we opt to say that the judgment
or decision isn’t either one of those events, but rather
the more extended event that also includes the subsequent
System 1 practical reasoning, then that event isn’t an intro-
spectable one. So either way, there is no one event, here,
that is both introspectable and is a judgment/decision.
However, let me emphasize that the introspectable
events that are involved in System 2 processes are by no
means epiphenomenal. On the contrary. Nor, I should
stress, is metacognition itself epiphenomenal either, con-
trary to a claim Buckner et al. make about the commit-
ments of the target article. Quite the reverse. System 2
reasoning processes are shot through with – and are
largely dependent upon – metacognitive thoughts and
beliefs. And on any account, System 2 plays an important
part in human cognition and behavior (albeit one that is
subject to significant individual differences; see Stanovich
1999).
R10. The evidence from autism
The target article maintains that there is no convincing evi-
dence that in autistic subjects metacognition is preserved
while mindreading is damaged (sect. 10). This is contrary
to the claims of Goldman (2006) and Nichols and Stich
(2003), who cite such evidence in support of a “metacogni-
tion is prior” account, or a “two independent systems”
view, respectively. Williams, Lind, & Happe´ (Williams
et al.) agree with the target article in this respect, and
cite Williams and Happe´ (in press a) as demonstrating
that autistic children have equivalent difficulty attributing
intentions to themselves and to other people, with their
performance on these tasks being significantly correlated
with their performance on traditional false-belief tasks.
These new results are very welcome.
However, Williams et al. also cite evidence provided
by Williams and Happe´ (in press b), which is said to
favor a “one system, two modes of access” account over
my preferred “mindreading is prior” thesis. In a modified
version of the Smarties task, autistic children have signifi-
cantly greater difficulty with the “self” version of the task
than they do with the “other” version.4 Williams et al.
are mistaken in their interpretation of the significance of
their own data, however. This is surprising, since all of
the materials for a correct analysis are contained in the
very article that they cite (Williams & Happe´, in press
b), as I shall now explain. The upshot is that these new
data are fully consistent with a “mindreading is prior”
account.
Suppose, first, that autistic children lack the normal
mentalizing system altogether. (This seems to be the
preferred view of Williams & Happe´, in press b.) Such
children would therefore lack whatever basic “core knowl-
edge,” or innate module, or innate domain-specific learn-
ing mechanism underlies the development of mentalizing
abilities in normal children. Autistic children may never-
theless achieve some limited success in performance by
other routes – by means of explicit domain-general theo-
rizing, by memorizing rules and explicit strategies, and
so forth. If an account of this sort is correct, then data
from autistic subjects are inherently incapable of discrimi-
nating between the “mindreading is prior” and the “one
mechanism, two modes of access” views of the relationship
between mindreading and metacognition. For each of the
latter applies only to those people who possess a normal
(or near-normal) mentalizing system, or faculty. The
“mindreading is prior” account claims that there is just a
single mentalizing system, designed initially for mindread-
ing, which is turned upon the self to issue in metacogni-
tion. In contrast, the “one mechanism, two modes of
access” account, although agreeing that there is just a
single mentalizing system, claims that the system in ques-
tion has both perception-based and introspective channels
of access to the mental items in its domain. The former
predicts that no one with a normal mentalizing system
should possess mindreading competence but lack meta-
cognitive competence; whereas the latter predicts that
there might be individuals with a normal mentalizing
system who can mindread successfully but who lack a
capacity for metacognition, because the introspective
channel has been broken or disrupted. Importantly,
neither model makes any predictions about what might
happen in individuals who lack the normal mentalizing
system altogether, but who rather “hack” their way to
success by other methods. There might be all kinds of
reasons why it could be easier to develop rules and strat-
egies that apply to other people than it is to acquire such
rules to apply to oneself, as Williams and Happe´ (in
press b) themselves argue.
Now suppose, in contrast, that autistic children (or at
least those who are comparatively high functioning) do
possess a mentalizing system, only one that is significantly
delayed in its normal development (and is perhaps slower
and less reliable in its operations thereafter). And suppose
that the “mindreading is prior” account of that system is
correct. Still there might be reasons why individuals with
a partly formed mentalizing faculty should find some
mindreading tasks easier than parallel metacognitive
ones. For example, as Williams and Happe´ (in press b)
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themselves suggest, it may be that the perceptions of
action that provide the main input for mentalizing are
much more salient and easily accessible in the case of
others’ actions than in the case of one’s own actions.5
However, wouldn’t such an account predict (contrary to
fact) that normally developing children should likewise
pass mindreading tasks before they pass the equivalent
metacognitive ones? Not necessarily. For the recent data
mentioned in R3 suggest that a basic mentalizing compe-
tence is in place well before children start to be able to
pass verbal versions of mentalizing tasks, and that there
is some extraneous factor or factors that inhibit verbal per-
formance. And the latter might contain no bias in favor of
“other” versus “self” versions of the tasks. In the case of
autistic children, in contrast, it is the delayed development
of the mentalizing system itself that delays successful
performance, enabling a bias in favor of mindreading
over metacognition to display itself.
R11. Neuroimaging evidence
Lombardo, Chakrabarti, & Baron-Cohen (Lombardo
et al.) cite neuroimaging evidence showing that identical
neural regions are implicated in mentalizing about self
and other, and that there are no other areas of the brain
that are recruited specifically for mentalizing about self,
or about other. These data are very welcome, and
provide strong support for the “mindreading is prior”
model. This is because all three of the competing accounts
predict that there should be some brain regions used
specifically for mentalizing about oneself and/or brain
regions used specifically for mentalizing about others.
Lombardo et al. claim, however, that it is an implication
of the “mindreading is prior” account that the various
brain regions implicated in mentalizing should be acti-
vated to the same degree when mentalizing about the self
or about another. Because their data conflict with this
prediction, they take this to raise a puzzle for the view.
However, the “mindreading is prior” account makes no
such prediction. For it allows that different kinds of data
are implicated in the two forms of mentalizing. Specifi-
cally, mentalizing about the self can utilize visual and audi-
tory imagery, somatosensory experiences, and so forth, in a
way that mentalizing about others normally cannot. I
suggest that these differences are sufficient to explain
the different degrees of neural activation in question.
Nor, it should be stressed, does the “mindreading is
prior” account predict that mindreading tasks are always
performed in the same way (on the contrary; see sect.
R2). So the findings reported by Lombardo et al. – that
people tend to rely more on stereotypes when reasoning
about the mental states of dissimilar others, while
using simulation strategies when reasoning about the
mental states of people who are perceived to be similar to
themselves – raise no particular challenge for the account.
R12. The evidence from schizophrenia
The target article discusses the significance of the finding
that schizophrenic patients with “passivity” symptoms
have difficulties in attributing intentions to themselves
while being normal at reading the minds of others.
Nichols and Stich (2003) argue that this reveals a dis-
sociation between metacognitive and mindreading abil-
ities, whereas the target article suggests that the data are
better explained in terms of faulty or unusual experiences
being presented as input to an intact mindreading system.
In contrast, Wiffen & David cast doubt upon the
reliability of the data in question. If they are right, then
that makes a “mindreading is prior” account even easier
to defend.
Robbins, on the other hand, argues that schizophrenic
patients with paranoid symptoms seem to display the
contrary dissociation. For such patients perform poorly
in mindreading tasks of various sorts, whereas there is
no evidence (he tells us) that they show equivalent meta-
cognitive deficits. Wiffen & David present two such
strands of evidence, however. One is that schizophrenic
patients characteristically lack insight into their own
condition, which is (Wiffen & David claim) a failure of
metacognition. But here they weave a tangled story. For
although most if not all schizophrenic patients do
perform poorly on tests of mindreading and do lack
insight into their own illness, they appear to have no diffi-
culties in distinguishing between normal and psychotic
thoughts, feelings, and behavior in another person
(Startup 1997). This raises a puzzle. If the lack of insight
that these patients have into their own condition results
from poor mindreading abilities, then how is it that they
can nevertheless possess insight into the disordered
minds of others?
We can begin to unravel this puzzle by noting that even
if paranoid beliefs result partly from faulty mindreading,
they cannot result from faulty mindreading alone. There
must also exist a willingness to believe propositions
whose prior probability is very low, in some circumstances.
(Most of us may have entertained a paranoid thought or
hypothesis at one time or another, but have immediately
dismissed the idea as absurd.) And indeed, there is an
extensive body of literature demonstrating that people
with schizophrenia display a marked “jumping to con-
clusions” bias, forming beliefs from new data much more
swiftly and with higher degrees of confidence than do con-
trols. (See Blackwood et al. 2001, for a review.) Moreover,
the bias in question seems to be one of data-gathering
rather than a failure of probabilistic reasoning as such,
since patients with schizophrenia reason normally about
the plausibility of hypotheses that are presented to them,
or when presented with the same range of data that lead
normal individuals to formulate a new belief. This could
explain why patients with schizophrenia lack insight into
their own condition while showing insight into the con-
ditions of others. For in the first case they are forming a
paranoid belief from limited data, whereas in the latter
case they are assessing the prior probability of someone
else’s belief.
Wiffen & David’s other strand of evidence suggesting
that schizophrenic patients have parallel difficulties in
mindreading and metacognition is much more direct.
They cite the demonstration by Koren et al. (2004) that
schizophrenic patients do poorly on tests of metacognitive
ability (see also Koren et al. 2006). Specifically, Koren
et al. administered the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test to
patients with schizophrenia, while also asking them to
provide confidence ratings of their recent choices and
while allowing them to decide whether or not each
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sorting of the cards should count toward their final score
(and potential monetary gain). The patients performed
normally on the test itself, but displayed a marked deficit
on the metacognitive measures. Although this is not yet
an extensive body of data, it does suggest that deficits in
mindreading and metacognition are paired together in
schizophrenia, just as the “mindreading is prior” account
would predict.
R13. Some friendly suggestions
A number of commentaries are entirely friendly to the
approach taken in the target article, and hence need
only a brief mention. First, Evans uses the position
defended in the target article to resolve a tension in
many theorists’ thinking about dual systems of reasoning.
For System 2 is often characterized as a conscious
system, whereas we know that people’s reports of
System 2 processes are often confabulated. The solution
is to note that only the globally broadcast contents of
working memory are ever accessible to the mindreading
system that is responsible for self-report, whereas many
other aspects of System 2 processing will remain inaccess-
ible to it. The contents of working memory represent but
small islands of consciousness within the overall oper-
ations of System 2, leaving plenty of scope for confabula-
tion about the remainder.
Second, Huebner & Dennett emphasize the dangers
inherent in the use that is made of first-person pronouns
throughout the target article, as in, “I have access to my
own visual images,” or, “We do have introspective access
to inner speech.” For these seem to imply a place for the
self in the account, in addition to the various subpersonal
systems described (for language, for mindreading, and so
forth). Of course I intend no such thing. The outputs of
the mindreading system are passed along as input to a
variety of other systems, included in which is a language
production mechanism that might issue in a (covert or
overt) expression of the metarepresentational content in
question; that is all. While use of personal pronouns
in cognitive science is a handy fac¸on de parler, we need
to take care that their use is eliminable from the theories
in question. I have no doubt, however, that they can be
eliminated from all aspects of the “mindreading is prior”
account.
Third, Langland-Hassan offers a welcome corrective
to what I actually wrote in the target article, though not
to anything that I believe or really intended to say. I had
claimed that perceptual and quasi-perceptual states can
be self-ascribed without interpretation by virtue of being
globally broadcast. But Langland-Hassan points out that
the question whether the speech that I seem to hear
running through my head is my own or is really the
voice of another person, cannot be answered without
interpretation. For by hypothesis the mindreading
system has no access to my own articulatory intentions.
All it has access to is the resulting experience. Likewise
for the question whether a visual image that I am currently
entertaining is a memory-image or a fantasy-image. No
experience can wear its own provenance on its face.
Hence, describing myself as remembering the event
depicted will have to be based on an inference grounded
in aspects of the immediate context, feelings of familiarity,
and so forth. All of this is entirely correct. What I should
have said is that the contents of globally broadcast states
can be self-attributed without interpretation, but
interpretation is required for one to know to what kind
those states belong. This leaves untouched the claim that
the mindreading system has accessible to it data which it
can use when self-ascribing propositional attitude states
that are of no help in ascribing such states to other people.
R14. Behaviorism bites back
Catania offers a behaviorist alternative to my account,
citing the work of Skinner (1945; 1963). Likewise, Lewis
& Carpendale challenge the computationalist assump-
tions made by the target article, while criticizing me for
not taking account of the work of the later Wittgenstein.
I don’t believe that I should need to argue in support of
either cognitivism or computationalism, since both are
foundational assumptions of most of cognitive science. In
any case I don’t have the space to defend them here.
(See Gallistel & King [2009] for the definitive argument.)
In addition, I don’t believe that Wittgenstein’s work con-
tains any challenges that cognitive science cannot easily
answer. There is some irony, moreover, in the charge
that I should have paid more attention to Wittgenstein.
For I spent the first fifteen years of my academic career
focused on his philosophy, and much of that time was
devoted to the so-called private language argument that
Lewis & Carpendale refer to admiringly. This formed
the topic of my doctoral dissertation. I ultimately came
to believe that no version of the argument can be success-
ful that doesn’t already rely on anti-realist (e.g., behavior-
ist) or verificationist premises.
R15. Conclusion
I am grateful to my commentators for the care and atten-
tion they devoted to the target article. As a result, the
theoretical options have been further clarified, and the
“mindreading is prior” model of self-awareness has been
additionally elaborated and strengthened. At the very
least, that model will now need to be taken seriously by
anyone considering the nature of self-awareness and its
relationship to our mindreading abilities. And now that
the strengths and weaknesses of the four main theoretical
options have been clearly laid out, there is an urgent need
for additional experimental data that will enable us to dis-
criminate between them. As things stand, my own verdict
is that the “mindreading is prior” account is the one that is
best supported by the existing evidence (in part because it
is the most parsimonious). But future findings could
change all that.
NOTES
1. And then to respond to Lurz’s question why we should not
believe that thoughts as well as perceptual states can be globally
broadcast – raised also by Pereplyotchik – note that all of the
evidence we have of global broadcasting concerns perceptual
or quasi-perceptual events. And note, too, that the best estab-
lished models of general-purpose working memory require
the operation of one or another perceptual “slave system” –
either the phonological loop or the visuospatial sketch pad; see
Baddeley (1990).
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2. Although Kornell, Schwarz, & Son (Kornell et al.) make
a similar claim, in their case it is based on a misreading of my own
view. So far as I can tell, they mean by “metacognition” precisely
what I do.
3. Note that the behavior-guidance account of represen-
tational content proposed by Anderson & Perlis will also have
exactly this consequence, because epistemic feelings guide
action targeted on the world rather than on the animal’s own
mental states.
4. Note that this result is actually the reverse of the claims
made by Goldman (2006) and Nichols and Stich (2003). For
the data seem to show mindreading relatively intact while meta-
cognition is damaged. Lombardo et al. mention similar data in
respect of emotion understanding, showing that autistic people
do significantly worse on measures of understanding their own
emotions than they do on measures of understanding the
emotions of others.
5. Note, too, that explanations similar to those provided here
can accommodate the data cited by Lombardo et al. on autistic
people’s differential understanding of emotion in self and other.
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